Chapter 4. First principles, mimesis, and Silicon Valley ideology — Fear of mimesis
Contents · Official record (SFU Summit)
Chapter 4. First principles, mimesis, and Silicon Valley ideology
Peter Thiel's relationship to Donald Trump's presidential campaigns was spotty. He donated $1 million USD in Trump's first election bid, and spoke at the Republican National Convention in Trump's support. Elon Musk, meanwhile, donated $50 million to attack campaigns in the 2022 U.S. midterms, and $10 million to Ron DeSantis' campaign for Florida governor in 2023. As discussed in the introduction, Musk's efforts were directly rewarded with the announcement that he would co-lead a "department of government efficiency," tasked with reducing the economic footprint of government to a lean, profitable machine. Cost is the singular element around which all decisions are made.
This singularism is reflected in their philosophy of operating from "first principles," or axioms from which any business decision can be made. Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Peter Thiel have all made this idea a core element of their business philosophy, expressing it as a means to avoid the supposed errors of what Musk calls "analogical thinking" (2013), Bezos "proxies" (2016), and Thiel "formulas" (2014). In other words, first principles stand as an antidote to the knowledge of the crowd. They represent the possibility of getting around the significations of knowledge's circulation: a first principle is that which is true prior to any other propositions or assumptions. Empiricism–the deduction of actionable knowledge through observable, shared experiences and phenomena–is replaced by a form of axiomatic, logocentric thought or action-praxis. Musk, for example, calls first principles "fundamental truths" (Innomind 2013). Bezos, in a 2016 letter to shareholders, talks about the fear of analogical thinking: for him, the first principle of business is to act as if it is "day one," and in turn avoid "managing by proxy" (Bezos 2016). Thiel, meanwhile, espouses faith in first principles as both the process and the principle of Silicon Valley business development (Thiel and Masters 2014). Beyond the business world, first principles are intimately tied to conceptions of intelligence in computational circles: a 2024 white paper written by Friston et. al. and sponsored by their employer, artificial intelligence company VERSES, describes an attempt to deduce "fundamental properties of intelligence" from the nature of physical systems, or first principles (Friston et al. 2024, 2).20
In this chapter, I explore the political implications of "first principles" thought, specifically its interplay with anti-democratic, neoreactionary, and alt-right politics. I do so through a reading of the historical development of first principles thought and its connection with conceptions of individualism, sovereignty, and intelligence. Reflecting technological solutionism's technocratic social vision, I argue that first principles thought presents society as an algorithmic problem to be solved, based on axioms that resemble programming languages themselves. This understanding of society is motivated by the desire to render the world intelligible–and in turn, for these self-styled intellectuals, available to master in the same terms as computation more generally. First principles thinking and its libertarianism sees the social world as organized into natural hierarchies of domination, setting up dreams of inevitable "escape" through the lens of what Schneider calls a "politics of no politics" (Schneider 2023, 4256). No politics, for the Western (especially American) world, is in reality a politics of the default and its hegemons, alongside their traces in history: white, classically liberal, kyriarchal.
What does this have to do with Silicon Valley libertarianism and first principles? As part of the general spirit of cyber-Californian frontierism, this politics of no politics promises a certain freedom that extends from discourses of the early internet. As mentioned in the introduction, these discourses themselves extend from 1960s conceptions of California and the western coast of the United States as a possible new frontier for democratic freedom (Turner 2006, 104). Personal computing provided political activists in the 1960s with the means to express a conception of selfhood that existed outside of dominant Western cultural narratives. Rather than the large calculators designed for industry and government, this new culture dictated a different vision for computing, one that would facilitate this greater self-expression and a radical political awakening contra more established forms. An explosion of workers and intellectuals involved in early computing research moved to Palo Alto, California in the 1960s to avoid military conscription. With the emergence of businesses like Intel and Apple in what soon became Silicon Valley, this contrast in political outlook was soon reflected in the development of personal computers. The hippies in charge of the work itself viewed the potential of computers differently—as communication mediums rather than “arithmetic machines” (Markoff 2005). Computers, as pioneers such as Doug Engelbart envisioned them, would not be tools for human use but would become extensions of human intelligence themselves (ibid.). The technical work of computational development was itself cultural, and industrial computing soon became a metaphor for oppressive and opaque systems against which the new left rallied. Student protest movements in the 1960s were fueled by a generalized disdain for the impersonal “machines” of administrative bureaucracy. As Fred Turner tells us, “the corporate world, the university, the military, and the punch-card universe of information seemed to be mirrors of one another. Each presented the otherwise whole and authentic individual with a world in which he or she must pare away some part of his or her self in order to participate” (Turner 2006, 12). Personal computing, on the other hand, transformed the mainframe arithmetic machines of the bureaucracy “into tools with which individuals could improve their own lives” (Turner 2006, 103). Computers became, then, tools for expressing and achieving the “authentic” self in the same manner as the cultural practices of the era.
Part of this involved physical escape. Stewart Brand, a forefather of hippie computational culture, briefly dabbled in space colonization before returning to earth and focusing on cyberspace frontierism (Turner 2006, 104). As we have seen so far, this historical script has been flipped on its head. No longer is it the hippies, the leftists, the revolutionaries, and the marginalized dreaming of social reform and restructure; no longer is it visions of ameliorated social structures, but a paranoid one full of billionaire bunkers, express wishes for sovereign control, and the exit from–rather than the improvement of–society.
One such instance of this contemporary politics of escape is the Thiel-backed Seasteading Institute, which is focused on the construction of “startup communities that float on the ocean with any measure of political autonomy” (Institute 2024). Techno-solutionist ideals abound on the Institute’s website, where seasteading is described as “disruptive”, “visionary”, and “proof that tomorrow will look nothing like today.” What, exactly, is seasteading running from? Why the need to “allow new forms of community with a fresh start and an ability to experiment as to form”? Seasteading is explicitly a form of “exit” from society, specifically preexisting government structures. Taking the concept of the sovereign as a metaphysical truth, seasteaders seek to escape the jurisdiction of preexisting states by taking advantage of the fact that sovereign law extends only 200 nautical miles from shore.
The stated political views and desires that motivate seasteading line up with broader Silicon Valley bunker projects in terms of their apocalyptic vision and their conception of sovereignty. Contractors constructing Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg's private compound on Hawaii's northernmost island of Kaua'i sign NDAs, are assigned to different projects, and kept in the dark about what other crews are working on (Scrimgeour 2023). Peter Thiel's own plans to build a bunker-style complex on property that he owns in New Zealand were put on hold by the region's local council in 2022 (McClure 2022); he is one of many tech CEOs (others include OpenAI CEO Sam Altman) who envisions, as LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman puts it, New Zealand as a "favoured refuge in the event of a cataclysm" (O’Connell 2018).21 While we'll deal more at length with ideas of apocalypticism in a later chapter, I want to focus on the function served by this vision of retreat and what sort of work this conception of sovereignty entails.
In this chapter I examine the thought that motivates this desire to escape the demos. I investigate how these visions of replacement involve a search for self-sustaining power, emergent from a felt knowledge and mastery over the logos–to understand the social as a computational system.
Fear of flows
Reasoning behind operating from the perspective of "first principles" is a belief in a sort of seed of knowledge, an algorithmic process that understands reasoning itself as not a (re)generative social activity but instead emergent from the metaphysics of an Enlightenment understanding of the person, possessing capabilities of reason that are analogous to operating rationally, like physics or computational logic gates. Elon Musk's fear of analogy and Peter Thiel's fear of the knowledge of the crowd stems from the fact that they appear to obscure pure knowledge and the action of getting things done. The thing being done is not solely the day-to-day operations of their business but the achievement and post-hoc justification of their own philosophy of first principles, a logic that recursively sets up and justifies its own desire for an axiom.
In a 2013 interview, Elon Musk describes first principles methodology as "a kind of physics way of looking at the world." When one thinks according to first principles, they "boil things down to the most fundamental truths and say, 'what are we sure is true?' or 'sure as possible is true' and then reason up from there…" (Innomind 2013). First principles extends beyond particular business decisions, however, and wraps them up with life itself. In the same interview:
The normal way that we conduct our lives is we reason by analogy. We're doing this because it's like something else that was done, or it's like what other people are doing. It's a slight iteration on a theme, and it's mentally easier to reason by analogy rather than from first principles.
To what end does this serve? Innovation, specifically in the discourse of the "new," the regenerative:
So somebody could say, in fact, people know that battery packs are really expensive and that's just the way they'll always be because that's the way they've been in the past. You're like, "Well, no, that's pretty dumb." Because if you apply that reasoning to anything new, then you wouldn't be able to ever get to that new thing, right?22
For Musk, reasoning by analogy impedes technical progress, which is attached to innovation, to genesis, to the new. On the face of it, this seems to emerge from a rejection of tradition in the name of logic: to illustrate his point about the supremacy of first principles, he uses an analogy that likens Tesla's innovative sourcing of lithium-ion batteries over gasoline cars to the shift from horse transportation to a similar "innovation" of gasoline cars–both, supposedly, went against the dictates of the crowd, and both were successes precisely because of this reframing. It is a form of market rebellion where the market, a symbolic and representative mass, becomes amenable to being "gamed" in certain manners through a distillation to its physics. Possessing the reasoning ability to identify its underlying logics means being able to work it like a program while existing outside of it. It is a rebellion built out of a sense of superior reasoning ability.
Peter Thiel likewise associates thinking through first principles with intellectual power. In the introduction to his book "Zero to One," he says that "the single most powerful pattern I have noticed is that successful people find value in unexpected places, and they do this by thinking about business from first principles instead of formulas" (Thiel and Masters 2014). Thiel's misunderstanding (first principles in physics are formulas) is telling ofthe totalizing aims of first principles thought. While the formula is used as-needed, the first principle brackets all that is formulaic about its own legitimacy. Latent in this conception of first principles is a similar avoidance of mimesis. Setting up a dichotomy of "horizontal" and "vertical" progress, Thiel writes:
When we think about the future, we hope for a future of progress. That progress can take one of two forms. Horizontal or extensive progress means copying things that work–going from 1 to n. Horizontal progress is easy to imagine because we already know what it looks like. Vertical or intensive progress means doing new things–going from 0 to 1.
The first principle is the zero, the apparently naive state that only logical progression, as opposed to mimetic knowledge, can fulfill. On the one hand, it is seemingly unimaginable, cannot be generated through the knowledge of the crowd–boiling down to first principles is presented as a clean slate from which things can be regrown logically. Horizontal progress is presented as a sort of easy progression, one where the path forward is already laid out through empirical knowledge (gained by looking aside) and through imitation, mimicry, already at hand in contrast to the generativity of first principles. Vertical progress, on the other hand, is the "new"–it is doing "new things." It is the prior form by which things can then be treated through the lens. Yet in its reduction to axiomatization, it gains power over the very possibility of mimesis–it is positioned as the original, the thing that engenders the copies that "work." The logic is algorithmic, and by extension, technological. "The single word for vertical, 0 to 1 progress is technology," he writes. Technology is the repeatable disruptor, the thing that can start anew, can always autogenetically instantiate itself–it lacks any relational element.
This view gives Thiel's philosophy of technology a certain speculative, exponential meaning. Thiel again:
New technology has never been an automatic feature of history. Our ancestors lived in static, zero-sum societies where success meant seizing things from others … after 10,000 years of fitful advance from primitive agriculture to medieval windmills and 16th-century astrolabes, the modern world suddenly experienced relentless technological progress.
Viewing technology as salvation from a "zero-sum," Malthusian past, Thiel pushes into technology the possibility of exponentialism in the realm of progress:
The smartphones that distract us from our surroundings also distract us from the fact that our surroundings are strangely old: only computers and communications have improved dramatically since midcentury. That doesn’t mean our parents were wrong to imagine a better future—they were only wrong to expect it as something automatic. Today our challenge is to both imagine and create the new technologies that can make the 21st century more peaceful and prosperous than the 20th.
Yet this vision in technological progress belies the apocalyptic visions as given earlier. The impetus to first principles thought is not only a path forward, but a borderline necessary one that hews closer to a computational vision of truth with logical validity as its only criterion.
The prime mover and the sovereign
First principles is, more broadly, an attempt to render social phenomena as amenable to calculative or computational means of problem-solving. It is indeed a "physics-based way of viewing the world," if here we view the world as a construction of enclosed knowledge, a metaphysics and a logos underlying all possible modes of meaning-making (in another term, conspiratorial). First principles thinking, in its reduction of social phenomena to fundamental axioms, mirrors the epistemic stance of algorithmic and cybernetic systems thinking: a belief that complex social dynamics can be rendered informational and thus calculable (or, as early cyberneticist Norbert Wiener put it, amenable to "bookkeeping" (Wiener, Hill, and Mitter 2019, 60)). This approach resonates with cybernetic attempts to formalize feedback and control, as well as with algorithmic manipulation techniques that act upon simplified models of user behaviour. In this way, first principles logic does not stand apart from algorithmic rationality, but functions as its philosophical substrate—a metaphysical belief in total legibility, often shading into conspiratorial interpretations of the world as ultimately knowable and manipulable. Etymologically, it has its roots in scientific knowledgemaking. The concept of ab initio, Latin for "from the beginning," emerged alongside work on quantum mechanics. Ab initio approaches prove useful in quantum theory because, as a methodology, they are independent of experimental data. Instead, the Schrödinger equation (which seeks to describe the behaviour of subatomic particles) is used as a fundamental law, or axiom, in order to then determine behavioural patterns of wave particles that exist on the quantum level (Griffiths 2005). Ab initio reasoning enables, for example, the ability to describe the behavioural patterns of electrons through pure computational calculation, eliding the need for experimental data to support a truth claim (Pokluda et al. 2015, 129). First principles, then, describe a form of knowledge that can thus arise purely through derivation and analysis from a given axiom. While quantum mechanics grounds its first principles methodologies in Schrödinger's equation, the term and its conception of primary emergence has a history in the Western philosophical canon: Aristotelian metaphysics describes a set of cosmological entities, the "unmoved movers," who rule the circulation of the planets that orbit around the Earth; these superintelligent, incorporeal entities, divine intelligences separated from the realm of matter. Derrida reads Aristotle's unmoved movers as tools that bring into language the conception of both the ideas of change and causality, and the relation between agency and the self. "The actuality of this pure energy sets everything in motion," he writes in Rogues, "a motion of return to self, a circular motion" (Derrida 2005, 15). The prime mover–God, the monarchic sovereign, what Derrida calls the "phallo-paterno-filio-fraterno-ipsocentric" (17)–is itself the capability to end time, a power over its march and over its tendency to change and to grant responsibility to the agent of change. The prime mover is the ultimate sovereign, and its very trace in the concept of the democratic subject instills a "certain sovereignty" (24) that relates to more collective or democratic imaginations of a sense of human power over causality in time. In the moment of the conception of this sovereignty, time itself in its sensuous nature, its chain of effects, ends as an experience of the affective. It shifts subjecthood from a mode of being acted-upon into a spontaneous cause of subsequent actions. For Derrida, then, the concept of sovereignty exists as a power over the march of causal time or a certain Hegelian history that ends in the declaration of material sovereign power and, by extension, subjecthood.
The spectre of the prime mover hangs over conceptions of sovereignty under democratic order, and thinking through the prime mover brings us to the political-subjective content of first principles thought. Embedded in the Western canon, it is the root of the conception of logos; while democracy is the play of subjects possessing a sense of sovereignty, the prime mover as this subject's exemplar locates conceptions of order in a singular intelligence outside of the material, analogous to reason and privileging it as a formalizing force. The prime mover takes its political form in conceptions of the monarchical sovereign–sovereignty as the first principle, or power to cause, the source code of the social order.23 In the next few pages, I weave this conception back through Silicon Valley cultures and neoliberalized conceptions of the individual, and how these relate to programming culture's play with logos. First principles enact these conceptions of the prime mover. Despite the emphasis, detailed here and later, on the supposed subject-annihilating effects of the macrological or the mimetic, first principles thought allows us to begin to understand the form that “theory” takes in the Californian ideology: it is a tool to illuminate the chain of causality that emerges from the prime mover. Theory’s aim here is to end itself, a question with one answer that can be arrived at programmatically. The executor of this program is none other than the CEO (which is, for example, Curtis Yarvin's solution for political disarray (Yarvin 2008b)).
Instrumental critique
From here, we can begin to answer the question about this ideological similarity to critical theory. Critiques of liberal bureaucracy are part and parcel of the critical-theoretical tradition, beginning especially with the Frankfurt School. Theodor Adorno, in Negative Dialectics, contended that bureaucratic reason classifies and ossifies the individual, dismissing the possibilities of subjecthood in the name of categories that make things easier to manage (Adorno 2004). His critique of bureaucracy is part of his larger project of critiquing the interrelationship between capital and rationality. For Adorno and other Frankfurt thinkers such as Herbert Marcuse, bureaucratic rationalization is seen as a means of consolidating and perpetuating the domination of capital. Bureaucratic structures reproduce capitalist social relations, wherein the imperatives of efficiency and profit maximization override considerations of human welfare and dignity. There are clear links between the Frankfurt critique of mass society and Yarvin's monarchist solution. Where these techno-libertarian discourses break from the Frankfurt critique is in how they attempt to reclaim algorithmic rationality against the social process. It is a technological solutionist approach that treats the social as a problem to be solved, specifically by identifying certain traits that offer a route to the grounding truth.
These Frankfurt critiques are part and parcel of the school’s renaissance in the last 15 years, and reflect a broader adoption of German philosophy to explain contemporary datafied and calculative subjectivities. On the one hand, these thinkers have been appropriated to explain a reemergent authoritarianism not seen since the school’s heyday (Woods 2019; Clavey 2020); New Yorker writer Alex Ross, for example, claimed in 2016 that “The Frankfurt School Knew Trump Was Coming” (Ross 2016). Yet just as Kantbot's revival of German idealism appropriates it for contemporary digital authoritarianism, Frankfurt School revivalism is not limited to leftist critique. Moira Weigel's work details one such nexus of neoreactionary/alt-right thinkers. In "Palantir Goes to the Frankfurt School," Weigel reads the dissertation work of Alex Karp, co-founder (along with Yarvin associate Peter Thiel) of security firm Palantir (Weigel 2020). Palantir is a surveillance and data analytics agency that Bloomberg Magazine once noted in 2018 "knows everything about you" (Waldman, Chapman, and Robertson 2018). Palantir acts as a second paranoid brain for the government agencies, police forces, and private contractors that hire them, and is deeply invested in official status as such—they once sued the U.S. army for declining to use its software (Winkler 2016). Despite Thiel's own warnings about the "communist totalitarian technology" of surveillance-based artificial intelligence, Palantir's own work seeks to create these exact structures (Shead 2021). The contrast between these infrastructures and Palantir's work is their overarching lack of a centre–a whole infrastructure lacks a particular goal, ambiently operating to not create clear lines of causality but instead construct data as a space of ambience (and, significantly, delegitimizes Palantir's own product).
Related to this end, Karp's dissertation renders axiomatic Adorno's work on the jargon of authenticity in an attempt to identify certain mediating effects of language and their relationship to aggression. In The Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno critiques the phenomenon of pseudo-authenticity in contemporary culture, particularly as it manifested in existentialist philosophy's influence on discourses of modernity. He argues that the pursuit of authenticity was co-opted by mass culture and capitalism, leading to a commodification of individuality and a loss of genuine autonomy. Adorno identifies a pervasive language or "jargon" of authenticity that masquerades as genuine self-expression but serves the interests of a conformist society. This jargon, according to Adorno, employs vague, mystical language to create an illusion of profundity and individuality while promoting conformity and passivity among the masses. Karp attempts to find a ground truth in the human psyche, rather than the operations of capital, to explain the emergence of this jargon in causal terms. This approach takes the perspective that aggression is a simple truth, and that jargon serves to mediate this aggression. Karp's own work depoliticizes Adorno in an attempt to identify social traits that emerge from a natural truth; aggression becomes a set variable in the social formula. Karp's dissertation notably lacks any implications, instead accomplishing what he sets out to do, a singular goal, a question to be answered–to "illustrate that the social is constituted through acts of aggression, and that this aggression becomes legible in specific linguistic interactions" (Weigel 2020). He adapts the Frankfurt School for technical purposes, "making them more instrumentally useful to the disciplines of sociology or social psychology by abstracting them from their contexts." For Karp, the desire to commit violence exists as an unchangeable aspect of human life, both founding and perpetuating itself. It makes aggression objective, identifies it as a ground truth or a first principle of human behaviour that expresses itself socially in language and group structure (ibid). Karp's attachment to Frankfurt theory, and his self-proclaimed identification as a "neo-Marxist," depoliticizes the Frankfurt critique by hewing closer to psychoanalysis than the post-Frankfurt tradition. This depoliticization illustrates how, and in what form, these critiques can emerge as tools of domination, as we will see later when discussing Thiel's relationship to the work of René Girard.
The Frankfurtian critical tradition–especially in its responses to the fascism that made up its contemporary condition–took as its analytic, and the emergent point of fascism, mass society. The society of the image was one in which social relations were reified into the objects that make them up; the aim, in this diagnostic, is to dereify, to see beyond a certain veil of market relations. This mass society, for Yarvin, is the cathedral, where power concentrates for its own sake. His vision is historical; it looks before capitalism in order to exit this particular analytic. But the result is something decidedly anti-Frankfurtian: for Yarvin, monarchy is the solution. How do we get here? It is, as it is written in the "cathedral" essay, simply the logical progression of democracy. There is a through-line from jargon to the "expertise" of the cathedral, the shared thought frameworks that, in this general view, extinguish possibilities for (free) speech. With aggression as a fundamental truth, a first principle, Karp leads a rational path forward that justifies Palantir's own work through the management of this aggression.
To understand the force of hostility emanating from these reappropriations of "first principles," it is thus crucial to unpack the stakes of hewing to axiomatic ways of thinking. The attempt to organize the world axiomatically is an attempt to order the world in a manner amenable to algorithmic logic. The axiom is, in another sense of the term, an algorithm: it is a process or formula, trying to be methodical, repetitive, and artificial. If, as Musk so desired, human decisions could be based on first principles, they would be rule-bound, predictable, and devoid of uncertainty (at least as far as this can be used as a heuristic). Yet, as an attempt to make algorithmic certain forms of thought, decision-making on first principles tries to subject the realm of the human to instrumental reasoning. Making things technical, giving them a technical function, frames human decisions as computable.
Alexander Galloway's work on the Uncomputable (2021) is generative here, for it illuminates the possibility of the existence of something beyond the computable. In fact, computation itself has been wrestling with the uncomputable, or rationality's own resistance to itself, since the beginning of the 20th century. Rationality failed as a totalizing scheme because it led to Russell's paradox, which itself was a response that invalidated a central identity claim that emerged from Gottlob Frege's formal logical foundation for mathematics: the "Basic Law V." Frege's law dictates that every property of an object corresponds to a unique set containing all objects that possess that property. Frege's system is considered axiomatic because it builds arithmetic on a foundation of fundamental principles and logical rules of inference between them. Using these axioms, Frege logically defined numbers and their properties, aiming to derive all of arithmetic from logic in a deductive framework. He aimed to reduce all forms of possible quantifiable decision-making to pure logic. Yet as Galloway writes, this foundation for the first paradox of rationality introduces the necessity of the irrational in defining or understanding limits. Galloway writes,
The resistance to rationality is as old as rationality itself. Nevertheless, a rash of rational paradoxes in the early twentieth century culminated in a series of limits to rationality from within that very reason. (Galloway 2021, 2)
As Galloway shows, then, the only way for rationality to follow its own rules of soundness is to allow for the unsound. Each of these claims detailing the limits of computation were themselves proved rationally–computation requires the uncomputable. To wit:
Bertrand Russell’s paradox from 1901—“the set of all sets that are not members of themselves”—seemed to impose limits on what was possible within the theory of mathematical sets. Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theories of 1931 showed that for any formal axiomatic system there will always be statements that are true in that system but not provable. Later, in 1936, Alan Turing demonstrated that it was logically impossible to calculate what sorts of machines will halt (given a certain input) and what sorts of machines will not halt. If, before, there were intuitive or poetic or biological limits to rationality, after Gödel, Turing, et al., there were also demonstrable limits to rationality from within rationality. Indeed, in a certain sense, computation in the twentieth century is defined more by the limits to computation, more by the uncomputable, than by a positive set of capacities. (Galloway 2021, 2)
First principles, then, is not necessarily a computational way of looking at the world. It is calculative, but it shies away from nuance. Yet this lack of nuance does not keep the two things in opposition. Galloway describes the ongoing tension between whether the uncomputable exceeds the computable. Luciana Parisi, quoted in Galloway's piece, writes that "error, indeterminacy, randomness, and unknowns in general have become part of technoscientific knowledge and the reasoning of machines" (Parisi 2017). "Indeed," Galloway writes, "part of the history of computation is the history of the uncomputable being colonized by the computable" (Galloway 2021, 3). This history dates back to mathematician Claude Shannon's own conception of information, a new model of information science, which forms the foundation of contemporary understandings of information. Shannon's information theory defines it in terms of entropy, probability, and uncertainty.
Parisi takes this one step further. She proposes that information theory, and its claim that axioms can generate infinitely complex structures–what she terms the metacomputational approach–fail to capture the possibility that algorithms themselves are actual entities, distinct from their status as instructions amenable as mathematical truth or physical law (Parisi 2013, 3). The Turing machine demonstrated that problems that can be solved axiomatically are computable problems. As Parisi writes, "beyond the axiomatic method or the mathematical program that could calculate all (in which all can be decided on the basis of its mathematical ground), Turing realized that there was a constellation of undecidable, incomputable propositions, the reality of which could not be empirically proven" (15). She claims that disorder is a fundamental part of computation, "against the metacomputational view of a universe contained in simpler axioms" (21). This means that "ontological complexity or chaotic incompleteness does not emerge from order, but is rather the unconditional condition, part and parcel, of procedural calculations." This contrasts with first principles thinking as, I argue here, analogous to a mode of instrumental reason that has been captured by capital. Both philosophical thought and computation rely on principles of indetermination and uncertainty. The incomputable is not only that which is opposed to reason; rather, it is its very presence that negatively defines both the ability for computation to exist as such and for the possibility for anything to appear axiomatic in the first place.
Computationalism thus relies on the presumption that the world is a set of first principles, ultimately computable and grounded in axiomatics. Axioms, again, shape their objects: they leave a trace of themselves on their product, and this trace influences the objects' own growth. This trace leads to a paradox emergent in the attempt to use first principles as a means to avoid thinking with macrological models—the ubiquity of the axiom’s trace leads to the feared impossibility of differentiation. As media theorist Antonia Majaca writes, these axioms become the grounds for paranoia:
The paranoid automatic writing-down-system sheds light on the moment when the fantasy of the complete (white male) subject is equipped with new means to become a next-level arbiter of truth, including in the control over life and death. Such a configuration of secular authority is accompanied by the immediately suppressed horror of recognizing that in his newly acquired position of the absolute sovereign, Man is the secular incarnation of Divine Law on Earth. In this light, Judge Schreber’s paranoia must be taken not only as the manifestation of a brutal extimacy (over-proximity to penetration by the nerves of God/Flechsig), but as a manifestation of the nervous breakdown of the white male subject of Enlightenment humanism, crushed in a moment of grasping its paradoxical double occupation: he is both the gatekeeper and author of the Law, and the sad penitent before it, a subject of eternal voluntary servitude, as described in Kafka’s famous parable. Here lies the uninterrupted and chilling continuity of the Schreberian double bind that leads to our age, in which the latest incarnation of totalitarian paranoia produced by the contemporary necropolitical apparatus of data positivism, profiling, and prediction creates its very own Aufschreibesystem. Similarly to Schreber, this one not only acts as the oracle of new truths but discloses the real of the regime behind it—the regime of an automated (data) totalitarianism (Majaca 2016)
First principles, then, function as the computationalist's defense–and, in a connection with the logicists throughout this dissertation, a technical defense–against decomposition caused by the increasing encroachment of the technical onto subjectivity. Monarchy and monopoly are against the corporeal; in being tautological, they are hardened against possible decay. Being the state and economic forms of autogenetic sovereignty, they assuage the fears of decomposition by any imposition from the outside. This anxiety fuels the suspicion of macrological phenomena. Yarvin's desire for the startup CEO-styled monarch is the desire for the mono, the singular leader–it is the necessary end result of the very processes of things embedded in the intersection of democracy and market capitalism. The desire for the mono, the first principle, plays into the aversion to the mass, the macrological, the mimetic that leaks into first principles thought.
The thinking monarch
To start this section, we'll go back to Yarvin's "Cathedral" essay (Yarvin 2021). As we may remember, Yarvin theorizes a "cathedral" that demarcates acceptable political discourse and, in turn, shapes political imaginations. Rather than the raw exercise of power located in dictatorial lawmaking and discipline, the cathedral operates as a discursive power, whose correlations and interplay end up stamping and shaping governing concepts and rule. It is, as he describes, "synoptic"–it always ends up agreeing with itself, it evolves in a predictable direction, and despite its disparity as organized under the conception of difference that makes up democratic rule, it behaves as if it were a singular organism with a Darwinian evolutionary logic. Institutions of the cathedral may have their own organising logics, their own aims and end goals, but Yarvin argues that they begin to coagulate into a sort of singular logical march impervious to intervention. It is still a question of power, and how it concentrates.
The concentration of power through linguistic manoeuvres, the consequent shaping of forms of socially acceptable knowledge and recursive solidification of this power–this is Foucault 101, arguments about power and governmentality applied to liberal modes of governmentality and its contemporary institutions. Rather than always existing in a state of pure competition, the market coalesces around dominant conceptions that Yarvin condemns as the natural evolution of market logics: "the cathedral operates as a discourse–not an army of ideas, a market of ideas. The institutions are just brands–marks of prestige. Ideas in this market evolve; they reproduce by being taught, they mutate by being thought" (2021). Under the sign of the cathedral, the discourse is necessarily atrophic, dominance (of ideas) necessarily taking over visions of progress. Atrophic because of this recession of the content of ideas itself in contrast to their movement within the market itself. In this frame, the marketplace of ideas justifies itself–according to this logic of market exchange, a dominant idea is one that "validates the use of power."
Yarvin's visions of searching for progress are solidified, set in stone, and unidirectional. For Yarvin, the problem isn't with the prime mover, the monarchic sovereign–it is the problem of the broader polis having to interact with each other from a material position of incomplete sovereignty. The cathedral stands in for the democratic, and intelligence for Yarvin (and for Thiel, as we see later in this chapter) is to see through democracy and its supposed scaling through the masses, the ultimate macrological model. Democratic representation becomes a veil, a failed signifier, obscuring access to a more "fundamental" truth (of logic underpinning all, just the truth of the logos). This is how Yarvin ends up with his pro-monarchy stance–it is not only desirable, but inevitable. The red pill, then–the trope common amongst these political milieux that stakes its claim as revealing the truth–is one that reveals something that can be justifiably true through logical explanation. As Yarvin would have it in the second half of the "cathedral" article, the inevitability of monarchy is the resolution of the play of democracy and its understanding of the democratic subject as a partially sovereign subject. Democracy develops, and eventually errs, in that it grants sovereignty to the mass, which coagulates into the macrologic. Democracy is a "useful tool" insofar that it is "never an end, but always a means." The recessive aspects of those agents that make up the cathedral is their very possession of sovereignty. For Yarvin, the fault of the social is its deferral of expertise onto institutions; sovereignty scaled obscures the logos. Analogizing sovereignty to complacency, one that emerges from the very fact of having it in the first place:
The professors and journalists have sovereignty because final decisions are entrusted to them and there is no power above them. Only professors can formulate policy–that is, set government strategy; only journalists can hold government accountable–that is, manage government tactics. Strategy plus tactics equals control.
The dissidents do not have sovereignty because neither the Tsar nor the Church [ed: Tsar is an earlier reference to a hypothetical dictator; the Church here is the cathedral] cares what they think. These powers do care that they think, and their only wish is for this thinking to cease.
In this framework, thought is base thinking, centred, achievable and identifiable as long as it is logically and formally impervious to outside influence. The demos, necessarily, cannot think. It is ruled by the injunction to mimic. This critique, in both content and how it emerges, glorifies the axiomatic at the expense of the empirical. Yet this attachment to the axiomatic, as I detail in a later chapter, is similarly mimetic. Sovereignty, in Yarvin's reading, is thus the power to not only think, but to enact that power. From here, we will take up the relationship between Yarvin, as an exemplar of Silicon Valley political philosophy, and its uptake of leftist social theory. Yarvin offers a critique of bureaucracy as an inalienable feature of democracy: a democratic government "leaks power" when it outsources responsibility to outside actors, whether these actors be socially-designated experts or other members of the cathedral. The bureaucracy is, according to Yarvin, constructed in order to avoid the need to take responsibility when things go awry. This cannot be fixed–it is categorical, and it snuffs out all besides the perpetuation of this power. Yarvin contends that dissidents value ideas through "mere truth and/or beauty;" this is in contrast to an expertise-based or bureaucratic society, where again in the marketplace of ideas, a dominant one is the one that is not necessarily beautiful or true but one that knows how to justify its own power and lacks an agency to do anything otherwise. It is devoid of the external, organizing frame of axiomatic or logical form.
The care of the "dissident," in Yarvin's view, is framed as anti-hegemonic. Yarvin's essay turns to the figure of the political dissident in the construction of this political-historical algorithm. As a figure, it is the oppressed, the disruptive, and simultaneously the one who sees behind the veil. The dissident has taken the red pill. Notably, however, the dissident's minority position is not grounded in racial, gender, or class conflict, but one of adherence to the values of truth and beauty, as if they exist outside the social. It is a counterhegemonic influence not informed through material experiences of marginalized conflict, but instead the ability to elide the coercive and seductive power of the hegemon's given ideas through sheer force of the ability to see behind the veil. It does not actually have a revolutionary bent; the explanation seeks solely to identify. It always manages to identify race and democracy as oppressive illusions.
The dissident monarch
Thiel's thoughts on companies mimic this. In an essay for the Wall Street Journal, Thiel argues that monopolies are the most desirable business model: a monopoly is, according to Thiel, "the kind of company that is so good at what it does that no other firm can offer a close substitute" (Thiel 2014b). The monopolist transcends competition, possesses and exerts its power over its market in an unassailable and destructive manner. Thiel defends monopolies against the accusation that they stifle the competition that capitalism so traditionally runs on by painting them as an engine for vitality: "creative monopolists give customers more choices by adding entirely new categories of abundance to the world," he writes. "Creative monopolies aren't just good for the rest of society; they're powerful engines for making it better." Exiting the mass of market competition, a monopoly is not a company in competition but a custodian of the axiomatic logic of its product.
Thiel doubles down on monopoly as a sovereign capable of both creation or genesis. He argues that contemporary criticism of monopolies emerges from (outdated) notions inherent in 19th-century economics. His critique of these notions is based on their macro-level vision:
Economists copied their mathematics from the work of 19th-century physicists: They see individuals and businesses as interchangeable atoms, not as unique creators. Their theories describe an equilibrium state of perfect competition because that is what's easy to model, not because it represents the best of business. But the long-run equilibrium predicted by 19th-century physics was a state in which all energy is evenly distributed and everything comes to rest—also known as the heat death of the universe. Whatever your views on thermodynamics, it is a powerful metaphor. In business, equilibrium means stasis, and stasis means death. If your industry is in a competitive equilibrium, the death of your business won't matter to the world; some other undifferentiated competitor will always be ready to take your place.
Who are these 19th-century economists Thiel speaks of? Given the critique of "interchangeability" and the ease at modelling this (I am also begging the question here given what we deal with later in this chapter), we can fairly assume that he is referring to the Keynesian tendency for econometrics and modelling that characterized economics before the emergence of the Austrian School in the early 20th century. Arguing against modelling as such, as a proxy that does disservice to what it represents, the monopoly form becomes the ideal form of vitality itself, one that exists outside of the very world conditions (namely competition) that gave rise to it:
Perfect equilibrium may describe the void that is most of the universe. It may even characterize many businesses. But every new creation takes place far from equilibrium. In the real world outside economic theory, every business is successful exactly to the extent that it does something others cannot. Monopoly is therefore not a pathology or an exception. Monopoly is the condition of every successful business.
Equilibrium presumes power exceeding the individual. It is a mass. It invalidates hypotheses of singular autogenesis and the primary power to cause. The alternative is the singular actor and a sense of agency that has correct and incorrect applications. Equilibrium, necessarily representative of the social, gets in the way of execution. In other words, the most desirable business strategy for a Silicon Valley company is to be inimitable–a walking version of its own first principles, escaping the very equilibrium model that gives rise to it while cornering and creating its market anew and without mediation. The model is the proxy, it is empirical knowledge. Meanwhile, the monopoly has no imitators, it exists outside of the perfect equilibrium and has the power (and the core function) to author all knowledge.
For Thiel, monopolistic hold on a market segment allows it to transcend market logics. Competition can be seen as democratic–the base liberal view is that democracy requires markets insofar as markets function to regulate and distribute democratic rights and economic efficiency, with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development describing it as "symbiotic" (Fox 2018, 2). Thiel adopts Yarvin's position of democracy as a necessary tool but not the end goal in itself. Democracy–and markets–mimic these same macrological models that make the Other; the enemy for Thielists and the alt-right is less-so any particular mode of collectivity but the concept itself, the scale or the mass. Going back to Thiel's critique of nineteenth-century economists, we can begin to trace this suspicion of the macrological–and the subsequent clinging to axiomatics, the singular, the phallo-logo-centric–in the Austrian School economic tradition. The Austrian School of economics, progenitors of contemporary libertarianism, pioneered these views espoused by Thiel. The Austrian School aimed to construct a universal methodology for social science, one that moves away from the macro and the mimetic, towards a direction that looks something more like the reified individual or some search for "authenticity."
Thiel's earlier writings are more explicit in their mimicry of the Austrian School. Let's move to another essay to examine the relationship between this and intelligence. In an April 13, 2009 post for the libertarian thinktank the Cato Institute, titled “The Education of a Libertarian”, Thiel opens with a statement of philosophy:
I remain committed to the faith of my teenage years: to authentic human freedom as a precondition for the highest good. I stand against confiscatory taxes, totalitarian collectives, and the ideology of the inevitability of the death of every individual. For all these reasons, I still call myself 'libertarian' (Thiel 2009).
Thus for Thiel, the “highest good” is incompatible with totalitarian collectives. Are all collectives totalitarian, or might there be such a decentralized collective compatible with this ideal of the highest good? Thiel continues:
I must confess that over the last two decades, I have changed radically on the question of how to achieve these goals. Most importantly, I no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible.
Thiel then goes on to trace the “development of [his] thinking” towards this goal, through studying philosophy at Stanford University to trading on the floors of the NYSE in the 90s. One line from this retelling sticks out for our purposes: “the higher one’s IQ,” Thiel narrates, “the more pessimistic one became about free-market politics–capitalism simply is not that popular with the crowd.” The question seems to be answered: the totalitarian collectives as described by Thiel are not only those that might fall under classical descriptions of totalities, but those for whom decision-making is wrested from some objective measure, like IQ.
Conceptions of IQ as an objective measure of intelligence are common tropes in the alt-right, especially their links to racial discrimination. Much of this discourse emerges from Charles Murray and Richard J. Herrnstein, who argue that intelligence, as measured by IQ tests, is a significant predictor of various social outcomes including educational attainment, income, and even criminal behavior. The two claim that there are inherent differences in IQ, a proxy for intelligence writ large, between racial and ethnic groups. Some groups, such as Ashkenazi Jews and East Asians, purportedly score higher on average than others, such as African Americans and Hispanics. Yet beyond the flawed research methodology of their study, the grounding for this social Darwinism is held to a concentric ideal, a computational fiction of measure. As Heidi Safia Mizra elaborates:
In racist pseudo-science they choose to tell us that there is such a thing as innate hereditary general intelligence, g. g they tell us, is the general factor of cognitive ability on which humans differ as measured by IQ tests. In fact the whole credibility of racist pseudo-science depends on the very existence of g. But g is no more than a statistical artifact, meaning that it is made up out of thin air (Kohn, 1996). g is derived from the factor analysis of dubious IQ test scores. It has been shown to appear and disappear according to manipulation of the data (Gould, 1995). Thus, pseudo-scientific race studies follow all the apparent precepts of scientific investigation, but here's the catch, the object of their study— g doesn't exist, it has no external reality. Quite simply, general intelligence upon which their entire science of social and racial difference is based is not a verifiable, immutable thing in the head (Mirza 1998, 115).
Yet g scores have not gone away. Katz, in 2020, details techno-scientific uptake of the concept:
The idea that IQ testing has been thoroughly discredited in the scientific profession—an idea that appears in most commentary on Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve (1994)—is also incorrect. In 2014, Stephen Hsu, a Michigan State University physics professor, argued in the mainstream science magazine Nautilus that Spearman’s g can be quantified with standardized tests and has a genetic basis. Hsu called for editing the genomes of human embryos to produce “super-intelligent humans” with “more than 1,000 IQ points;” failure to do so would apparently produce “inequality of a kind never before experienced in human history" (Katz 2022)
Thiel's defense of free market capitalism in this essay similarly uses the superiority of IQ to stake its claims. The supposed incompatibility between freedom and democracy stems from a market logic taken to its extreme, where the lack of interplay between these forces indicates not a tension that is to be wrestled with and taken up but a binary opposition wherein one must triumph–that the operations of the free market are necessarily correct, and democracy’s attempt to measure and represent “the crowd” necessarily gets in the way of this free operation of correct truths. The very quantitative nature of IQ scores makes human subjects amenable to measurement, just as supervised machine learning: as Beth Coleman contends, the fundamentally binary logic of machine learning "takes sorting as an a priori—as the precondition for a thing or a state" (Coleman 2021, 3). The irony is that Thiel presents his fellow high-IQ individuals as a crowd themselves, one victimized against the amorphous and fuzzy desires of the democratic masses. Yet this high-IQ crowd possesses some capacity to turn away from democracy, to decide that it does not work for them and to act like one of Thiel’s supposedly “saner peers” who “retreated to tending their small gardens” (Thiel 2009). Technolibertarian discourses of escape thus function to preserve the sanctity of IQ as a measuring stick while always keeping a faith in logic (as representative of IQ) as, if not the promised form of the utopia, at least something to cling to in a sense of superiority and control. In making equivalent the desire to retreat with a feeling of marginalization based on IQ level, Thiel is bemoaning the inability to establish a technocracy that he is supposedly rallying against. The supposed freedom of free-market logic becomes the freedom to dominate, one granted by possession of an IQ high enough to authorize such decisions. Freedom, according to this view, implies something far different than the ability and capacity to act according to the dictates of some individualized, idealized Self.
Thiel attributes the atrophy of freedom (for high-IQ individuals) to the encroachment of democratic welfarism into Western state projects. “Since 1920,” he writes, “the vast increase in welfare beneficiaries and the extension of the franchise to women—two constituencies that are notoriously tough for libertarians—have rendered the notion of ‘capitalist democracy’ into an oxymoron.” What’s interesting about this claim is not its shot at “capitalist democracy” but that it comes from a self-avowed libertarian. It illustrates the core differentiation of libertarianism from its (neo)conservative brethren on the right: while the latter might be able to work on a capitalist democratic project, the former wants to do away entirely with the “democracy” part–it posits market forces as the only governance needed, the first principle of human behaviour. Thus the general libertarian trend of extending as a sort of extreme liberalism, as opposed to an extreme conservativism: the freedom of the self is taken as not only necessary but sufficient to, as Thiel puts it (adopting Carl Schmitt’s position), ensure the avoidance of a sphere (politics) that is just “us versus them; good people versus the other.” Thiel’s libertarianism thus emerges as a form of technological liberalism. IQ here becomes the measurement of deserved freedom, and the failure of democracy is the failure to reward the high-IQ elite (and, in turn, a correlation between high IQ and wealth) These conflations of IQ and capital success, of capitalism as a smart man's game, and a route to freedom are intimately tied up with the concept of autogenesis described in the previous chapter. Susan Buck-Morss, writing on the myth of the autotelic or the self-sustaining figure (the male-gendered, default subject of modernity, emerging from a Kantian dismissal of the sensuous and the affective), writes
What seems to fascinate modern “man” about this myth is the narcissistic illusion of total control. The fact that one can imagine something that is not, is extrapolated in the fantasy that one can (re)create the world according to plan (a degree of control impossible, for example, in the creation of a living, breathing child). It is the fairy-tale promise that wishes are granted—without the fairy tale’s wisdom that the consequences can be disastrous. It must be admitted that this myth of creative imagination has had salutary effects, as it is intimately entwined with the idea of freedom in Western history (Buck-Morss 1992)
The plan of the autogenetic creation requires control over the causal chain; an axiomatic or first principle allows for this control through the conception of total knowledge. In turn, knowledgemaking and its subsequent power elides the indeterminacy of subject necessary to models and their observation of the outside, with a faith in some deserved correlation between IQ and the power to generate the prime mover. In the next section, I trace the suspicion of models and libertarian notions of truthmaking through the work of the Austrian School of economics, the intellectual forefathers of 1970s- and 80s neoliberalism and how these notions extend through today to both Musk and Thiel's business philosophy but also wider conceptions of individualism and neoliberal subjectivity under digitality.
White principles
Beyond the symbolic and repetitive similarities–between the phallus and the one–first principles thought is a form of sticking with defaults, both creating and retaining the conditions for a genesis or emergence. Control becomes the default status. While philosophical ontologies aim to know, a computational ontology is "intended for application." "As a result," Kishore et. al. write, "a philosophical ontology addresses an unbounded universe of discourse, and the universe is bound in a computational ontology" (Kishore, Ramesh, and Sharman 2003, 3179). In other words, the first principle fetishizes knowledge as something designed to execute; it naturally sets up a position of defensiveness and resentment, because the first principle is tainted as an ontological claim the second that something contingent or reliant on it infringes on it. The first principle, as a sovereign form of reason over an object that shapes this object, remains in a fetishistic relationship to that very object.
How does the default hegemonic position in Western culture (the white male) end up disavowing its own hegemonic power? Is it, as their own logic would have it, because of a diffusion of rights from a sort of fallen power or patriarchal authorial position? It is not the inherent functions of whiteness or its historical emergence that continue to hold such sway, but rather the very appeal or construction of victimhood status as a principle underlying these feelings. It is the desire to attach to a singular explanation that might be a part of hegemonic power itself. This is explicitly tied to the axiomatics fundamental to the Austrian School's own attempts to describe social processes from an a priori point of view. Decision-making from first principles function in a manner that isolates the knowledge of the first principle (and its possibility for extending towards any answer through a logical unfolding) from any necessity to know the "analogies," that is, the means of reasoning that has its basis in some other empirical phenomena already observed. A first principle is an axiom. The chain of logical unfolding that follows from reasoning according to an axiom is algorithmic. The logic underlying classical mechanics is algorithmic logic: the input and the processes determine the output. Axioms purport to organize uncertainty, they allow for a control of phenomena and its understanding; they become the tool of Peterson's valiant male hero warding off chaos. Their usage marks an attempt to organize understanding into modes of certainty: anything deduced from first principles can be justified in of itself, and is not subject to infringements from analogical thought. As an epistemological chain, first principles are autogenetic: they continue to posit their own validity through a recursive, post-hoc justification.
The "physics," or logos, of reasoning by first principles necessarily recreates the past in contrast to the continued construction of the social. It promises possible domination because it hides its reliance on the other to reflect its dominant status. The cleverness of sticking to first principles, the axiom of logical treatments of social pricing, treats the market–and the world at large–with an algorithmic mode of thought. Here, algorithmic reasoning is the only mode of intelligence: an input, subject to a formula, which produces output. Intelligence becomes computation, which in turn becomes a form or property given to whiteness. And the position of whiteness and intellect emerges as a version of white male masculinity, the supremacy of knowledge emergent from first principles as opposed to one that exists relationally. Or, in other words: whiteness and masculinity engender a relationship to knowledge that is, by design, iterable and repetitive or repeatable.
Thus the first principle is the colony, the masculine, whiteness itself. Any infringement is, necessarily, an assault on the causal reasoning that forms the first principle's self-identity; the perceived victimhood is a feature, not a bug (an engine, not a camera). This link to race draws out the apocalypticism of the first principles thinker and computationalist ontology. The recursivity, and in turn foreclosure, of first principles as a form of thought–of whiteness as both originary point and final horizon–necessitates this orientation towards the apocalypticism that drives Silicon Valley escape fantasies. As Parisi and Dixon-Román write in Recursive Colonialism and Cosmo-Computation,
As we have seen throughout history, the horizon of the apocalypse comes first in the messianic Judeo-Christian image of total destruction through which slavery becomes justified as a means of salvation of the Prometheus Man. The apocalypse finds in techno-scientific progress a universal model of civilization rooted in the mathematics of divide-and-conquer, where space becomes subsumed by the nexus of whiteness, patriarchy, and capitalist logics, which constantly anticipate the end by constantly reproducing its unconditional violence (Parisi and Dixon-Román 2020).
This reproduction is the result of the removed, nonrelational perspective of first principles–to stick with the first principle is to, necessarily, look towards death. Yet the very idea of knowing anything at all is equated with the idea of generative and generating knowledge. To close, I argue that it is this very irrelationality or untouchability of first principles, rather than any self-desired marketing or branding push from reactionary intellectuals and grifters, that exudes a particular concept of "cool" to the low-information environment of first principles thought. Here I follow Alan Liu in understanding cool as the "aporia of information" (A. Liu 2004, 179). As Liu writes, that which is cool is that which is designed to communicate as little as possible. Cool is flash, aesthetic appeal, spectacular and immediate information designed to resist information. It is "not so much noise in the information theory sense as information fed back into its own signal to create a standing interference pattern, a paradox pattern" (ibid). And while Liu theorizes that it is this very resistance to being informed and informatized that gives this information the sense of cool–it is the means by which an "ethos of the unknown" tries to emerge from the restrictive and bureaucratized rationality of contemporary knowledge work.
First principles do not grant the same affective relief as they might first promise; rather, they foreclose the possibility of surprise, of the impulsive, of chance and the uncertain. They occupy a relationship to the world that relies on a binary that is self-referential. To put perhaps too fine a psychoanalytic point on it, the one in the first principle informs a phallic presence. Klaus Theweleit writes of this relationship between the relation of the world and the male ego, this frames
a power relation in which pleasure is taken in violating whatever displays itself as living. Within that power relation, subject-object polarities can never be transcended; notions of a possible "synthesis," "mediation," or "sublimation" represent nothing short of a refusal to acknowledge a power relationship within which the fiction of a good totality is either simply celebrated or raised to the "higher" spheres of abstract power (Theweleit 1987, 2:422).
Knowledge from first principles is thus knowledge that prescribes its own technique of usage. A first principle, or an axiom, tells its user how to use it (it is, in the terminology of German media theorist Cornelia Vissman, a cultural technique: it "prescribes its own usage" (Vismann 2013, 83)). It tells the user to split the world into an axiom. It also tells its user that infringement from the outside is a threat; it is embedded with eliminationism. This is what differs the axiom or first principle from a law. Laws can be transgressed, reinforced by punishment; first principles epistemology, in the fact that it already shapes its elements prior to their enactment, cannot be ignored if it is to remain faithful to itself. It is, again, the result of the male ego that cannot let in relationality, instead replacing it with a mode of logistical management:
The bourgeois male individual sees himself as "understanding" such things as the limits to human endurance (by which he means making them subject to surveillance, control, and comprehension), as long as he can dissect them into numbers, tables, statistics, analyses of materials, investment costs, empirical details (Theweleit 1987, 2:422).
Logistical (logical) masculinity renders space rational; it presents itself as the control that will beget freedom.
Mimesis and infringement on the sovereign
The idea that knowledge can be created from an axiom, with no trace detectable, makes things appear to be objective: first principles elide the social and attempt to illustrate the pure and unadulterated. Axiomatics are a computational, technical version of doing theory, and respond to calls of its possible death (C. Anderson 2008) with a desire to formalize the theory as it is seen fit. This is not an innovation of Silicon Valley so much as it is the continuation of a form of the destructive instrumentalization of theory. Eyal Weizman, in his seminal piece "Lethal Theory," discusses the appropriation of critical theory (Deleuze, Guattari, and Debord, for e.g.) by the Israeli military. Weizman quotes from Shimon Naveh, a retired brigadier general and at the time the director of the since-shuttered Operational Theory Research Institute, in saying that "we employ critical theory primarily in order to critique the military institution itself–its fixed and heavy conceptual foundations" (Weizman 2006, 67). The military here is painted as the lumbering, institutionalized body that needs to be innovated against. Yet it is countered through an instrumentalized use of theory, one devoted to domination and antagonism. "We share more with architects; we combine theory and practice," Naveh explains. "We can read, but we also know how to build and destroy, and sometimes kill" (ibid. 68). It would be as if the rest of the military does not know how to kill, but does know how to read, and yet is alienated from the social import of the critique. The OTRI's usage of theory, directed internally at its own operations, provides a sense of power and knowingness within a social milieu that already asks for conformity from its members.
The next chapter will take up this desire towards inimitability, and its consequent move to avoid the knowledge of the crowd, in what I'm calling fear of mimesis. Michael Taussig, writing on Walter Benjamin's own work on mimesis and modernity, notes that the mimetic faculty is a “rudiment of a former compulsion of persons to ‘become and behave like something else’. The ability to mime, and mime well, in other words, is the capacity to Other” (Taussig 1993, 19). If mimesis, as Taussig says, is the capacity to Other, then a fear thereof is a fear of the very possibility that the sovereignty of the individual is violated. It is the fear that there might be an encroachment on the possibility to understand and master the chain of causality that emerges from the axiom. As an epistemology, then, first principles begins in this fear of the mimetic. As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison write, in their history of the concept of objectivity, "all epistemology begins in fear—fear that the world is too labyrinthine to be threaded by reason; fear that the senses are too feeble and the intellect too frail" (Daston and Galison 2007, 372). Fear of uncertainty is here the result of an imaginary in which it does not exist, a fantasy that knowledge itself can come to assuage fear and the negative. In writing about objectivity, Daston and Galison capture the fear latent in the reversion to first principles thought: the possibility for difference, for movement, for sovereignty to descend from this paranoid-schizoid position adopted in the Urbit node or the vigilance of remaining a "Day 1" company. "Objectivity fears subjectivity," they write, "the core self" (374). The search for first principles is the search for a form of objectivity in the realm of decision-making, acting within the world: the sovereign as the first principle of the subject, in attempting to continually reenact their sovereignty and needing to enact its isolation or separateness, can only ever remain in this state of arrested first principle. A decision made from first principles is one that engages with and absorbs the past as its only possible mode of reasoning: the already-existing subject position, continually clawing back any attempts to move beyond this initial state of isolation and primacy. First principles are objective insofar as they are against themselves: to repeatedly make decisions from first principles is to dial back progress. Reasoning–from first principles, no less, as what appears to be the purest form of reason–becomes something that manages to get rid of the very concept of subjectivity itself. The sovereign self is the autogenetic one, the one with mastery over cause, and not subject-to anything as a result.
Notes
Two of the paper's writers, Conor Heins and Brennan Klein, acknowledge funding from the John Templeton Foundation, a philanthropic organization whose efforts, funding, and aims to answer the religious and spiritual questions of American Christianity through scientific enquiry have come under fire (Waldrop 2011). For a broad overview of the foundation's role in debates over the teaching of intelligence design in U.S. schools, and the foundation's current chairman's involvement in Christian neoconservative political campaigns, see (Wiebe 2009) and (Schneider 2010).
The extent of this rising apocalypticism and escape, especially in New Zealand, is detailed well in (Osnos 2017).
This justification echoes some of the more destructive tendencies of innovation discourses. In 2023, a small submarine created by the company OceanGate Expeditions imploded, killing its five occupants, while travelling to explore the wreckage of the Titanic. OceanGate's innovative ‘sell’ was to use carbon fibre for the submarine's hull instead of the industry-standard titanium, flouting established engineering knowledge. The subway failed to pass standards checks by both the American Bureau of Shipping and Lloyd's Register, two independent inspection agencies. OceanGate CEO Geoffrey Rush framed his avoidance of certification as an instance of established institutional rules getting in the way of innovation: in an interview with vlogger Alan Estrada in 2021, Rush claimed that he had "broken some rules to make this. I think I've broken them with logic and good engineering behind me. The carbon fibre and titanium, there's a rule you don't do that. Well, I did" (S. Anderson, Angelovski, and Kelley 2024).
Contemporary alt-right ideologies are no stranger to attachments of sovereignty and escapism that soon turn to garden-variety authoritarian structures. QAnon cult leader Romana Didulo’s followers believe that she is the "Queen of Canada" and has declared her sovereignty outside of the country in which she resides. In summer 2023, she commandeered a campground in rural Nova Scotia, Canada before taking residence in an abandoned school in a small town in the province of Saskatchewan (Lamoureux 2023a, 2023b). Didulo's attachment to QAnon extends from the sovereign citizen movement, where a sovereign citizen group known as the Oath Enforcers attracted QAnon and Donald Trump supporters into the movement following the 2021 storming of the United States Capitol (Wilson 2021). Sovereign citizens reject the domain of government, claiming that they are not subject to any form of federal law without express consent. The movement, which expanded from origins in 1970s Christian eschatological anti-government groups (Balleck 2014, 111–12), was fuelled through internet discussion forums and content virality (Taplin and Holland 2023).