Contents · Official record (SFU Summit)

Chapter 6. Excursus: Praxeological theory

In this short chapter, I examine the Austrian School of economics' methodology of praxeology. Praxeology is a methodology that claims that action, and its observation, are the only reliable indicators of knowledge. I explore praxeology here for a few reasons. For starters, it is the closest thing that thinkers associated with the Austrian School of economics have to a theory of knowledgemaking. By reading Ludwig von Mises' meandering attempts to confront the problem of human behaviour, we can see the historical and theoretical links to computational libertarian politics. The Austrian School is a critical intellectual foundation for the new right more broadly examined in this dissertation; as Melinda Cooper writes, "the paleolibertarian alliance–and its popular expression as the alt-right–lend themselves to both short-range and longue duree of analysis, as enduring symptoms of the American far right" (Cooper 2021, 31). Cooper argues that this alliance works precisely because paleoconservativism resolves the contradiction of libertarian freedom: namely, that

As long as it implied the protection of private property, a free market order needed some recognition of law and some institution capable of administering violence – a point that libertarians implicitly conceded when they turned to the solution of private militias and private law courts. Paleoconservatives offered libertarians a way out of this conundrum by acknowledging the fact that freedom from the state implied radical unfreedom in the social or private sphere, where rigorous gender and race hierarchies must hold sway (40).

I expand on Cooper's argument to use praxeology as an instance of historical and intellectual kinship between Silicon Valley and the alt-right. By positioning themselves in opposition to Keynesian macroeconomic models, empirical methods, and mainstream academic and governmental institutions, the Austrian School embodies the abstraction and the reduction of its own methodology and of the broader themes in this dissertation.

In dismissing all possibilities of observation, praxeology performs the very relationality it so seeks to problematize: by rejecting empirical data, historical contingency, and structural factors like race, gender, sexuality, and class, it becomes a necessarily anti-social ontology. In this atomism, it functions similarly to the "first principles" thinking discussed in the previous chapter: both projects emphasize fundamental truths or axioms as starting points for reasoning and decision-making, treating the social world as a computable problem amenable to algorithmic logic. Despite conceiving of itself as pure, unadulterated, and universal, the axiomatic approach of praxeology relies on exclusions and dominations through the violence of its abstraction. Praxeology provides a historical and theoretical grounding for the techno-libertarian emphasis on "first principles," extending it as an anti-social and often paranoid epistemology rooted in the paradoxical narrative of victimhood and dominance. In addition to Cooper's work, other historical work has explored in depth the historical and intellectual lineage between the Austrian School and Silicon Valley (See, e.g., Slobodian 2023, 2025; and Harris 2024, among others). This chapter instead functions as a gesture to the intellectual lineage traced throughout this dissertation.

The Austrian School

Along with Friedrich Hayek, von Mises and the Austrian School's work in Vienna in the 1920s is often credited as the birthplace of neoliberalism, especially with the publication of the latter's Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus (Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis) and Liberalismus (Liberalism) in 1922 and 1927 respectively. Ludwig von Mises, as then-secretary of the Vienna Chamber of Commerce, saw himself as an opponent of socialist and Marxist economic planning prominent in Austria at the time. Alongside Hayek and economist Fritz Machlup, von Mises ran seminars that positioned neoliberal economics as "the most important intellectual foe of scientific and technocratic socialism" (Plehwe 2009, 11) and later created the Austrian Institute of Economic Research. The seminar attendees were made up not only of traditional academics but a variety of intellectuals outside of the academy: "business intellectuals" such as Machlup and banker Alfred Schütz, alongside members of the Chamber that employed von Mises. The latter, alongside Hayek, was likewise not employed in the academy; the two earned their money by performing research on business cycles, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, to sell to Austrian financial firms (ibid). Yet the seminars proved popular, and the writings that emerged from it and its attendees spread quickly, first westward throughout Europe and later, with resonances to American journalist Walter Lippmann's The Good Society, a certain strain of liberal intellectualism rising in France (ibid. 13). Early Austrian economists, alongside Lippmann's stated democratic goals, positioned themselves as responses to fascist totalitarianism that had arisen through the 1930s in Germany and eastern Europe; von Mises, among others, took refuge in Switzerland's Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales and later to America.

The neoliberalism emerging from the Austrian School viewed itself as a response to both the Great Depression and the rise of fascist and communist political regimes. On the former, it opined that government economic intervention was partly the cause; on the latter, the role of the state as an organizing body was brought to question. As Miguel de Beistegui writes:

The very simple, yet highly effective idea it put forward in response to both is that any form of economic interventionism, whether it serves nationalist or socialist ends, leads to totalitarianism and to the erosion, if not the eradication, of individual freedom. There is, it claims, an intimate and necessary connection between political voluntarism in economic affairs, and tyranny. Conversely, there is a necessary connection between liberalism and democracy. This means that only liberalism can constitute a genuine protection against the rise of totalitarianism. Unsurprisingly, the Draft Statement of Aims of the Mont Pèlerin Society affirms that “each extension of the power of the state gradually erodes the minimum basis for the maintenance of a free society” (De Beistegui 2018, 65).

Teacher of Hayek, von Mises's work centring the Austrian School revolves around conceptions of praxeology as a general basis for the social sciences writ large. Praxeology is a mode of analysis based on the fundamental axiom that humans act, and all knowable information can be derived from observations that accord to this axiom. This emphasis on action-praxis runs through the mode of analysis of the School. The Austrian School places itself in opposition to Keynesian macroeconomic models, which arose in the context of the modern turn and, by the end of a 1930s marked by American president Franklin D. Roosevelt's Keynesian "New Deal," alongside general attempts of Western countries to recover from the effects of the Great Depression. The general genealogy as positioned by Austrian economists is of an academic project of relative obscurity in the face of global uptake of macroeconomic modelling. This "rebel" posture is part and parcel of the Austrian School's self-conception. As second-wave Austrian School economist Edwin G. Dolan claims, the Austrian School "was left to pursue an independent course in relative obscurity" (Dolan 1979 viii).

Reactionary knowledgemaking

This opposition is integral to the very operation of this form of knowledge creation. Rather than remain associated with their contemporaries and the general spread through society of Keynesian principles through academia, teaching, governmental and policy applications, the Austrian School aimed towards a larger project that is more interested in being correct than being applied. Dolan even goes so far as to frame this posture through the lens of science historian Thomas Kuhn's seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn argues that changes in the production of scientific knowledge are the result of a paradigm shift from "normal" to "extraordinary" science. As Dolan would have it, the rivals of the Austrian School in Keynesian economics perform what Kuhn would call a "normal science:"

We find that in contemporary economics, normal science is represented by work within the framework of the Keynesian-neoclassical synthesis. We can easily list many features characteristic of normal science. Communication among economists is primarily by means of journal articles presenting incremental contributions to knowledge rather than by means of books concerned with first principles. There is a well-established textbook tradition, and students are exposed to the original works of classical and contemporary economists only briefly and at a relatively advanced stage in their training (3).

For Dolan, then, part of the problem with mainstream economic thought is its very entrenchment in the "cathedral;" such a case leads to a lack of innovation, where economists pay "little explicit attention to such fundamental questions as what constitutes a valid problem or a valid solution in economic analysis" (4). Orthodox economics, in Dolan's critique, is focused on minutiae, ritually upholding its own orthodoxy–it is synoptic. Austrian economics, according to Dolan, contains a possible kernel not only of radical solution but an ability to avoid or revolutionize a sense of stagnation in knowledge, or innovation in the field of economics. Orthodox economists are bound by certain practices that sound quite like Yarvin's "cathedral;" the Austrian School, meanwhile, sees itself as functioning like a pre-blogosphere contrarian essayist collective:

In contrast to the majority of economists, the contributors to this volume on Austrian economics talk and act like people who are doing extraordinary science. They produce relatively more books and contribute fewer articles to established journals. They do not write textbooks; their students learn directly from the masters. They are very much concerned with methodological and philosophical fundamentals. And what makes the label extraordinary most applicable to their work is that they share a conviction that orthodox economics is at the point of breakdown, that it is unable to provide a coherent and intelligible analysis of the present-day economic world (4).

Where does Austrian economics gain this ability to elide the cathedralesque implications of orthodox economics? Through its fundamental principle of analysis, praxeology. The term is a coinage of Austrian School forefather Ludwig von Mises, and is carried throughout Austrian analysis. Rothbard, in the same volume as Dolan, writes

Praxeology rests on the fundamental axiom that individual human beings act, that is, on the primordial fact that individuals engage in conscious actions toward chosen goals… This concept of action contrasts to purely reflexive, or knee-jerk, behavior, which is not directed towards goals. The praxeological method spins out by verbal deduction the logical implications of that primordial fact. In short, praxeological economics is the structure of logical implications of the fact that individuals act (Rothbard 1979, 19).

Described as the "action axiom," praxeology makes a few assumptions about human nature (at least as they enable the particular economic analysis so desired by the Austrian School). It implies a constant sense of will, a directedness of action, and that any knowledge not emergent and logically traceable to a prime cause is invalid. Upon this basis all economic policy and decision-making can operate from this first principle as opposed to the maxims of econometrics, modelling, and other forms of macro-level analysis. The error in the latter, for Austrian economists, is one that manifests on the particular level through orthodox economics but is founded upon a logic that itself is incorrect, namely the principle of empirical verifiability. Rothbard again:

The modern empiricists ignore the necessary presuppositions of the very scientific method they champion … knowledge of such presuppositions is 'empirical' in the broadest sense (ibid. 29).

This principle is positioned as a kernel of absolutism and knowledge that Rothbard views as an extension of classical liberal economics. Rothbard refers to the writings of John Elliot Cairnes, a classical economist and disciple of economist J. S. Mill, who viewed the mission of economics as that similar to physics (with an advantage over the latter, gained through the a priori existence of the action axiom). For Cairnes, "the economist starts with the acknowledgement of ultimate causes. He is already, at the outset of his enterprise, in the position which the physicist only attains after ages of laborious research" (qtd. in Rothbard 26). This question of ultimate causes emerges as the "first principles" method detailed by von Mises.

Hayek's idea that "no single subject, mind, or central authority has complete knowledge of the world" (Halpern 2022, 335) emerges both in response to and as a call towards political reorganization. Praxeology was the Austrian School's attempts to rethink knowledge itself and, in turn, elevate economics to the status of a science that can indeed attend to ultimate causes, specifically in the realm of human behaviour. Hayek's 1945 essay, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," marked, according to Orit Halpern, a "battle on behalf of neoliberalism" (Halpern 2022, 334) to reconceive notions of knowledge not as some ideal to be attained but rather incomplete, and in turn only ever amenable to its dictates of self-organization through notions of this incompleteness. Her essay elucidates the central problematic of the Austrian School, the aforementioned failures of explanatory methods that seek to uncover macro-level explanations of human behaviour. It's well understood that Hayek, and the Austrian School more broadly, desired to move away from macro explanations as a response to totalitarianism: "Hayek's obsession," Halpern continues, "was thus modelling the world as one of self-organizing adaptive systems to counter the idea of planned and perfectly controllable political (in his mind totalitarian) orders" (352). Yet this attempt to elide macro-level systems of thought through the first principle of action (the two thus posited against each other) itself reduced explanatory mechanisms to a type of mechanical calculation.

Praxeology as philosophy

In 1949's Human Action, von Mises' purest treatment of the praxeological method, he gives the concept a philosophical weight. The book opens with weighty goals, with von Mises approaching the situation as a revolution in the understanding of "mankind's destiny and evolution" (von Mises 1996, 1) that succeeds where philosophy, mathematics, psychology, and logic have failed. Von Mises describes a failure for philosophy to capture what motivates human action towards a singular goal, and dismisses the complexity of macrological explanations as a form of epistemic floundering. Religion and humanity are "desperate shifts" to explain that which praxeology already can. Similar macrological explanations are, off the bat, dismissed by von Mises as they appear in governance or forms of political action; these are described, by von Mises, as the inability to discover the "regularity and invariance of phenomena" in aspects of social cooperation in the same manner as they are discovered in logic or physics. While these previous methods supposedly banked on the "moral failure of man" to explain their possible falsification, von Mises points to "the discovery of the inescapable interdependence of market phenomena" as a paradigm shift from a moralistic perspective to one that posits a singular grounding truth of the relative unknowability of anything that exceeds the individual as viewed from without. Yet this very method of eliding macro-level systems belies a certain formation of reason that encompasses a similar property of subjectivity available to the individual, restating a property of the liberal subject. "Choosing determines all human decisions," von Mises writes:

In making his choice man chooses not only between various material things and services. All human values are offered for option. All ends and all means, both material and ideal issues, the sublime and the base, the noble and the ignoble, are ranged in a single row and subjected to a decision which picks out one thing and sets aside another. Nothing that men aim at or want to avoid remains outside of this arrangement into a unique scale of gradation and preference (3)

Praxeology thus aims to be a general science, and in turn, a general logic. Yet this focus on action immediately gives way to a more universal agenda of logocentrism, where action is both the necessary and sufficient condition of knowledgemaking. It is Peterson's maxim, discussed earlier, about action being the index of moral judgment scaled through economics onto the human. Under the action axiom, all possible outputs of the social process are flattened, stripped of their particular materiality and reduced to propositions on a causal chain. This is, as Deleuze contends, a result of axiomatization. Axioms are always social: they do not exist in themselves. Axioms act as a macro-level understanding of a set of phenomena. In a 1980 seminar, Deleuze describes how axiomatics are "treatments" of systems of objects. Rather than existing as qualified prior to the object in phenomena, as the Austrians would claim, axiomatics are those very things. They are intimately involved in actively determining or giving form to those things that they are applied to, the "untreated elements" that we might consider as the input to an algorithmic form of knowledge construction (Deleuze 1980, 9). Thus an axiomatic, rather than exist as a form of shaping phenomena, rather exists as a mode of things already-representative of a particular logic.

We see this in von Mises' attempts to treat a wide range of both ideologies and methodologies with the Austrian axiomatic. He lumps together Marxist ideology, historicism, and "irrationalism" and, in doing so, dismisses them: Marxism is, according to von Mises, a "polylogism," in its positing that reason and logic differ according to class position and thinking. "Historicism" likewise errs in positing that reason is contingent on historical moments; "racial polylogism" and "irrationalism" likewise fail in how they cede the possibility of universal understanding to a belief in human behaviour as an inherently rational thing. Yet von Mises positions praxeology as a necessary bulwark against any attempts to universalize, while excluding the base principles of praxeology from this critique–"omniscience is denied to man," he claims, in a section that precedes an argument that economic policy is solely responsible for progress in the natural sciences that has "heaped benefits upon the masses" (9).

The racism comes in soon in the form of a colonialist argument for his economics as an extension of colonial reason. This is the project of the Austrian School: one where post-Humeian empiricists fail in their movement to Keynesianism. This leads to discourses of victimhood:

The characteristic feature of this age of destructive wars and social disintegration is the revolt against economics. Thomas Carlyle branded economics a “dismal science,” and Karl Marx stigmatized the economists as “the sycophants of the bourgeoisie.” Quacks—praising their patent medicines and short cuts to an earthly paradise—take pleasure in scorning economics as “orthodox” and “reactionary.” Demagogues pride themselves on what they call their victories over economics. The “practical” man boasts of his contempt for economics and his ignorance of the teachings of “armchair” economists (von Mises 9).

Victimized, in his view, unfairly, because of its crucial role in Western civilization:

It must be emphasized that the destiny of modern civilization as developed by the white peoples in the last two hundred years is inseparably linked with the fate of economic science. This civilization was able to spring into existence because the peoples were dominated by ideas which were the application of the teachings of economics to the problems of economic policy. It will and must perish if the nations continue to pursue the course which they entered upon under the spell of doctrines rejecting economic thinking (von Mises 10).

This analytic emerges from von Mises' conception of human society as "an outcome of human action, i.e., of a conscious aiming at the attainment of ends" (Von Mises 1996, 145). Von Mises frames enlightenment rationalism and liberalism as the originary epistemologies to discard the macro-level explanations for phenomena, giving it a tone of ethical imperative (while disavowing the possibility of an ethics itself): "[e]very step by which an individual substitutes concerted action for isolated action results in an immediate and recognizable improvement in his conditions" (146). This means that action itself creates society as an output in a determinate manner: "society is a product of human action, i.e. the human urge to remove uneasiness as far as possible" (ibid.). In praxeology's algorithmic nature—steps leading to an understood and definite outcome on a social level—we find a flaw in the methodology's supposed claims to eliding larger-scale macro structures and epistemologies (or what von Mises refers to as "metaphysics"). While the political-economic tradition von Mises clings to "consisted in the complete demolition of all metaphysical doctrines concerning the origin and the operation of social cooperation" by substituting an "autonomous rational morality for the heteronomous and intuitionist ethics of older days" (ibid.), it replaces this with a faith in rational action, specifically its ability to always result in the ideal society, one that preserves individual desire alongside a faith that the best society is one wherein this desire is preserved.

This algorithmic logic supports the structure of human society as "purposeful cooperation;" it is also the same logic that preserves the synonymity of intelligence and rationality that allows the system and its acolytes to justify itself. For von Mises, not only is economics a regulating and inextricable force for social good, but its very status as such places its adherents in a position of victimhood. Mainstream hegemony brings forward a particular subject position wherein those (white, modern, civilized) ideals are allowed to deteriorate in the name of the mass. This extends to von Mises' descriptions of contemporary economics' desire to assert the authority of the market in human and social realms. The "welfare propagandists" of von Mises' time err in their invocation of "metaphysical principles" of morality. He diagnoses the problematic as a causal chain that, for the subjects of his critique, results in a deferral of authority to "state, government, society, or other cleverly designed synonyms for the superhuman dictator" (von Mises 1996, 853). What their work instead reveals, according to von Mises, is that "human wants are practically unlimited" (ibid). Von Mises is thus arguing here that, even in its supposedly base and incorrect applications, economics is about desire and its measurement, specifically the desire for easiness, for smoothness, for solutions.

Libertarian axiomatics

Kuhn's concept of revolutionary science, as a practitioner's subject position, contains a possible unorthodox or outsider perspective. Central to Kuhn's argument is a critique of the idea that a pure language of science existed; while empirical facets of phenomena are described across sciences using "protocol statements" in pure language that describe immediate experience, Kuhn argues–in a manner similar to the Austrian School's attempts to discredit empirical sciences–that such ideas fail because language itself is contingent to the scientific epochs that give rise to it. "For Kuhn," Steingart writes, "words were attached to nature only within a given paradigm. For the historian, this meant that scientific concepts could not be assumed to remain the same across paradigms" (Steingart 2023, 175).

Such a perspective–of the potential power of scientific discourse to shift conceptions of knowledge–has been cynically adopted by the right. This suspicion of any macrological explanation has direct political effects. Describing a "post-modern Right," Mark Andrejevic looks at media-political ploys to describe an abandonment of this very supposed process of distillation in knowledge: "if scientific knowledge is replaced by the more general category of fact- or research-based claims, the pattern is becoming a familiar and oft-bemoaned one in American politics," he writes. "In each case, the goal is not so much to propose an authoritative counter-narrative as to use the expanded media space to engulf any dominant narrative in possible alternatives … not to 'speak truth to power' but to highlight the contingency, indeterminateness, and, ultimately, the helplessness of so-called truth in the face of power" (Andrejevic 2013, 26). This is a self-defeating discourse, usually invested in the maintenance of existing power relations–the truth buttresses the state of affairs and preexisting situation, else it would not have any power in itself. And this hewing to the truth is, in essence, a farcical mode of critique, stripped of its own revolutionary power–"when the truth crumbles around you, the assumption is that you'll still be holding the reins" (ibid.). From here, we can see the possible adoption of first principles as creating more uncertainty for the concentration of power.

These reins emerge partly from the dreams of the Austrian economists who inform first principles thinking. The reins, in this sense, are a form of power precisely because they remain impervious to outside critique, preexisting hegemonic situations self-justifying their own discourses of truth. Thus intelligence is set up as a disinfectant, in critique's ability to appeal to the possibility of truth's emergence as revolutionary; in this very gambit, the "reins" that remain give the illusion of truth winning out in the end, obscuring its fallibility. Hence the "seeing behind the illusion" of the red pill: the cleverness, or particular reactionary intellect, associated with it is not only grounded in preexisting hegemonic power as an axiomatic from which claims of facticity need no justification. Nothing behind the red pill is ever actually new. It is always a semiosis that signifies the already-existing regimes of power; its own cultural positioning comes from the very reiteration of needing to know more, of progress being a veil over the conservative and logocentric notions of what should be (we see this obsession with classical, especially eschatological, notions of the "actually true" in a later chapter dealing with René Girard and his "things hidden since the foundation of the world" (Girard 2000)). Neoliberalism's supposed abandonment of enlightenment conceptions of the individual belie something even more atomistic. As Halpern contends, the Austrian School replaced the reasonable, liberal human subject with a conception of human reason that synthesizes distributed intelligence and the market as a primarily distributive technology (Halpern 2022, 335).

Erickson et al. argue that this emerges from Cold war communication practices and the development of early algorithmic theory (Erickson et al. 2013). Prior to the development of cold war-era communications infrastructures (and extending from mathematical theories of communication, pioneered by Claude Shannon and Norbert Wiener), reason was conceived as a human quality separate from mechanical thinking–for example, when Charles Babbage was developing the "Analytical Engine," widely considered the precursor to digital computing, he wrote that the possible mathematical computation it might inaugurate must be distinguished from "the domain of understanding … reserving for the pure intellect that which depends on the reasoning faculties" (qtd. in Erickson et al. 31). This conception of reasoning soon gave way to what they call "cold war rationality," which incorporated these ideas into the ephemerality of the self. The shift in the meaning of rule from model to algorithm informs first principles thinking: (social-scientific) models are representative yet grounded in reality, and serve to represent or bring to knowledge and perception a particular object of knowledge; the algorithm, as an extension of rationality's reification, removes the possibility for phenomena to form any new representations. Cold war rationality developed through the

shared assumption, rarely examined but always fundamental, that whatever rationality was, it could be stated in algorithmic rules–whether these were strategies in game theory, the consistency specifications of personal utilities, linear programming code, actuarial formulas for clinical decisions, or cognitive representations (Erickson et al. 2013, 30).

Steingart, writing on a speech delivered by Hayek in 1956 on the "dilemma of specialization," claims that Hayek "did not object to theoretical studies out of hand, but he rejected scientism as the model for social sciences" (Steingart 2023, 3). This attachment to axiomatics was part and parcel of the Austrian School's attempts, alongside general postwar intellectual thought, to respond to totalitarianism. Bernhard Dionysus Geoghegan, writing on the development of the concept of code in cybernetic and structuralist thought, frames code as an attempt to "clean the non-measurable from communication" (Geoghegan 2023, 7). For cybernetic thinkers, this code was likewise an attempt to correct for the possibility of the totalitarian error in World War II; cybernetics emerged from this war against possible war and its technological solution. Efforts emerged in wartime: what Galison calls the "Manichean science" mobilized operations research, cybernetics, and game theory in order to develop a possible axiomatics for conflict with an unknowable enemy (Galison 1994, 233). Cybernetics, as MIT scientist and mathematician Norbert Wiener coined it, was to be a science of command and control: communication was seen, extending from Wiener’s colleague Michael Shannon's mathematical theory, to be an issue of separating signal from noise. The noise, in this moment, is the crowd–it is that which cannot be determinately controlled or understood through the pure rational and actionable knowledge given by the game-theoretical matrix.

Axiomatics are invested in a singular, grand explanation as an antidote to perceived totalities. And while structuralism necessarily posits the existence of forces outside of the individual, and on the face of it appears to create models, it similarly attempts to abstract that which cannot be measured. The midcentury mathematicians from whom the social scientists like Hayek borrowed axiomatics, a tradition to which Wiener and Shannon among others contributed (Steingart 2023, 86). Steingart refers to Theodore Porter's seminal work on the development of quantitative methods as part of the project of axiomatics, "whereby 'trust in numbers' was commensurate with objectivity" (5). Objectivity here becomes the condition of possibility for knowledge itself, grounded in conceptions of the certainty of the senses. These early 20th century mathematicians were focused on axiomatics insofar as they served to further the epistemological validity of quantification, extending from objectivity. Both trust and objectivity in numbers persist.

Yet rather than standing in opposition, quantification gives way to–is borne from–axiomatization, specifically its stated ability to reduce and deal with those things quantified from the distances of abstraction. "It was not quantification per se that rendered the social sciences amenable to mathematization," Steingart writes, "nor a belief in the objective nature of numbers, but, more fundamentally, a faith in abstraction as a central methodology" (Steingart 2023, 5). Abstraction here allowed for the mathematicians and social scientists that took up abstraction to create distance from the "real" world, where social and political disaster existed in the moment, while also claiming that their work was integral to the technologies and theories that defined American life. This contradiction allowed for "epistemic room to maneuver creatively while denying any ideological stance," which entailed adopting knowledge as "universalized and generalized theories" that placed the formal consistency of a theory–its formalism–above the phenomenological correspondence (that is, its ability to correspond with the world at large).

Heterodoxy and victimhood

First principles or axiomatic thought thus emerges as a perceived bulwark to what Andrejevic terms "infoglut" (Andrejevic 2013), what Halpern, Jagoda et al. term "surplus data" (Halpern et al. 2022), or what Hong refers to as "recessive objects" (Hong 2020). These terms all describe a certain property of contemporary social uses of data, where the data's appearance as objective, immediately indexical, has instead morphed into an ether that exceeds human knowability. The existence of these things beyond individual perception betrays the formalism of algorithmic knowledge; it likewise attempts to, as many have argued, lead to a particular form of sensemaking that blurs the line between conspiratorial thinking and legitimate critique (Tuters and Willaert 2022; Bruns, Harrington, and Hurcombe 2020).

It's in this victim status, I propose, that we can begin to explore the nexus between first principles, libertarian thought, and contemporary configurations of the alt-right. It partially emerges from the Austrian School's self-positioning as heterodox to mainstream economic thought. Von Mises himself considered himself victimized by his contemporaries in economic thought–Rothbard, who studied under von Mises, once described him as having been discriminated against in academic hiring because he was opposed to socialism and collectivism "and there were only two kinds of economists or social scientists who received paid university posts in Austria at the time, either Marxists or fascists" (Rothbard 1990). This victim narrative emerges from the early Mont Pelerin Society's meetings and the relative outsider status; we see similarities throughout cultural movements that extend from the libertarian, neoliberal modes of thought of these moments. Von Mises adopts a victim position for white, colonial culture in Human Action, where his form of economics is a necessary bulwark to preserve "the destiny of modern civilization as developed by the white peoples" (von Mises 1996, 10).

The praxeological framework presents itself as a means of grounding economic and social analysis in an undeniable axiom: conscious human action toward chosen goals. Positioned as a "primordial fact", this first principle aims to deduce logical implications to build a structure of analysis, distinct from and opposed to empirical methods, macroeconomic models, and mainstream academic institutions. This self-proclaimed heterodoxy and pursuit of "extraordinary science" against what is framed as the stagnant orthodoxy of Keynesianism reveals a fundamental anti-social ontology. In focusing solely on the rational, purposeful action of the individual, praxeology–like first principles–treats the social world as a computable problem, seeking a universal, axiomatic logic akin to physics or programming languages. This perspective inherently dismisses methodologies and ideologies that posit a contingent or non-universal understanding of reason or social dynamics, lumping together critiques like Marxism, historicism, and irrationalism as flawed "polylogisms" that deviate from the necessary belief in the universality of rational action, and in this sense is yet another project of colonial universality.

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