Chapter 3. Experts, intellectuals, and a dark web of sovereigns — Fear of mimesis
Contents · Official record (SFU Summit)
Chapter 3. Experts, intellectuals, and a dark web of sovereigns
Peterson's status as a public intellectual located him as the resident psychologist of the "intellectual dark web," a loose network of academics, writers, and tech figures—such as Peterson, Sam Harris, Peter Thiel, Bret Weinstein, and Heather Heying—who portray themselves as heterodox free-speech advocates victimized by the liberal mainstream. According to former New York Times columnist Bari Weiss, herself associated with the movement, the IDW encompasses an "alliance of heretics" engaged in a "rolling conversation" that sounds "unlike anything else happening" in culture (Weiss 2018). The group's name, like the political realm for which it writes, describes a motley group of people associated with varied "intellectual" movements who claim to bear a scarlet letter for speaking against the social mores of Western society. Heretics, or exiles, indeed abounded in the group: the (now defunct) "intellectualdark.website" in 2019 featured a collection of the movement's figures. Weiss cited this site as the IDW's "closest thing to a phone book," with small biographies of 32 figures ranging from "professors-in-exile" to memetic media makers; controversial tech figures to associates of (and including) Peter Thiel (H. Farrell 2018). The IDW's credentialed intellectuals span fields. Evolutionary biologist Bret Weinstein and his wife Heather Heying, for example, resigned their posts from Evergreen State College after criticizing their school's annual Day of Absence, while Peterson's infamy found him a membership. New York Times bestseller and neuroscientist Sam Harris is a part, with more to do with his Islamophobia than his neuroscience; likewise Douglas Murray, an Oxford-educated political columnist known for pushing conspiracy theories about the replacement of white people with non-white populations.
Having traced how the red pill emerges from the crisis of symbolic efficiency under neoliberalism, I read the intellectual dark web as emblematic of how the autogenetic sovereign's flight from social contingency becomes institutionalized as intellectual rebellion, transforming critical thinking itself into a commodity that promises access to forbidden knowledge while delivering consumers deeper into algorithmic capitalism's paranoid structures. The IDW's spectacular failure to engage in genuine intellectual exchange—epitomized in the Peterson-Žižek debate—reveals how contemporary reactionary masculinity appropriates the forms of scholarly authority while evacuating their substantive content, creating what amounts to a pornographic relationship to knowledge that positions truth as something to be consumed rather than collectively produced through dialectical encounter. As I argued in this dissertation's introduction, by attempting to both create and occupy its own reality, the IDW extends and buttresses general "red pill" discourses that have circulated around alt-right spaces since the early 2010s by attempting to both create and define its own political reality. The seeming exposure of the "red pill" that is invested in the power of the IDW's rebel figure is, in reality, deeply invested in the blue pill's "illusion," or idealism. While positioning itself as a transgressive and "cool" reaction to mainstream liberal rhetorics, the IDW fulfills a return to conservative values precisely because of this desire to define, enclose, and inform others of the "real." Someone who has taken the red pill–an external, pharmacological supplement–can “see” the “eternal truths” of conservatism, patriarchy, and white supremacy behind the veil of liberal multiculturalism. This positions its consumers as both more knowing and more courageous. The red pill’s rebellious glint makes consumers supposedly speak truth to power, adopting a cultural position traditionally associated with left critique. The thought systems of members of the IDW share a strong attachment to particular rationalities and are supported by the abstractions that give them access to sovereign power. By hiding under the guise of intellectualism, the IDW couches its rhetorics in a similar manner that the alt-right did when it first came to prominence, "cloaking its distinctly white nationalist arguments in appeals to intellectualism and a rhetoric of 'alternatives' to mainstream politics and political correctness" (Hartzell, n.d., 9).
A specter haunting the dark web
While Peterson, in the debate with Žižek, could not name any current academy members who fulfilled his criteria of postmodern cultural Marxism, he eventually furnished his followers with a list:
“Ibram X Kendi, Ta-Nahesi-Coates, Robin DiAngelo, Kimberle Crenshaw, bell hooks, Andrea Dworkin, Michel Foucault, Naomi Klein, Catherine McKinnon, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida and, perhaps above all, Michel Foucault. This list is not complete.” (Peterson 2022)
This cabal of thinkers spans from critical race theorists (Kendi, Coates, DiAngelo, hooks) to incompatible feminisms (Dworkin, McKinnon, Butler) to Derrida and Foucault, who are often (begrudgingly, in Foucault’s case) associated with the post-structuralist movement. That the general antagonistic lump of "postmodern cultural Marxism" has little to no ideological coherence is a useful example of the abstraction–and, in turn, reduction– at play in the combative spectacle of left-right intellectualism. Much ado has been made about the alt-right movement being a movement of collective grievance (Cooper 2021; Hankes and Amend 2018), fundamentally reactionary in nature and in reality a grab-bag of differing ideological standpoints: political scientist George Hawley claims that "it has no formal institutions or a leadership caste," including "anyone with right-wing sensibilities that rejects the mainstream conservative movement" (Hawley 2017, 11). The thread that ties these groups together is also under debate: some focus on the alt-right as an extension of classical forms of white supremacy (Daniels 2018); others Christianity (Berry 2021); populism plays a role (Montgomery 2017); masculinity too (Banet-Weiser and Miltner 2016); as does social media and the internet (Massanari 2017). All of these aspects are themselves subject to certain notions not only of hierarchy, but of binary oppositions: white supremacy presupposes a supreme, while Christianity's good and evil dichotomy generally totalizes action into the degree by which it reaches towards each polarity; populism's "antagonistic front" is likewise always formed against a hegemony; masculinity (or, specifically, antifeminist thought) relies on phallocentrism.
The IDW appears distinct from the alt-right in its focus on intellectualism over controversy, fueling its attempts to remain within the public view. After Donald Trump's election in 2016, social media platforms had a collective mea culpa moment: faced with accusations that maximization algorithms and dark patterns exposed users to conspiratorial ideas and propaganda (see, e.g., Barnes 2018), platforms like YouTube and Facebook attempted to atone by changing their content policies and banning high-profile alt-right agitators like Milo Yiannopoulos, Alex Jones, and (eventually) Donald Trump (Hern 2018). Trump and others used this censorship as a means of drumming up political support. The exact same "big tech" establishment that enabled their careers in the first place, in the case of pundits like Jones and Yiannopoulos, came to send them away towards the existence of platforms like Gab, Parler, and eventually Trump's own truth.social (Kafka 2021). This tech platform cull ended some careers: Yiannopoulos, for example, had a book contract from American publisher Simon & Schuster rescinded shortly after he was banned from Twitter for inciting hate speech (Hunt 2017), while Alex Jones was ordered to pay $1.487 billion in damages for making erroneous claims about the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting (Reuters 2022). In contrast to these figures whose populist stance brings them credence and popularity, the intellectual dark web presents itself as popular on intellectual merit: the venture capitalists and academics that comprise it operate from a position of prior social legitimacy, whether it be through scholarly accolades (Ph.Ds, New York Times-bestseller positions, or academic appointments littered the list) or, at the very least, some form of intellectual credence to their operations as venture capitalists or business figures. The IDW posture is itself not against the political establishment or mores, like the alt-right pundits of the mediasphere. The day to day of U.S. politics is not the symbolic concern of the group; many wade into cultural commentaries as experts in other fields with a sense of disciplinary overlap. Thus the IDW presents not a popular alternative but something that cuts through to more fundamental truths, a view on the construction and exploration of epistemology. This epistemology leverages intellect as a tool for domination.
The fact that this rise coincides with social media culture is no accident: many of these hierarchies take advantage of quantifiable attention metrics to rise to the top of these very hierarchies. Many members of the IDW are loosely associated with what Becca Lewis termed the "alternative influence network," a network of social media influencers "who often develop highly intimate and transparent relationships with their audiences … and 'sell' them on far-right ideology" (Lewis 2018).
Weiss argued that the exile status of the IDW indicates that something about what they are saying is dangerous to the mainstream order–and their expertise a contraband good (H. Farrell 2018). The logic goes something like this: if their ideas were frivolous, they wouldn't be dangerous. What makes them dangerous–and thus subject to censorship–is their epistemic status. The differences in content and discipline across the IDW is subsumed under the idea that this "dark web" of ideas are the truths that, instead of being publicly unsavoury like the alt-right commentators that came before them, emerge from positions of prior social legitimacy. The IDW runs on the tension between the hegemonic credentials of its members–expertise granted through conventional means–and their perceived exile from the institutions that uphold these conventions. The basic narrative of the IDW is that truth has become subsumed to the "postmodern cultural Marxist" politics of the contemporary academy and multicultural Liberalism, to use the words of Peterson (or, in Thiel's terminology, the "misdirection" of "liberal multiculturalism" (2023)). There is a politics inherent to this anti-politics: the very proposal that intellectual activity can exist outside of the realm of the political places epistemology and politics on different scales, where politics is not only downstream from culture but anathema to the free play of intellectual activity. The varying political perspectives that make up the IDW–from Peterson's identified "classical liberalism" (Lott 2019) to fringe figure Curtis Yarvin's neo-monarchism (Yarvin 2008a)–presuppose a mode of social relation where ideas operate and proliferate according to some epistemic merit of a rationality emerging from an axiom (liberalism's subject, neo-monarchism's C-suite analogue). As the IDW would have it, rationality overcomes ideology.
Doctor's orders
As I discussed in the introduction, the symbolic nature of taking the red pill (there is no pill to actually swallow) is crucial to the structure of this awakening. Imagining the unreality of the symbolic order as the subject currently encounters it requires the internalization–literally, consumption and digestion–of an imaginary version of a pill that symbolizes a revelation of the real. The irony of this "real" is that it is the real of a history almost always never recorded by the private subject who consumes the red pill. Instead, the "truth" gleaned from the red pill is the knowledge imparted by an expert, whose very expertise is a spectacular or imaginary version thereof–the expertise is given as final and binding despite being based in a relational phantasm. Peterson is the psychologist of the IDW, yet paused his clinical practice and teaching duties in 2018 to promote 12 Rules for Life and resigned from academia in 2021; Sam Harris' training is in neuroscience, not comparative religion. Expertise and knowledge in the IDW are, more than any other categories that make up the red pill, stand-ins for the two concepts' deterioration. This reification of knowledge extends from what Žižek discusses as the elevation of science into a form of fetishistic speech, where the "objectivized" language of expertise in the mid-aughts could no longer be translated into the commonplace but shape popular imaginations (Žižek 2006, 1553–54). The language of expertise took on a fetishistic form, where the expert became "the subject supposed to know" and the deferral to her authority a feature of the symbolic order itself, regardless of the degree to which she could give the layperson access to the real knowledge of science. In turn, and developing from this, consuming the red pill anaesthetizes its subject into collapsing the distinction between expert and expertise: it removes the requirement for one to integrate into the symbolic order of knowledge as signification of the world. The flattening of this fetishism is only possible through its reliance on the already-existing identity categories of white, patriarchal hegemony, which forms its rationality.
This collapse represents a crucial moment in the development of what I earlier introduced as perverted knowledge—knowledge that maintains a fetishized distance from its object precisely to preserve the knower's position of mastery. The red pill's promise is that one can access the "real" truth behind expertise without submitting to the lengthy process of actually acquiring expertise, without engaging with the Other (whether that Other is the academic institution, the scientific community, or the social conditions that produce knowledge) in the terms that the Other sets. Instead, the red-pilled subject claims direct access to truth through a pharmacological shortcut that bypasses the mediating structures of symbolic authority. This mirrors the autogenetic sovereign's fantasy of self-creation ex nihilo—the belief that one can generate authoritative knowledge about the world without being subject to the social processes that constitute both knower and known. The spectacular failures we witnessed with phenomena like DOGE reveal the underlying contradiction in this fetishistic relationship to expertise. When Musk claimed he could eliminate government waste through computational efficiency, he was performing exactly this flattening of expert and expertise—positioning himself as someone who possessed the "real" knowledge of efficiency that actual policy experts lacked. The fact that DOGE's promises proved wildly unrealistic demonstrates how this fetishistic knowledge thrives precisely on its distance from material engagement with its supposed object. The autogenetic sovereign's expertise generates itself recursively through its own performance, creating what appears to be knowledge but functions more as "post-truth politics"—the restaging of old beliefs as though they were new, algorithmic optimizations of existing prejudices rather than genuine intellectual innovation.
Part of this laundering of knowledge is the common refrain, usually associated with political commentator Ben Shapiro but fundamental to the IDW’s critique of contemporary liberal culture, that “facts don’t care about your feelings" (Ben Shapiro 2016). The slogan places facts and feelings in binary opposition. Targeted to an individual, it also means that feelings are the mark of subjectivity, while facts exist as external truths. This is a classic “verifiability” aspect to facts - the idea that facticity grounds the shared reality of a polis, or that reality itself is understandable according to the same principles that underlie self-evident realms and disciplines of knowledge production like the “hard” sciences. And while Weiss and others characterize the IDW as simply "telling the truth" against the behemoth of mainstream liberal culture, the movement is more attached to positing itself against a particular strain of liberal intellectualism that it ascribes to mainstream culture. Thiel and his PayPal co-founder David Sacks wrote in their book The Diversity Myth about "multiculturalism" as a correlate of diversity, moral relativism, ideology, and conformity. In their words, it "filled the vacuum created by the elimination of the West" (Sacks and Thiel 1998). Comparing the multicultural mission of higher education to Nazi German glasnost and Gorbachev's parastroika, Thiel and Sacks argue that efforts to implement this in higher education (notably Stanford, the two's alma mater) will result in a certain homogeneity of thought, where "harmony" is equated with universal agreement.
Paternal intellect
These dominance hierarchies recreate themselves in the thought of the IDW through its own signification of a particular (often white) social role: that of the public intellectual. In this section, I outline the cultural relationship between intellect, authority, and digital transgression through the lens of the sovereign, neoliberal subject. The particular male and intellectual dark web-tinged flavours of these dominance hierarchies evoke an emphasis on a certain freedom of intellectual thought, where freedom as a value is grounded as freedom for a certain type of thought that equates intelligence with expertise over a certain set of facts and in turn intelligence as the human trait of dominance. The freedom of the intellectual dark web to engage in its musings about freedom is somebody's freedom: the freedom to re-engage with a certain logocentric conception of the individual, the freedom to dominate or ascend a hierarchy. It is accomplished, from the "intellectualism" of the intellectual dark web to attacks aimed precisely at higher education in the 21st century, by reclaiming the mantle of intellectualism and expertise from its contemporary liberal manifestations. Jodi Dean, writing on Christopher Lasch's seminal Culture of Narcissism, uses its conceptions of late-20th century Western conceptions of the individual in order to analyze the rise of narcissistic personality adaptations. For Lasch (and, in turn, Dean), one such effect of the neoliberal diffusion of expertise is social changes in the paternal function: "Unlike the materially self-sufficient frontier family, the family in the second half of the twentieth century depends on help and advice from experts. Whether as medical and therapeutic child-rearing guidance or educational and juridical intervention in the domestic sphere, expertise dislodges symbolic patriarchal authority" (Dean 2016, 39). This collapse of the paternal function, she states, is part and parcel of the neoliberal diffusion of authority into "welfare capitalism's bureaucratic rationality," which replaces hierarchy with "administrators, technicians, and experts" (ibid. 40). "Rather than having symbolic authority," she writes, "experts and administrators have knowledge. This knowledge is generally contestable and provisional: experts disagree; what a bureaucrat knows may not be useful" (ibid.). The spectacle of the IDW intellectual is a spectacle of this possession of knowledge, and it is a spectacle–a sign or signifier that's been deferred onto something else–of the patriarchal authority.
In "Feminism in Technoculture," Dean furthers this analytic of the decline of patriarchal symbolic authority in the context of the development of technoculture and, qua Žižek, the decline of symbolic efficiency (Dean 2001, 24). A societal version of the uncertainty principle in physics: without symbolic efficiency, we can't be sure of anything so much anymore, and there is always the possibility of something unexpected arising. "That a symbol or identity works in one place," Dean writes, "doesn't mean it works in another place" (ibid). Symbolic efficiency thus refers to the possibility for meaning to be determinate, for the relationship between sign and signifier to resolve itself with efficiency. The "uncanny excess and lack of meaning" of technoculture destabilizes relationships of trust and authority and, more importantly, the criteria with which we decide who is worthy of trust and belief in the first place. Dean argues that this reflects the decline of the big Other: "no master signifier or ultimate authority holds everything together. The rule of the phallus is over" (25). The No of the superegoic father is a cry from beyond the grave that does not need to be heeded. Instead, its prohibitive norms are replaced by imaginary ideals of success, fitness, and achievement–the neoliberal masculine ideal. Dean reads this incentivization as an eruption of the imaginary into the actual dictates of being a human at all, where the very personality is at stake in a drive to be unique incentivized by neoliberal technoculture. The circuits of capital subsume idiosyncrasies and transgressions, transforming them affirmations of subjectivity into a system of fame and publicity that binds the self into the circuits of capitalist technoculture (27).
Žižek draws on Lacan to distinguish between the “real Other” as the unattainable, unconscious source of desire and the “fantasy other,” the mediated image or object to which we actually relate. Žižek takes Bill Gates as a prime example of this dynamic of the "real other." Gates’s immense fortune is not rooted in traditional measures of exploitation—it “has nothing to do with the production costs of the products Microsoft is selling” but instead in his ability to monopolize the “general intellect” and extract rent from everyone who must operate within the extensive industrial and computational ecosystem he created with Microsoft (Restrepo 2009). Yet at the same time, Gates represents a particularly Silicon-tinged example of the shift from the big Other as demanding superego to the cheering, cheerful, apparently inert "real other"–one onto whom the projected fantasy is not one of domination but affinity. In The Ticklish Subject, Žižek writes:
Gates is not only no longer the patriarchal Father-Master, he is also no longer the corporate Big Brother running a rigid bureaucratic empire, dwelling on the inaccessible top floor, guarded by a host of secretaries and deputees. He is, rather, a kind of little brother: his very ordinariness functions as the indication of its opposite, of some monstrous dimension so uncanny that it can no longer be rendered public in the guise of some symbolic title. What we encounter here, most violently, is the deadlock of the Double who is simultaneously like ourselves and the harbinger of an uncanny, properly monstrous dimension … an ordinary guy, whose devious smile none the less implies a wholly different underlying dimension of monstrosity beyond representation which threatens to shatter his ordinary-guy image (Žižek 2000, 347).
In other words, Bill Gates functions for us as a “fantasy-other:” we don’t confront a fully realized, self‐determining Other but rather an idealized, fetishized figure whose authority stems from the “general intellect” he privatized. Our engagement with Gates is thus one of imaginary identification (the fantasy of frictionless innovation and ultimate technological mastery) rather than a relation to a concrete “real Other” with its own irreducible demands. Elsewhere, Žižek discusses the implications of this fantasy of the real other:
Note also the strict homology with Lacan’s notion of fantasy as constitutive of every ‘real’ sexual act: for Lacan, our ‘normal’ sexual act precisely IS an act of ‘masturbation with a real partner,’ i.e., in it, we do not relate to the real Other, but to the Other reduced to a fantasy-object – we desire the Other insofar as s/he fits the fantasy-coordinates which structure our desire (Restrepo 2009).
By juxtaposing Gates’s status as an untouchable, fetishized icon of technological capital with the specter of a “real Other” whose hatred cannot be neatly assimilated into universalist fantasies, Žižek underscores that our default mode of relating to figures like Gates is through a mediated, fantasy-driven lens. Only when confronted with an Other who refuses to play by our symbolic scripts—“real in his hatred”—do we glimpse how precarious and illusory the fantasy-other framework truly is, and of the violence in this moment of misrecognizing the Other.
This dynamic of constructing fantasy others to avoid genuine encounter with real alterity finds its institutional expression in the IDW's systematic targeting of what they perceive as the coordinated apparatus of liberal power. Rather than engage with the concrete complexities of academic institutions, media organizations, or policy-making bodies on their own terms, the IDW constructs these entities as a singular, malevolent "cathedral"—a fantasy-institution that can be safely attacked for not according to the rationality of that which has not been subsumed into the institutional. These institutions become another fetishized object of knowledge, one that can be "known"–and, in turn, dominated–from a safe distance.
The cathedral, the congregation, and the spire
More sophisticated than the typical alt-right touchstones of race and gender as the basis for identity and dominance, the IDW claims a more general argument "for empowering the few capable of resisting the dominance of liberal humanism" (ibid). The task of the IDW is to take aim at both liberal multiculturalism as well as the institutions that supposedly uphold it. Yarvin describes a "cathedral" of institutions "at the center of modern society, just as the Church was the intellectual institution at the center of medieval society" (Yarvin 2021).
The "center," in Yarvin's definition and the IDW's rebellion, is more broadly understood as the liberal multiculturalism that both Žižek and Peterson posture themselves against. Yarvin posits the cathedral as a centralizing structure, and describes a sort of universalization of ideologies through a discursive and "doctrinal" commonality. Yarvin claims that "all the modern world's legitimate and prestigious intellectual institutions, even though they have no central organizational connection, behave in many ways as if they were a single organizational structure." This identification of the "pseudo-structure" is that it is synoptic, with one clear doctrine or perspective–"it always agrees with itself." Yarvin continues:
It’s not just that everyone—at least, everyone cool—is on the same page. It’s more like: everyone is reading the same book—at the same speed. No wonder all the peasants are seeing conspiracies in their motherfucking soup. If you saw a group of bright red dots move across the evening sky this way, what would you think they were? Pigeons? Remote-controlled pigeons, illuminated by lasers? Sometimes even Occam is baffled.
Moreover, this mystery is critical to the nature, fate and epistemology of our society, because we regard the distributed nature of these prestigious and trusted institutions as an inviolable principle of [sic] of our intellectual security. We would never concede this level of axiomatic infallibility to a single organization, like the Catholic Church—that would be putting all our brains in one basket. No egghead would make that mistake.
While we are aware that individuals—even very smart individuals—can go extremely awry in their perception and analysis of reality, and while we have seen even groups do the same thing (hence “groupthink”), we are sure they cannot all go wrong together. To err is human—but eliminating error is just a function of sufficient statistical power.
The obvious irony is that Yarvin simply substitutes the central authority of the institution with that of statistical truth. Yarvin's article places emphasis on the generativity of intellectual exchange, and adopts what he thinks is spectacle–"the cathedral operates as a discourse… The institutions are just brands" (ibid.)–in order to explain the vantage point against which he is writing. The essay's explanation for how this discourse forms links together Yarvin's thought with his IDW brethren, namely the idea of hierarchy. Framing the discourse of the cathedral as a "Darwinian system," Yarvin explains how a supposed singular organism like "bad ideas in the humanities" have flourished. Detaching, ultimately, from the content of the ideas, Yarvin uses the metaphor of "selective advantage" in the "marketplace of ecology" to explain that the concentration of ideas that creates the discourse of the cathedral is one where, like Darwinian evolution, traits amongst ideas work towards the top. Thus the central claim of the free speech advocates is underlied as, in reality, closer to a war or conflict wherein there is a singular, apparent victor–a resolved binary.
Yarvin gained mainstream notoriety before Donald Trump's second presidential term as the intellectual of the right. In a New York Times interview, he laid out his critique of democracy bare: “It’s not even that democracy is bad; it’s just that it’s very weak. And the fact that it’s very weak is easily seen by the fact that very unpopular policies like mass immigration persist despite strong majorities being against them” (Marchese 2025, 4). For Yarvin, democracy's weakness stems from its inefficiency: its exploitativeness, porosity, flow, and femininity.
Intellectualism and digital subject positions
This parallel between intellectualism and efficiency is an extension of the social governance condition that media theorits Joshua Neves describes as neuropolitics, a set of techniques "geared towards hyperbolic performance that generates new thresholds for physical and cognitive (dis)ability [and] an intensification of voluntary and purposeful modes of self-optimization" (Neves 2022, 89). Neuropolitical life prioritizes self-optimization over social transformation, with its emphasis on cognitive success belying a view of the world as organized hierarchically through cognition and intelligence (90). This extends towards digital, datafied economies as well as the possession of expertise–the autogenetic sovereign builds a particular following along the lines of cognitive power, or the "intellect" of the IDW, and in the context of the parasocial relationship of microcelebrity, it provides a locus point for the symbolic paternal function of expertise to shift from its diffusion among experts towards the singular project, making it anew. The sovereign operates through knowledge, wielding both absolute authority and strategic isolation at the top of self-constructed hierarchies. This sovereign positioning depends on controlling the very systems through which knowledge gets produced and circulated. As Foucault argues, power and knowledge are inseparable: "Power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault 1995, 27). The autogenetic sovereign thus gains authority not simply by possessing knowledge, but by positioning himself as the one who determines what counts as knowledge in the first place. Rather than congeal the individual into the mass, the sovereign creates the very category: "the individual is one of power's first effects" (Foucault 2003, 52).
Foucault's framing of the development of sovereignty partially explains the development of the autogenetic intellectual sovereign subject. Positioned against hegemonic discourses of multicultural liberalism, there is particular emphasis on the independence of each of its members–the sovereign island–as an effect of the development of a growing rationality. It is no coincidence that rationality as an explanatory mechanism runs through the conceptions of human nature, of business, of the body, and of race that characterize the IDW's thought. Enlightenment-era ideals of "pyramidal" centralization, and in turn the control of knowledge, are located in the sovereign insofar as it represents the state. Yet rather than be a reaction against "mainstream" culture, one that posits itself as more progressive than its enemy, the very upholding of particular "rational" processes itself serves to uphold particular conservative hegemonic values that illustrate the connection to rationality at the heart of the IDW's prescriptions.
Sovereignty, the "eternal knower," evolutionary biology–these conceptual abstractions uphold its concentration of power. The rationality that upholds this supposed rebel posture is the fundamental rationality of the very liberal culture that the IDW agitates against, where over time–and the flight to abstraction–it becomes "more and more abstract, more and more bound up with fragility and illusions" (Foucault 2003, 77). This is the "rationality of calculations, strategies, and ruses; the rationality of technical procedures that are used to perpetuate the victory, to silence … the war, and to preserve or invert the relationship of force" (ibid). It is a rationality that emerges from the very management that it fights against, and in its attempt to provide an explanation that requires no more critique or creativity from beyond it, it offers a peace by looking backwards towards the power structure that founds it. It is a peace not as stability but as a reflexive position of temporary and temporal authority. This rationality's peace cannot be maintained forever, which is precisely the point–its repeated ruptures, its destructions that enable the autogenetic sovereign's return to repair what it has broke in its very flight, iteratively concentrates power in the hands of this sovereign. Because it is a peace that exists at the hand of the rational schema, it looks for a stasis that is always too dynamic to ever hold. The repeated "flight to abstraction" that Bratich indicates is fundamental to the autogenetic sovereign is one that is focused less on ordering the polis or its adherents and more oriented towards self-making as the primary sovereign act.
The very possibility for parasocial relationships with followers is buttressed by the privilege of content creators to enact the longstanding sovereignty myth of networked culture, where the internet enables a liberal subjectivity, an infinite space of making the self–a self that is quantifiable, measurable, and in turn accordant to a value hierarchy. These myths of self-creation were part and parcel of early imaginations of the computer. What were once the "great machines of empire," computers in the 1960s and 1970s had for the most part been owned by government, universities, and corporations, performing large-scale calculations on large-scale problems. The dawn of personal computing gave both a sense of agency and freedom to users, where these mainframe arithmetic machines of the bureaucracy became “tools with which individuals could improve their own lives” (Turner 2006, 103). Computers became tools for expressing and achieving the “authentic”–read, free–self in the same manner as the cultural practices of the era. This frontier mentality extended to understandings of cyberspace, which "maps the Internet as a perfect frontier, as a heterotopia" (Chun 2005, 37). Yet in its very operation through reciprocal relationships of blinkage, Chun continues, the internet "turns every spectator into a spectacle" (ibid.).
The spectacle of the user is, in other words, the occupation of a subject position titled what Olga Goriunova calls the "digital subject" – someone who is "an abstracted position, a performance, constructed persona from data, profiles, and other records and aggregates" (Goriunova 2019, 2). The digital subject is the representation of the self that exists in various databases, profiles, browsing histories and user data bundles that are constantly interfacing with each other across the industries and infrastructures that make up the web. Yet it is also a commodity subject, fundamentally a neoliberal idea–you are your data, and you must authenticate against this datafied existence. Thus the making of the "self" available in these networks is closer to a conception of self that is an agglomeration of points of knowledge that, in their consumption and reflexivity, create a sense of diffuse authority. Knowing the self becomes knowing data, and "expertise" extends domain into the stuff of human experience.
This knowledge thus becomes the background "against which individuals are identified and judged;" the spectre of knowledge gains the possibility to point towards the height of the hierarchy through "futuristic imaginations of posthuman augmentation and absolute predictivity" (Hong 2020, 7).18 The very possibility of the post in posthuman points towards the striving nature of knowledge-augmented humanism. The desire to exceed biological capacities through the non-biological–that is, the non-limited, that which is subject to the possibility of accumulation without material constraints–appeals to a means of skirting the bureaucracy of expertise precisely because it does not need to be accounted for in a diffuse manner. Instead, it can emerge from the figures (and, in the case of the IDW, the disciplines they embody) that are reified to take the place of the scientific "economism" of power, when it is equated between the repression of the diffusion of knowledge amongst neoliberal bureaucratic expertise (Foucault 2003, 37).
This flight, then, is fundamental to what defines the IDW as "transgressive." It is a repeated flight from the real world into the realm of (masculine) abstractions. The power to make anew is the power to authorize, to authenticate (the self), to be (and determine what is) authentic. Yet as Chun notes, "for authenticity to be transgressive, the real world must be latent, beyond view, lying in wait–beneath the surface" (Chun 2021, 174). The eternal knower, the autogenetic sovereign, who makes the world in his own image proffers the assumption that the world seen by the naked eye, that is the material world of experience, is not the real world. Instead, the real world is that which is known only through the expertise of the maker itself. Knowledge, in this instance, acts as pure generativity in its ability to constantly be involved in the process of making–especially in the human dynamics of the subject. This is a masculinist knowledge.
Identitarianism and irony
The red pill is an attempt for a fundamental sea change in consciousness. The form of the human–the image, or the imaginary–that exists and emerges from the intellectual dark web and the red pill attempts to bring forward the idea that certain possible categories of knowledge are just the case, existing outside of discourse or from particular subject positions.
Knowledge here is akin to data, in its own reified and removed existence. Software studies scholar Dan McQuillan talks of "algorithmic seeing," where data produced by machines is most often 'seen' by other machines before it comes to bear on the reality of the viewer's gaze. The truths "seen" when the red pill is consumed are identities as datapoints–a datapoint as a fetishized or othered object. The subject of the intellectual dark web is thus both the subject whose gaze fetishizes and the subject of a fetishizing gaze. It positions the viewer as a datapoint, taking in and reflecting the hegemonic discourses that are already constituting the subject as they approach this media (Goriunova 2019). The viewer of the intellectual dark web is confronted with what someone or something recognizes or uses as themselves—the audience spoken to, in the form of Peterson's advice or the direct address of the debate of Žižek, is an audience indexed as being made up of one of the "true" categories that constitute the red pill's determinations.
Here, the intellectual dark web's logic aligns with what Carpentier outlines as neoliberalism's "agency fantasy" (Carpentier 2016, 99). This fantasy centers on an idealized form of autonomous subjectivity, where agency is imagined as wholly self-contained and sovereign. Such an epistemological orientation serves to other those perceived to lack this autonomy, reducing them to objects of fetishized knowledge or datapoints in what Chun calls the "drama" of Big Data (Chun 2016). The agency fantasy operates by positioning the sovereign subject as the lone arbiter of "truth," while dehumanizing others as lacking interiority or reflexivity. These others—those outside the ideological frameworks of the intellectual dark web—are rendered as NPCs, a meme term borrowed from video games that refers to the "non-playable characters" that populate videogame worlds as set pieces. NPCs are automatons incapable of agency, and in the context of the agency fantasy, they are a singular abstraction that reflects the supremacist logic of whiteness and masculinity embedded in the autogenetic sovereign's gaze. The subject lacking an internal monologue is almost always antagonistic to the red pill's values: the face of the NPC came to stand in for any number of Trump's opponents, from portraying Black and Asian people as 'non-sentient drones', shadowy Jewish puppetmasters as 'flesh golems' (Gallagher and Topinka 2023, 2).
The agency fantasy is thus integral to the "truth-seeking" spectacle of the intellectual dark web. Its knowledge production fetishizes the other as a passive subject to be revealed, surveilled, and ultimately controlled. This fantasy fuels the reactionary scopophilia of alt-right subjectivities, where the act of seeing—of consuming the other as a fetishized object of knowledge—reaffirms the viewer's imagined autonomy and sovereignty. By upholding this binary of agency and its absence, the agency fantasy legitimizes exclusionary practices and the reification of white, masculine, and sovereign subjectivities. In this way, the intellectual dark web’s reliance on the agency fantasy not only sustains its discourses of "truth" but also perpetuates the broader ideological structures of patriarchal and racialized power.
Yet, as Merkelj and de Zeeuw remark in their revisiting of historian Timothy Melley's concept of "agency panic," digital technologies do indeed give the sense–not unfounded–that our media environments are highly manipulable and opaque, and construct a feeling of agency anxiety for which the red pill offers a possible salve (Markelj and De Zeeuw 2023). Melley defines agency panic as a set of anxieties surrounding a possible "loss of agency or self-control–a conviction that one's actions are being controlled by someone else, that one has been 'constructed' by powerful agents" (Melley 1999, 39). For Melley, agency panic is a distinctly American phenomenon, a culture of paranoia emergent from Cold War anxieties about the possibility of cognitive and mental control emergent from an other. Melley posits this panic as an infringement on conceptions of individual sovereignty intimately tied to American conceptions of the liberal individual. There are metaphysical presumptions made in this mode of agency panic: the belief that individuals "ought to be rational, motivated agents in full control of themselves." This entails a "strict metaphysics of inside and outside; that is, the self must be a clearly bounded entity, with an interior core of unique beliefs, memories, desires easily distinguished from the external influences and controls" (ibid).
I argue that under algorithmic automation, paranoia is the fear of denial of not agency but a sense of this agency. Merkelj and de Zeeuw posit that this digital agency panic persists and takes on new forms in the age of datafied platforms, search engines, and recommendation systems (Markelj and De Zeeuw 2023). Digital infrastructures both define users and reflect those definitions back to them through screens and interfaces. This creates new forms of anxiety about influence and compromised agency—users sense they are being watched or, at least, accounted for by an unknown figure. In turn, they are shaped by something external that they cannot understand. The gap between how the network perceives the user (through data collection and algorithmic processing) and how the user perceives themselves generates this unsettling feeling of being observed from the outside. This external gaze operates like what Parisi calls algorithmic automation—a form of machine thinking that processes human behavior without human-like reasoning or intention. Rather than thought and philosophy providing refuge from technocapitalism in their status as "safe enclaves of pure uncertainty and singularity," Parisi argues that algorithmic automation is a form of rule-based thought that is indifferent to these human qualities yet encompasses them, "all without representing philosophical or critical thought" (Parisi 2015, 130). Parisi argues that this is a second nature of thought that "supplants the teleological finality of reason," one that disjoints the human from its possible status as reasoning. With Melley's agency panic, then, agency is violated when the subject perceives someone or some thing thinking for or outside of them. The red pill's hearkening back to identity categories that make up the history of power that they reckon slipped from their hands is, given the exact same biases are encoded in algorithmic thought and large language models, a tacit acknowledgment of the entrenchment of these categories. Hence the deep imbrication of these discourses with social media microcelebrity: cries for the left to, for example, enter the "bro" podcast sphere19 are inert precisely because algorithmic thinking itself already thinks according to these lines. The expertise of the intellectual dark web is the spectral image of expertise precisely because these experts parrot an idea of individuality. Algorithmic discourses flow through them algorithmically. The knowingness of critiquing ideology and the projective accusations of centralized, spectralized thought (Peterson's "postmodern neo-Marxism") are continuations of the exact forms of discrimination that gave them the possibility of expression in the first place. To take the red pill is to become machine, not in the sense of a roboticism of affect but to dislodge or de-fang the uncertainty of one's own subjectivity into the unthinking paradigm of algorithmic thought.
As Parisi writes, algorithmic automation and its thought lack the teleological drive of human reasoning, instead operating as rational structures of repetition. As a mode of sovereign reasoning, then, the algorithmic sovereign is an autogenetic sovereign. And as Bratich argues, the autogenetic sovereign's gaze comes from a necessarily white standpoint. Whiteness seeks to ground itself and its values as a "nationalist common sense." This epistemology–this way of knowing–is tied to an ontology, which produces a subjectivity that has the power and capacity to shape a world where its supremacist claims make sense (Bratich 2022, 22).
Contra its claims, then, the red pill is unironic. While the red pill claims to be against the prevailing (liberal, multicultural) common sense of its time, it does so from a perspective of reactive superiority. Richard Rorty, in his writings on irony, describes an ironist as someone who doubts the ways that they view the world because of a relationship of humility: the ironist doubts her vocabulary because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, realizes that she cannot solve this argument in her current vocabulary, and knows her vocabulary is particular to herself (Rorty 1989, 73). Irony arises from a recognition of the contingency of the moral on the vocabulary used to define it. The ironist knows that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed, and in renunciating the attempt to formulate criteria of choice, they are placed in a metastable position: never quite able to take themselves seriously because they are aware that the terms with which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves. This intellectualism is, rather, grounded in conceptions of common sense. For Rorty, common sense is the opposite of irony; irony is the negation of common sense. To be commonsensical is to take for granted that statements formulated in that final vocabulary are suffice to judge the beliefs, actions, and lives of those who employ alternative final vocabularies.
Ironic gawking
The autogenetic sovereign's repeated flight away from the very conditions that it creates are the conditions for male loneleness online; the parasocial relationships that viewers can foster with the intellectual dark web constitute a form of lurking, continuing to consolidate a form of patriarchal authority. But lurking and pornography share the same fundamental structure: both position the subject as an unseen observer who gains secret knowledge about others without risking reciprocal exposure or genuine encounter. The rebel status of the IDW gives a pornographic sheen to intellectual consumption, promising access to hidden truths about society, gender, and power. Pornography and the will to knowledge coincide. As Chun argues, the Enlightenment "drive for knowledge" is ingrained within all pornography, "from Renaissance 'primers' about female academes to eighteenth-century confessions, from Victorian secret museums to twentieth-century porn films/videos/photographs … pornography portrays its protagonists and readers as voyeurs, who gain secret knowledge through their spying or 'lurking'" (Chun 2005, 101). The autogenetic sovereign's movement away from the social is the movement of the subject who sees but is not seen. Pornography mimics this image, "the mythic image of power: the position of the colonizing subject, the guard in the central tower of the panopticon, the cinematic spectator" (ibid).
The myth of power involved in the colonizing subject and its sovereignty is thus an attempt to see all, to provide ambient vision that shapes the subject. This is a fetishization of both audience and viewer, and, as Whitney Philips and Ryan Milner argue, it is endemic to the internet as a space of whiteness. The mythical creator from without is both the subject of the internet and the subject of the viewer's parasocial gaze. As Philips and Milner write, the white racial frame
allowed participants to—among other things—heed [cyberlibertarian John Perry] Barlow’s utterly Cartesian proclamation that the internet is the “new home of Mind” and that cyberspace “is not where bodies live.” Any harassment directed at people of color, any hate speech, any harm, that wasn’t real, it was just the internet—an easy thing to say when you’re not the one being targeted.
For Philips and Milner, the subject position of the internet "user"–especially in the anonymous spaces of 4chan and other pseudonymous spaces associated with alt-right or racist subjectivities–is one that is, by default, white. They in turn equate whiteness and fetishistic sight. The sovereignty of this pornographic gaze is therefore a sovereignty where whiteness is made into an image of the internet culture that prefigured the emergence of the IDW. Fetishization informed the spaces that gave rise to the alt-right emerging in contemporary subcultural space; a white myopia enters the frame, and this gaze is intellectual. It looks at the other from the perspective of whiteness in the social frame. This fetish perspective is the perspective of the poster, who writes these absent subjectivities onto the board. But it's also the perspective of the "user," a vantage point from which the rest of the world–NPCs–lack reflexivity or interiority.
The knowledge of the intellectual dark web is a knowledge that is informed by a kind of reactionary scopohilia. Scopophilia–which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as the "sexual stimulation or satisfaction derived principally from looking; voyeurism"–has a legacy in psychoanalytic thought as one of the primary sexual drives. Laura Mulvey, in her theorization of the forms of pleasure in cinema, theorizes the male gaze as one of scopophilic pleasure. For Freud, via Mulvey, pleasure in looking is simultaneously a fascination with the human form; it is the taking other people as objects, subjecting them to what Mulvey calls a "controlling and curious" gaze (Mulvey 1975, 9). The seeming paradox of control and curiosity implies a distance, where the look cannot be reciprocated–the extreme end of scopophilia is the pervert, the peeping Tom who can only derive pleasure from an active controlling sense or an objectified other. Mulvey is writing about this derivation of pleasure from the position of the cinema-goer: not only is there a pleasure in viewing from without, but there is also a more fundamental, narcissistic dynamic at play. Bringing Lacan's mirror stage into the picture, Mulvey discusses how the first articulation of the I, of subjectivity, comes when the child sees themselves in the mirror. The child sees themselves, and identifies with an image. The ego identifies with the object–on the screen, in Mulvey's analytic–and understands itself in certain capacities. This second form of scopophilia is not about pleasure so much as it is about ego formation. The child sees themselves as coherent and whole in the image of the mirror (or, as Mulvey has it, onscreen). Common among these forms of scopophilia, according to Mulvey, is that they "both pursue aims in indifference to perceptual reality, creating the imagised, eroticised concept of the world that forms the perception of the subject and makes a mockery of empirical objectivity" (Mulvey 1975, 13).
It is the extension of the internet user as a "gawker." Wendy Chun theorizes the gawker as an inversion of the Baudelairean flaneur. Chun is responding to early digital media theorists who posit the user as a flaneur or explorer, "a perfect spectator, who feels at home only while moving among crowds" (Chun 2005, 60). This is problematized partially because, as Chun notes (alongside Lev Manovich, whose initial theory of the user as flaneur she is responding to), the flaneur would never post–the flaneur must be seen but not seen at the same time. This flaneur is impossible, as the user leaves traces of data in their movement through networks. The gawker, instead, is the subject traversing the commercial internet–captured by commodities, inundated by and part of the flood of information. No longer the individual browsing the arcades, the gawker is a member of the crowd, powerless under the gaze of the internet as an experience.
The gawker is a key figure, I argue, in understanding the construction of a particular reactionary alt-right subjectivity. The gawker's inundation with the images of social media influencers makes him the subject of these influences. Yet these very influences have, contra dreams of freedom that buttressed the early internet, fought against their own attempts to be seen. Peter Thiel, for example, funded Hulk Hogan's lawsuit against gonzo journalism outfit Gawker for publishing a sex tape of the latter. By all accounts, Hogan did not initially intend to sue Gawker until Thiel privately funded the lawsuit (Sorkin 2016). Gawker drew Thiel's ire ever since a 2007 article outing him as gay. After his presence was revealed, Thiel began to frame his work as a defence of privacy at all costs against the invasive eyes of exploitative media (Thiel 2016). In other accounts, however, Thiel took issue most with Gawker publisher Nick Denton's question, at the end of the outing article, asking "why on earth was he so paranoid about its discovery for so long?" (Thompson 2018).
What, in 2005 (the time of Control and Freedom's writing), was once the production of "spectacular spectacles" on websites that "emphasize the agency of the user and not the server" (Chun 2005, 62) in a decade became the very content of a certain strain of social media culture that emphasizes that the desire of the other as a destructive desire. The spectacle of desire on the alt-right, then, is caught up in the concept of the imaginary: the gawker's distance from the screen leaves the images intact in the position of the user, and the gawker is in turn not independent. Chun, quoting Benjamin's adoption of Victor Fournel's description of the gawker (written by Fournel as the baudad, and translated by Howard Eilan and Kevin McLaughlin as rubberneck), is a subject of the spectacle. "The average flaneur … is always in full possession of his individuality, while that of the rubberneck disappears, absorbed by the external world, … which moves him to the point of intoxication and ecstasy. Under the influence of the spectacle, the rubberneck becomes an impersonal being. He is no longer a man–he is the public; he is the crowd" (Benjamin 1999, 429). The becoming-public of the gawker is to become the passive receptacle of the knowledge of the intellectual dark web: he takes upon knowledge in the form of a substitute for thought. Rather than engaging in the active work of thinking—which would require grappling with uncertainty, contradiction, and the demands of genuine encounter with others—the gawker consumes pre-packaged insights that arrive with the authority of revelation. This knowledge functions as a narcotic that numbs the capacity for critical reflection while providing the illusion of enlightenment. The gawker mistakes information consumption for intellectual activity, confusing the accumulation of "red-pilled" talking points with the development of genuine understanding. For Chun, the gawker is captured by commodities, standing and staring; when these commodities are themselves the knowledge of the "truth" of being an NPC, of being subject to the whims and phantasms of what comes across to be as a subject computed in- and through. The gawker becomes transfixed not by material objects but by a particular form of commodified knowledge—the "truth" that most people are non-player characters, algorithmic automatons lacking inner life or genuine agency. This knowledge-commodity promises to elevate the gawker above the masses by revealing their mechanical nature, but it actually subjects him to a more insidious form of control. He becomes what he claims to see in others: a subject whose responses are increasingly predictable, whose "thoughts" are generated by algorithmic feeds and recommendation systems, whose sense of superiority depends on the very digital infrastructures that shape his consumption patterns. The becoming-public of the gawker is to become the passive receptacle of the knowledge of the intellectual dark web: he takes upon knowledge in the form of a substitute for thought. For Chun, the gawker is captured by commodities, standing and staring; when these commodities are themselves the knowledge of the "truth" of being an NPC, of being subject to the whims and phantasms of what comes across to be as a subject computed in- and through.
The flaneur takes its impressions with criticality, with an agency of thought unique to it as an individual: Benjamin tells us that reads "from faces the profession, the ancestry, the character" (Benjamin 1999, 429). The gawker, on the other hand, takes what they see at face value and in turn loses their own individuality. It becomes a consumer of knowledge as a datapoint, where data becomes equated with documentary evidence. The autogenetic sovereign's gaze is the ubiquitous, fetishizing gaze of whiteness, that makes us look in to its own senses of data subjectivity: the gawker is authenticated as a particular image of the self that is reflected on to them through these discourses of the intellectual dark web.
The subject of the intellectual dark web is thus a subject for whom all vision is fetishistic. It is the subject of a fetishizing gaze and subject of a fetishizing gaze: both their own, in the (relatively) anonymous discursive spaces they occupy, as well as by the algorithmic flows of which it remains a part. It positions the viewer as a datapoint, taking in and reflecting the hegemonic discourses that are already constituting the subject as they approach this media (Goriunova 2019). The viewer of the intellectual dark web is confronted with what someone or something recognizes or uses as themselves–the audience spoken to, in the form of Peterson's advice or the direct address of the debate of Žižek, is an audience indexed as being made up of one of the "true" categories that constitute the red pill's determinations. The mythic creator from without is an attempt to take up the gaze or position that is otherwise occupied, and understood to occupy, discourse itself. It misreads the very definition of discourse, attempting to wrest control from the very idea that things can ever be socially determined and instead place this control back in the hands of the purported sovereign-as-author. This sovereign acts as if it can speak, and in turn write, the social realm itself. It is a dream of programming the social, where the autogenetic sovereign's act of hiding from view results in a loss of horizontal vision in an attempt to vision a god.
This fetishistic subject position is the subject position of data and computation writ large: the spectacle of the red pill, the cleavage between the real (that never was) and the illusion (that the social occurring outside of the identity-political range is a facade). Knowledge is a spectacle that is viewed from without, something to be had and not lived. It is frozen. The red pill is itself a spectacle. The progenitor of specacle critique, Guy DeBord, writes in Society of the Spectacle:
Fragmented views of reality regroup themselves into a new unity as a separate pseudo-world that can only be looked at. The specialization of images of the world evolves into a world of autonomised images where even the deceivers are deceived. The spectacle is a concrete inversion of life, an autonomous movement of the nonliving (Debord 1992, 7)
The red-pill, as a knowledge is the spectacle here – knowledge-of, knowledge how, and knowledge as final. For Debord, the spectacle as a unification adheres through the principle of separation. Alienated activity and historical appearance combine to accentuate and embellish resemblances while disavowing and effacing differences. In this sense the red pill can only be looked at, is a purely aesthetic object.
The supposed objective or metaphysical truths that underlie it are collective fictions upheld through histories written in narrative through colonial violence and expressions of power. These fictions are fictions of knowingness, of the possibility of there being one singular truth (of the Real being accessible at will). This promises a panacea to uncertainty through the appearance of unification. The spectacle accentuates and embellishes resemblances while disavowing and effacing differences. It is a postulate of equivalence, derivative of exchange relations, that holds together a unity of differences under a reign of appearances. There is no subject of the red pill at all: it anaesthetizes its subject, stripping it of the capacity to speak meaning of the subject into being. It strips it of the capacity of identification as anything other than true. If desire is, as Lacan posits (Lacan and Lacan 1991), the lack of the real object, desire's own nature as a real entity depends upon an essence of a lack that produces the fantasized object. The alienation emergent from datafication leaves a lack of self-determination that is a felt and nourished lack. The consumer of the red pill is those who are already born, who exist in a form of subjection where they are already datafied. They are envisioned as part of the regime of whiteness and thus already seen or belonging in a regime of visibility, already made to matter prior to any expression of subjectivity. To be the everyman is to be no subject at all. Taking the red pill shows its users a form of truth that is exercised, built, and maintained socially, through networks of colonial power. Yet the paradox of identity diffusion between perceived victimhood and hegemonic power that necessitates such a pharmacological intervention is that to rely on these reified categories for a semblance of truth–in showing the structures of power that have already inured, repeated again ad nauseum–is to lose recognition of one's own subjectivity outside of these already-given identity categories. The resolution of reactionary anxiety promised by the red pill is the resolution of subjecthood, a fracturing of the ego into a split.
We can return to Freud, here, to examine the split ego as the result of this fetishistic gaze unto the othered other outside of the red pill's mythology of total knowledge. Fetishism develops, as Freud has it, when a powerful instinctual demand–previously easy to appease–is, or has been, disrupted. The ego encounters a crossroads: does one recognize the danger and renounce the demand, or does one disavow reality itself and deny any reason for fear? (Freud 2009, 275). The ego naturally aims for both, resulting in a split or loss of integrity in its attempt to hold both the desire and the fear in tandem with each other. In the case that Freud uses as an exemplar, the subject is a three year-old boy who begins masturbating after being "seduced" by an older girl (the language is vague) (276). After being caught masturbating by a nurse, he is threatened with the possibility of being castrated by his father (literally). The boy, rather than obey the command of the nurse to stop masturbating–to adopt the rule of the father into his life–continues to masturbate. He cannot give up the satisfaction of the instinct, even in the face of possible castration. What function does the fetish serve? It soothes the anxiety about the very possibility of castration–the boy continues in a state of believing that all will gain the penis, eventually. He has not, cannot face the possibility of woman as permanently castrated; compulsion, that thing which is definitionally out of the control of the anankast, emerges as an unconscious response. In adopting the fetish, "it is true that he had disavowed reality," Freud writes, "but he had saved his own penis. So long as he was not obliged to acknowledge that females have lost their penis, there was no need for him to believe the threat had been made against him." This is an intentional and direct turning-away from reality, "a procedure which we should prefer to reserve for psychoses"–something resolved, in the case of the fetish, by displacing his own castration fears onto the feminine (277).
Lacan takes us one step further: the fetish keeps knowledge in the realm of the ego, the imaginary knowledge that precludes no necessary other. It is the red pill as phallic identification. The very contradiction of the red pill is that there is a lack in the proper power of the truths that are said to be the necessary social foundations behind the spectacle. It is the difference between knowledge as connaissance (and the necessary correlate, meconaissance or self-knowledge) and the savoir. The distinction exists in French in a manner that it does not in English: the former represents a "factual, explicit, articulated kind of knowledge," while the latter represents "a more experiential kind of knowing" (Lacan 2006, 763). The former belongs to the imaginary register, that which exists in the perception of the "I" before encountering or being born into the symbolic. The latter is symbolic knowledge, the knowledge of the subject: the knowledge that one is a subject, is liable to subjectification, and might not possess the pure agency of the autogenerating subject that views the world at its will. Possessed with imaginary knowledge and the illusion of agency so given by whiteness and masculinity, existing in the imaginary register, the illusion that any loss of agency is an illusion and must be either weathered or reformed can only remain at the level of illusion if knowledge itself remains at the level of the imaginary or egoic.
It is again no coincidence that the red pill is something that one consumes, a drug, a pharmacological solution: a change in consciousness that, while it might be offered by Morpheus (or whoever else the subject has deemed enlightened), it is not a change in anything socially constructed (space, location, discourse) but the unlocking of a capacity already in the body. The red pill is thus a symbol itself for regression into the imaginary and the mirrored: a symbol that catapults the viewer out of the symbolic, out of the social and the relational, a turn away from the processes of collective or social individuation. This is only possible on knowing how to pay attention. Hence this fallback to the connaissance, to the knowledge of the imaginary: the thing that they never experience but has the best truth claim insofar as it is what the ego sees, the spectacle buttressed by the past. Before the mediation of the symbolic, there is the sameness, and there becomes the psychic loop that the incel becomes caught within: the accumulation of knowledge becomes a trap of its own making.
Contemporary masculinity is thus a paranoid masculinity (Markelj 2024): there is no social for this masculinity, only a deeply individuated object or archetype (qua Jung). Thus any attempts at repair cannot gaze at the past without gazing past the present. The fetishistic vision of the red pill contains its own form of jouissance, where this inability to cope with (the) reality of the destruction of a patriarchal dream that never was (or never was able to manifest without the actual exercise of patriarchal and colonial violence). Jernej Markelj theorizes this desire to somatize or immunize as endemic to masculinity throughout history, where masculinity has been historically "maintained through differentiation from women and homosexuals but also from racialized masculinities," and reclamations of the hegemonic past are paranoid, "immunopolitical" maneuvers (Markelj 2024, 116). Like imaginary knowledge in the Lacanian register, paranoid masculinity involves the delusion of absolute control and mastery.
Paranoia and knowledge
One question and contemporary counterpoint remains visible: this form of paranoiac knowledge, of the possibility of paranoia to uncover a truth, has resonance with critical theory. The difference on the face is that the latter has been aimed at reparative or revolutionary perspectives while the paranoia of conspiracy and the alt-right is looking backward, but this reading has been challenged by recent work in critical theory that acknowledges the similarities between the two. Media studies scholars including Clemens Apprich, Joshua Neves, and Wendy Chun, among others, read Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's essay comparing paranoid and reparative reading in the realm of critical theory (Apprich and Neves 2023; Chun 2023). Sedgwick's idea is that paranoid reading, rooted in what literary theorist Paul Ricoeur originally coined, to describe the trifecta of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the "hermeneutics of suspicion"–an attempt or acknowledgment of the failures of guile, or the requisite nature emergent from a series of paranoid postures that position the subject of knowledge as one who should question or orient themselves against a text or its possible first-signified reading. Paranoid reading, for Sedgwick, had already lost its appeal by the time of her writing in 1997, having an "unintentionally stultifying side-effect: [paranoid reading] has made it less rather than more possible to unpack the local, contingent relations between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailment for the seeker, knower, or teller" (Sedgwick 1997, 4). Inherent to the hermeneutics of suspicion, Sedgwick argues, is a "seeming faith–inexplicable in their own terms" in the effects of their own demystification practices as reparative, or at least a noble aim of the paranoid mode. Paranoia is characterized "by placing, in practice, an extraordinary stress on the efficacy of knowledge per se–knowledge in the form of exposure" (Sedgwick 1997, 17). It acts "as though its work would be accomplished if only it could finally, this time, somehow get its story truly known," she writes. "That a fully intimated listener could still remain indifferent or inimical, or might have no help to offer, are hardly treated as possibilities" (16).
Paranoid knowledge has a "thorough practice of disavowing its affective motive and force, and masquerading as the very stuff of truth" (17). Hence Chun's prescription, when discussing the incel's displaced rage towards women, that the incel's identification with the (imaginary) man that is simultaneously his disidentification:
What incels describe as a feminist utopia, feminists would call dystopian—a situation of traditional male dominance. Defining one’s worth in terms of men is exactly what feminism opposes. Feminists and incels could be allies rather than enemies, but instead incels hate feminists as they hate themselves (Chun 2023, 301)
To define oneself in the vision of the other (especially an Other constructed out of the paranoid fantasy of redpilled knowledge, of the fantasy of being able to know everything at all with a quick pharmacological intervention) is to define oneself as lacking or present only in lack, and in turn to necessitate, to need, the other as a jumping-off point from which to define the self. There is a hole (yes) in masculine self-consciousness that patriarchal culture itself dictates as necessary for masculinity to know itself as masculine, especially in reflexive identification with the feminine. Yet it is more likely this very idea of castration, the possibility of completeness (if only you take the right pill) is endemic to the reflexive self-identification of masculinity under patriarchal culture. Mulvey writes of phallocentrism's paradox: it is this concept of castration, the lack possessed by woman, that produces the phallus as symbolic presence. She continues:
Woman's desire is subjected to her image as bearer of the bleeding wound. She can exist only in relation to castration and cannot transcend it. She turns her child into the signifier of her own desire to possess a penis (the condition, she imagines, of entry into the symbolic). Either she must gracefully give way to the word, the Name of the Father and the Law, or else struggle to keep her child down with her in the half-light of the imaginary (Mulvey 1975, 7)
From this, the position of the woman in patriarchal culture signifies the male other; as Mulvey writes, in this context woman bears meaning but lacks the capacity to make meaning. The perverted or paranoid male gaze is one where the incel cannot see the feminine; while it objectifies women, it gazes beyond towards a spectral image of masculinity. The misidentification that occurs in incel masculinity is the possibility that they can not be relationally defined in the first place. It is the psychotic dream of pure knowledge, that knowledge itself can be adequate–for life, for power, for the removal of uncertainty and negativity and the childlike love relationship can be reattained. It is the fantasy of knowledge existing purely through the conaissance and not the savoir. Taking the redpill thus positions one as before time, before the past and the entrance into discourse itself: a psychotic structure of knowledge, one that takes the spectacle of the manosphere influencer, of the false reality of male victimhood, of narcissistic masculine power as the subject's truth.
Hence the fractured relationship to time possessed under paranoia and through this paranoid masculinity. In short, there is no time in the sense of time being something that is moved through and open to contingency or change. Paranoid reading practices are closely tied to the idea of the inevitable, the historical repetition of "Oedipal regularity" (Sedgwick 1997, 26): if it happened to the man's father, and his father, then it will happen to the man, and to his son, ad nauseum. The world that the autogenetic sovereign creates in his departure and return is the world that can be inhabited by filiality, and different images of the fractured incel ego. If one need only to "maxxx" various aspects of their life in order to be someone markedly different from themselves (Bernstein 2023), then this fractured vision of the self is one that can shift, with an ideal imago for which time itself is just a matter of fitting within. Maxxing, for example, is a theory for technical purposes, an algorithmic apparatus for the achievement of self-study. Maxxing presupposes an already-abject male body, the imago of the Chad or the masculine ideal that is the preliminary experience of want, of desire, of an abnegation of the male body in favour of its ideal. The abject subject is that person who, "turning away from perverse dodges, presents himself with his own body and ego as the most precious non-objects" (Kristeva 2010, 5). Kristeva marks abjection as the remainder from that which was left over away from humility towards a Christian God, the self-abasement of the ego. Abjection thus shares much in common with masochism, namely a "failure to recognize its own kin" (6); it differs in that nothing is familiar except a shadow of a memory, rather than the image of the master the masochist posits.
Again, with Sedgwick through Klein and Freud, the paranoiac places an extraordinary stress on sunlight as the best disinfectant, on knowledge in the form of exposure (exhibition). Paranoia's drive to be known leads to a drive for its abject subject to be seen, for others to know some truth of the masculine subject's destructive non-relationship with the masculine ego ideal, with the Chad, with the maxxed. The function (of becoming-masculine, of maxxing, of behaving according to the masculine ideal) is always reaching towards the exposure: the act of rule upon the autogenetic return. In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth: before the beginning, God.
This uncertainty is generated, politically-speaking, by the very drive to power-for-power's-sake that animates the right and those patients of the red pill. The violence of right-wing elimination of social programs, of undervalued populations, in the name of saving the economy is naturalized, as Halpern argues, through uncertainty: "there is a crisis of evidence and objectivity that the Right has now utilized to attack regulation, the notion of planning, legislation against disease, and any defense of diversity" (Halpern 2020). Uncertainty is the engine that drives the masculine desire to fill itself out, to make the ego whole through achieving mastery, the possible reconciliation of the perverse-paranoiac gawking view from without. This viewing position, feinting at Donna Haraway's "god trick" (Haraway 1988), aims for the brutal objectification of all that it sees outside of it yet succeeds only in further (self-)alienation.
This is, as Haraway wrote in 1988, a capacity for perversion inherent in vision, and without a feminist intervention–the removal of the rigid binary (of male and female, of Chad and incel) this perversion leads to a disembodied masculinity that finds itself scrambling to collect its fractures through pharmacological intervention (Haraway 1988, 581). Getting "high" on the red pill is an attempt to view from the God trick; the red pill becomes the very postmodern caricature that it proffers as a perverse boogeyman. "It is a common idea that a perverse practice undermines laws, conventional norms, and morals, that the perverse subject is some sort of avant-garde against a bigoted heterosexual hegemony," Kirsten Hyldgaard writes. "The pervert knows what he desires. The pervert's relation to the other's desire is, or must be, a relation of knowledge, not of question, not of lack of knowledge" (Hyldgaard 2004). The pervert does not seek to know (savoir) what the Other wants because it does not want the other to be actually other. He would rather know (connais) what they want so as to not break the chain of fetishistic signification.
What happens when this sense of control is frustrated, the perversion of this view from without? The confrontation with the possibility that one cannot know (the lived experience of the other, biological determinism or white supremacy as laws) is not resolved in asking the question, for to do so would be to convert to neurosis, to welcome in the possibility of uncertainty and thus the demand to ask in order to know. Instead the masculine subject splits into the Chad-incel binary. The red pill hormonally extends into a form of masculinity. This disavowal of anything not related to order becomes the fixation, which is itself a position alienated from any sort of social belonging–with its inherent messiness, contingency, and chaos. This inability to cross from hateful alienation into any sort of social belonging is the byproduct of what Chun calls "liberation envy," that is, the desire to identify with marginalized groups in order to skirt the need for apologies through identifications with the victim position. "With liberation envy, one bypasses shame altogether by envying and taking the place of those who could demand reparations" (Chun 2023, 304). The binary of the redpill reflects the binary of thinking oneself victim, the sadistic-masochistic relation mistaking perceived subjugation with joy.
Chun argues that it is cyberspace itself that allows for the consensual illusion of the redpill: "as a reparative paranoid vision, [cyberspace] enables dominant groups to disidentify as oppressed, militant minorities and to promote repair without reparations" (282). Yet it is the necessity of taking a pill as a pharmacological intervention, a wholesale shift in consciousness: one is either redpilled or not; Neo can take the red pill or the blue pill, but he cannot abstain. Hence the alt-right refrain, common from someone like Ben Shapiro, that "facts don't care about your feelings:" this very denial of nurture motivates disidentification. The envy of liberation envy is the possibility that emotional claims will be heard by the other, that the disavowal of white patriarchal power and heteronormativity requisite for any sense of real progress or belonging might be the only possible route forward. But instead cyberspace has given ground for the recursion of masculinity (as a logic) into an order of what might come to be seen as a form of truth. As Parisi and Dixon-Román write on recursion,
It is in the name of the axiomatics of modern science that technology became the measure of progress against which the global world became measured. The self-posited universality of Western technology resides in the epistemologies of racial capitalism founded on principles of causal efficiency where knowledge becomes equivalent to automated tasks that carry out other tasks in a mindless chain of effects (Parisi and Dixon-Román 2020)
Knowledge as equivalent to automated tasks that carry out other tasks in a mindless chain of effects is knowledge as the tool of domination, the possible supplementary capacity added by the red pill to its adherents. The red pill is dead, necropolitical.
Ironic failure
To conclude, the red pill fails to accomplish what it sets out to do precisely because it cannot actually embody the perspective of power that it desires underneath the surface. Donna Haraway’s depiction of Jesus as a “trickster” underscores the necessity of self-aware subversion when challenging dominant narratives: “Ecce homo! …can, indeed must, be read ironically by ‘post-Christians’ and other post-humanists as ‘Behold the man … the actor of a history that mocks especially the recurrent tales that insist that “man makes himself” in the deathly onanistic nightdream of coherent wholeness and correct vision’” (Haraway 2013, 90). As Haraway describes it, the true trickster is not merely a figure who disrupts from the outside but one who understands and enacts the very codes it appears to denounce. This reflexive irony is essential: the trickster knows it is performing, and that knowledge is what allows it to hold power in abeyance and expose the arrogance of any sovereign claim to “pure” insight.
Despite (or, rather, because of) the intellectual dark web's attachment to logic and rationality, with epistemic mastery as their mode of power, the autogenetic sovereign constitutes themselves and is constituted by normative performances while disavowing their performativity. The ironic posture of the red pill is anything but. The autogenetic sovereign believes it is generating itself from a place of absolute agency, based on the attachment to the supposed objectivity of rationalty. Yet rationality itself is always already embedded within and reinforced by existing power relations. In this respect, a truly “autogenetic” figure would function much like Haraway’s trickster: knowingly manipulating the codes of representation to reveal hidden dependencies.
When the autogenetic sovereign fails to adopt this trickster’s self-awareness, its project unravels. The claim of ironic distance foundational to the red pill, the purportedly self-generated subject, simply reinforces a new norm under the guise of radical autonomy. In red-pill epistemology, for example, the believer imagines herself awakened, yet remains blind to the ways her “sovereign” critique recapitulates a different but equally totalizing narrative. Such a subject is a would-be trickster who never realizes its performance of intellect and the limitations of the sunlight that it needs itself to master: it cannot “mock” the paradigms that sustain it, and so it can only fall onto reiterating itself.
In this chapter, I have traced together the thought and effects underlying a collection of thinkers closely attached to right-wing thought of the last 20 years. The ideological posturing of these thinkers as "true" liberals reads liberalism not as a freedom to subjectivity but the freedom to dominate, to become and remain sovereign, and to (re)establish and enact dominance hierarchies. The turn towards interdisciplinary explanations to model social behaviour–from lobster analogies to Foucauldian discourse-turned-evolutionary biology–speaks to the deterioration of authority that open up the possibility for the intellectual sovereign to claim it. While positioning themselves as novel or new, the "intellectual rebel" posture adopted by a subset of this new right ends up only serving the same systems that they gain their identity against.
That such an epistemic authority is up for grabs is both the engine and the fuel that drives the construction of the expert intellectual as symbolic authority. Cultural theorist Jordy Rosenberg notes that these contemporary reactionary postures refer not to the defence of particular values so much as the cultural positioning of a particular type of "outsider" intellect as perverse: "neo-fascism isn’t about claiming the moral high ground for itself," he writes. "Rather, it exults in performing its perversity" (Rosenberg 2018). This perversity provokes a sense of drive away not from social desire but from the self. In the case of the intellectual dark web, the paternal authority is gleaned as an (intellectual) challenge, but also an available subject position, in reaction to neoliberal faceless expertise. Power and authority are located in knowledge, yet the face of this knowledge is the isolated individual libertarian subject. This partly explains the relative lack of overlap in the IDW's fields of expertise: Peter Thiel is the only expert on business; Peterson its resident psychologist; the movement extends from new Atheism by looking towards someone like Sam Harris as in-house neuroscientist. In true reactionary form, the hegemony of neoliberal expertise and technocratic rule is ostensibly challenged but in reality reinforced by the offloading of the patriarchal authority onto specific, self-presenting sovereign "experts" whose very position is gained by putting their name to the paternal authority so lacking after neoliberalism’s rejection of anything beyond the scale of the individual.
Notes
While I do not delve into theories of technologies of the self and the alt-right or neo-fascist movement in this dissertation, there is a link. Thiel, for example, has pushed such ideas as parabiosis (Basu 2017), which involves blood transfusion from chronologically-younger adults to older adults.
A common prescription, especially after Trump's second election–see, for example, lectures about "What the mainstream media can learn from 'bro podcasters'" (Ward 2024).