Chapter 2. Dr. Jordan Peterson and the autogenetic sovereign — Fear of mimesis
Contents · Official record (SFU Summit)
Chapter 2. Dr. Jordan Peterson and the autogenetic sovereign
On 19 April 2019, the Slovenian Marxist philosopher Slavoj Žižek and Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson participated in a debate titled "Happiness: Capitalism vs. Marxism." In a high-ticket event at Toronto's Meridian Hall, Peterson argued that capitalism promotes personal responsibility and individualism, which offers the potential to achieve happiness that is unavailable under communism. Žižek, on the other hand, argued that these very conditions lead to a social alienation that stymies the possibility of joy.
One could have gotten Toronto Maple Leafs hockey tickets for cheaper. Here was Peterson, a popular professor-turned-guru whose crowdfunding efforts had crested the million-dollar mark annually, up to test his ideas and ideals against a paragon of the "cultural Marxism" that underlies so many of his critiques. Representing the left side, Žižek–arguably most popular for his engagements with cinema, and who was once described by Times Higher Education columnist Scott McLemee as the "Elvis of cultural theory"–took a mantle that his unorthodox intellectual position might have prompted more spectacle than cavalry. But rather than a stirring conversation between two intellectual heavyweights arguing the nuances of their respective ideological systems, the debate was a failure. Most figured that Žižek handily won the debate. Peterson's antagonisms were directed less at Žižek's ideas than what he has repeatedly called the "cultural Marxism" that has supposedly extended from academia to culture entirely; Žižek, no staunch defender of the academy himself, mostly freewheeled about contemporary culture and capitalism in the style that has characterized much of his writing since after the publication of his first book, The Sublime Object of Ideology, in 1989.
The debate failed because its promise depended on both Peterson and Žižek inhabiting the clear subject positions that Peterson's worldview requires: the rational defender of Western civilization versus the nihilistic destroyer of traditional values. Žižek's refusal to occupy this prescribed role, combined with his own ambivalent relationship to academic orthodoxy, left Peterson shadow-boxing against phantoms.
The debate's failure thus reveals the sterility of a particular approach to knowledge that underlies the red pill’s claims of consumption as empowerment. Peterson's inability to engage dialectically with complexity reveals a preference for the satisfaction of demolishing strawmen that pose no genuine threat to his sovereign position as interpreter of cultural decline. But this spectacular breakdown is precisely what makes Peterson worth examining—not as an aberration, but as a particularly revealing symptom of the broader crisis he claims to diagnose. In this chapter, I use Peterson's career and public persona as a key to unlock questions about the relationship between the alt-right, the "red pill," spectacle, and knowledge. Peterson achieved academic success researching alcoholism for clinical psychology journals, yet is better known for his 580-page tome Maps of Meaning and the humanist mysticism of his public intellectualism he published on YouTube beginning in the mid 2010s. This work led him to be what New York Times columnist David Brooks called in 2018 "the most influential public intellectual in the Western world right now" (Brooks 2018). An intellectual of his fame so firmly entrenched as a figure of the alt-right, with a self-stated mission to "take the humanities back from the corrupt postmodernists," motivates the questions of this chapter.
The spectacle of ideological attachment communicated by pitting Peterson and Žižek as two sides of a binary turns political imagination into a dichotomy, and forecloses the possibility of thinking anything otherwise. This matters: Žižek and Peterson are together an impoverished vision of political possibility. Peterson's emphasis on individual responsibility dismisses the possible role of systemic issues and sells the illusion of full agency, that one might be able to solve their own problems given the correct inputs (will, effort, determination). He perpetuates a destructive binary of chaos and order, poorly-hidden proxies for a misogynist view of the feminine. Binaries run through his thought: chaos versus order, for Peterson, is a battle of good versus evil, or (as we'll see later in this chapter) the virtuous, nubile, and courageous young man against the monstrous, devouring mother. Žižek, meanwhile, leans into his status as enfant terrible in a manner not unlike Peterson: his bucking of the tradition of the liberal academy has been as much a part of his popularity as his critical-theoretical excursus. While firmly entrenched in the critical-theoretical tradition, Žižek constantly positions himself outside of it.12
Peterson and Žižek's debate was part of a history, especially over the 20th century, of both a spectacle of intellectualism and a way to map or continue the cultural narrative of drawing binary distinctions in epistemes of political and social thought. Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer debated phenomenologist Martin Heidegger in 1929 on the significance of Immanuel Kant's notions of freedom and rationality (Schalow 2012). In 1971, American linguist Noam Chomsky and French historian Michel Foucault debated the existence of human nature and the role power shapes in its formation (Wilkin 1999). In letters, Foucault found himself and his theory of genealogy up against Jürgen Habermas' "communicative rationality" as a form of critical theory (Mayes 2015); likewise, much of French post-structuralist Jacques Derrida's fame in the United States emerged from his scholarly exchange with American philosopher of language John Searle, where the former articulated the "structure of absence" that underlies his theory of différance (Kenaan 2002) and the latter repeatedly attempted to describe it as bunk. On the more popular side, the most famous of this genre is perhaps the series of debates between Gore Vidal and William F. Buckley in 1968, likewise pitched (and landing closer to the mark) as a debate between two proxies for the American political left and right, and continued for years–in both lawsuits and letters–as a media spectacle emergent from Barry Goldwater's neoconservative campaign for Republican president (Brody 2015).
The spectacle of these historical debates marked out a particular social role for debate and debaters: the antagonism of ideas serves a dialectical function to advance conceptual thought within the public sphere–a means of testing the rigour of a hypothesis or at least building of previous knowledge in a causal and relational chain of events. The Peterson-Žižek debate, while aiming in apparent good faith at such a contrast, represented something different. While Žižek's status as the "left" or "continental" philosopher was debatable at best (Queer studies scholar Chris Coffman notes, even before the debate, that Žižek "has never been a friend of North American multiculturalism" (Coffman 2017)), his synthesis of Marxist and Lacanian theoretical frameworks offered a close-enough analog to the "left" side of contemporary debate history made up of Foucault, Derrida, and Heidegger that contrasted Peterson's status as vanguard paternal philosopher of the right. The debate's central question, too, set it up as an almost comically superficial battle of the spectrum–the search for happiness is not a war of two competing intellectual projects but an adoption of a different criterion.
The Žižek-Peterson debate was a vision of the conflict between the left and the right that has come to be understood as a necessary feature of contemporary liberal order. Two "renegade" intellectuals, associated loosely with their assigned sides but neither orthodox members, came instead to an agreement (one posited by Žižek in his opening remarks): that the problem at hand was not one of their respective sides but "left liberals" and their intolerance of difference in the name of multiculturalism and the pursuit of happiness. When both "radical" intellectuals converge on attacking "left liberals," they inadvertently reproduce the same scapegoating mechanism that the alt-right deploys more explicitly, redirecting systemic critique toward a convenient target that poses no threat to capital or patriarchal order. This convergence is not accidental but symptomatic of how intellectual labor gets absorbed into the broader neoliberal apparatus, where even critique must be packaged as consumable content that reaffirms rather than challenges dominant power structures. The debate thus functioned not as genuine intellectual encounter but as a form of ideological laundering, where the appearance of rigorous thought legitimates conclusions predetermined by the market conditions of their production.
Debating together
Žižek and Peterson's positions were distinct, but both rejected the very frame under which they entered: Žižek began his opening remarks noting their respective relations to an idea of culturally liberal academia. "I cannot but notice the irony of how Peterson and I," Žižek opened the debate, "are both marginalized by the official academic community. … Really? Most of the attacks on me are now precisely from left liberals" (Manufacturing Intellect 2019). Peterson, meanwhile, rejected an opposite implication: that he was there to debate Žižek, as opposed to debate a particular position. The posture, for the both of them, is a sort of renegade intellectual attached to rationality as criticism. Peterson understood and presented himself as mercenary for the right-wing side of the argument, his opening remarks consisting of a superficial critique of the Communist Manifesto:
I've rarely read a tract that made as many errors per sentence–conceptual errors per sentence–as the Communist Manifesto.
Yet before delving into separating "the wheat from the chaff" in the Manifesto, Peterson took pains to outline his position not through competing values, or direct disagreements with the premises of the Manifesto, but through polemic. Prefacing the audience with how he approached his role, he gives a brief lesson in his conception of literary criticism, a search for the truth of a text:
It doesn't seem to me that either Marx or Engels grappled with one fundamental truth, which is that almost all ideas are wrong.
With this premise in mind, he claimed that true knowledge or insight comes from a particular perspective of deep skepticism as a sort of intellectual warfare, from without,
Even if they strike you with the force of brilliance your job is to assume first of all that they're probably wrong and then to assault them with everything you have in your arsenal and see if they can survive.
Before Peterson begins the content of his opening remarks speech, he positions himself as a certain arbiter of truth, whose task is, as his speech later shows, to test "ten of the fundamental axioms" of the Manifesto. Peterson's liberal position simultaneously appears to transcend the dichotomies of debate–that there might be half-truths on each side–and yet credited to the capacities of liberal thinking, a side-of-no-sides. Both the position that Peterson adopted and the very conceptual appearance of the left and the right as two possible sides of debate assumes that the very tension between the left and the right is a feature integral to contemporary liberal order, the engine that keeps the whole machine running. In the latter framework, ideas always have their opposite, and the truth is found somewhere in the middle through Peterson's self-anointed task of critical skepticism. Spectacular public intellectualism, then, vulgarizes the act of critique into distrust or suspicion of the very packaging that prompts debate. Negation becomes the default reaction. This reactive stance creates the illusion of intellectual independence while ensuring deeper entanglement with the systems under critique. The public intellectual who defines himself primarily through opposition—whether "cultural Marxism," "postmodernism," or "liberal orthodoxy"—becomes structurally dependent on the continued existence and perceived threat of these targets. His authority derives not from generative thinking but from the performance of resistance, a spectacle of rebellion that requires the very establishment it claims to challenge to remain intact and visible. The intellectual's negation thus functions as a parasitic relationship, where the critic feeds off the cultural anxieties he simultaneously stokes and claims to cure. This dynamic transforms critique from a tool for understanding and transformation into a mechanism for perpetual deferral. Constructive thought is repeatedly postponed by a phantasmal conflict of its own making, mistaking compulsive negation for radical thought.
Wendy Chun, writing on the interplay between transgression and liberal ideas of freedom, proposes the transgressive hypothesis, “the notion that individual defiance and difference ground freedom” (Chun 2021, 75). This notion, emergent from resistances to mass media and “groupthink” purporting to brainwash individuals, posits that true freedom emerges only by resisting particular ideological frameworks that foster a totalitarianism of the same. The "red pill" of the alt-right’s infamy presents not an a priori adherence to baser human truths but a return to them through active resistance against what Fred Turner calls the “democratic surround” (Turner 2013) and the new right variously calls liberal multiculturalism, the “woke mob”, social justice warriors, "feminazis," and other epithets. Thus the "liberal" position is in reality a reactionary position masquerading as negation.
The two position themselves against the hegemon, and much of their value is grounded in the (mainstream) spectacle of this opposition. Yet this refusal or rebellious posture does not have the same valence as times past. There is a tension between the identification of two academics on the spectacular debate stage. There is a further tension with the idea of the celebrity intellectual signifying anything at all–Peterson attempting to mount a battle on behalf of capitalism, for example, presupposed that he was capable of speaking for an entire economic system (in other words, he was no nobody). This does, on first glance, indicate a liberal version of what Mark Fisher identified as capitalist realism: the inability to imagine anything beyond capitalism as the "only viable political and economic system" (Fisher 2009, 2).13 This emerged in the debate's conclusion, where the two sides could agree on nothing more than their shared opposition to whatever makes up the current order.
Rather than alternative or transgressive cultures as locations to escape the tyranny of the same, with political society as the basis, part of the transgressive hypothesis encompasses a location for politics itself. Andrew Breitbart, who brought usage of "red pill" to the alt-right and ran an eponymous blog that gave many early alt-right punditstheir start, once declared–in a statement that became a rallying cry of much of his acolytes–that "politics is downstream from culture" (Poniewozik 2012). This statement grew variations–alt-right commentator Paul Joseph Watson once declared that "conservatism is the new punk rock" (Joseph Watson 2017). It assumes an aesthetic status at the very root of all politics itself. For the alt-right, politics are a cultural, or aesthetic, assumption; the transgressive posture, in its very aesthetic presentation, in turn informs a political milieu insofar as it involves a positioning against that which is deemed the "mainstream" (or as Chun refers to it, a "reverse hegemony": when "angry minorities, clustered around a shared stigma, are strung together through their mutual opposition to so-called mainstream culture" (34). This positioning is an inherently reactionary posture, and it is in this sense that they differ from the countercultures of yore: rather than grounded on a certain essential or ontological differentiation or existence, these postures are all reflexively defined by their very opposition to the referential structures that uphold them. In this sense, transgressive postures–not restricted to, but especially, transgressive “alt-right” political postures–are inherently aesthetic projects.
Peterson as false metaphysician
Maps of Meaning was Peterson's attempt to provide a comprehensive theory of how humans make meaning in the world. The Canadian province of Ontario's public broadcaster, TVO, released a 13-part miniseries based on the book in 2004 (“Maps of Meaning” 2017). The book is ambitious: Peterson claims to have taken over 13 years to write it, and its pages are littered with graphs that map, for example, "The Regeneration of Stability from the Domain of Chaos" (Peterson 1999, 56). The dichotomy of order and chaos is the major thematic of the book and, by extension, Peterson's career. This idea has its roots in Nietzsche's metaphysics, as outlined in his Birth of Tragedy: the tension between order, represented by the Greek god Apollo, and chaos, represented by the Greek god Dionysus, represent the two fundamental forces of nature. Despite his time at Harvard and, in turn, the University of Toronto, alongside public speaking engagements like that on TVO, Peterson's profile did not reach public notoriety until 2016, when he spoke out against Canada's Bill C-16.14 From here, his YouTube channel exploded in subscribers; his Patreon began to net him just shy of $1 million a year by 2018 (Weiss 2018); that same year, his self-help book, 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos rocketed to the top of the New York Times bestseller list.
Peterson's mythology is a world of heroes and villains, of the "hero's journey" against archetypal villains such as the "chaos god." Order, the first of the binary that made Peterson famous, stems from narrative: "The known, our current story, protects us from the unknown, from chaos–which is to say, provides our experience with determinate and predictable structure. Chaos has a nature all of its own" (Peterson 1999, 18). In Peterson's framework, order is the structure surrounding experience. Narrative is a salve for chaos, tying experience together through the possibility of knowledge. And chaos is the unknowable. Chaos is, by shorthand, fear, and to know is to mitigate ever being exposed to that fear. "When we are in the domain of the known," he writes, "there is no reason for fear. Outside that domain, panic reigns" (ibid.).
Given the dual existence of order and chaos at the core of Peterson's metaphysics, fear becomes a fundamental condition of existence. The world is a terrifying one, asking for an ordering structure from a masculine hero. The world itself emerges from the hero's journey, the "son of the heavenly mother:"
When the world 'regresses' to 'precosmogonic chaos', it is always the case that the hero is missing. The hero is, after all, incarnation of the process by which chaos is transformed into order (Peterson 1999, 126)
Chaos and order together make up "the world" through the humanities and the sciences, respectively:
The world can be validly construed as a forum for action, or as a place of things… No complete world-picture can be generated without use of both modes of construal (1).
According to Peterson, there is a gulf between what is and what can be understood. The time of the child bridges this gulf. It is a time when people can operate "naturally," when "what something signifies is more or less inextricably part of the thing, part of its magic" (Peterson 1999, 2). This "childlike" mode of perception elides the "distinction between essence and significance;" significance and essence appear to be the same, entirely coherent. Viewing something in this coherence is, according to Peterson, a "natural"` state of affairs, yet it is this exact coherence that falls under the domain of chaos and in turn leads to authoritarianism: "the modern mind … become[s] impressed or terrified, despite ourselves, in the presence of a sufficiently powerful cultural figurehead–in the presence, that is, of anyone who sufficiently embodies the oft-implicit values and ideals that protect us from disorder and lead us on" (Peterson 1999, 2).
This protection from disorder rules Peterson's conception of a metaphysics of the subject. His conflation of modernity with the "modern scientifically oriented consciousness" (Peterson 1999, 3) likewise conflates moderntiy with a specific form of representation, namely that wherein the modern consciousness loses the object in a sea of representations and abstractions. This is, for Peterson, a necessarily causal process: the core experience of the subject is an affective impression, one which provides "motivational relevance," in order to develop a definition of the specific "sensory properties" of the latter (Peterson 1999, 2). Science, then–or any project that seeks to divorce the mythical and the sensible insofar as the latter relates to the rational–is the marker of modernity, the loss of narrative denaturing experience in the name of "thinking empirically" (Peterson 1999, 5) and the catalyst for the decline of symbolic efficiency that characertized the modern, post-mythological turn. Rather than order associated with science, however, Peterson argues that the order that structures contemporary society–hidden as it may be through the idea that science denatures instead of reveals–is "predicated on mythic notions of individual value–intrinsic right and responsibility–despite scientific evidence of causality and determinism in human motivation" (Peterson 1999, 6). Science, and modernity, is, according to Peterson, a "capacity for abstraction," obscuring rather than revealing certain fundamental truths and promoting a counterfactual mode of existence, wherein we suppose meaning to our activity without grounding it in abstraction.
Peterson's metaphysics reads as a mythical return to the formal principle of experience as a privileged knowledge over scientific deduction–or, in his terminology, myth. "The great forces of empiricism and rationality and the great technique of the experiment have killed myth," he writes. We continue to act as if there is a mythological underpinning for our behaviour–"thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not covet"–despite the modern turn's claims that such underpinnings are irrational and therefore unjustifiable. Yet mythology persists, according to Peterson, as a substrate of order that has ruled the development of (Western) civilization and continues to do so despite the turn towards empiricism. The "rationalist" ideologies, according to Peterson, which include fascism and communism, "demonstrated their essential uselessness within the space of mere generations despite their intellectually compelling nature" (Peterson 1999, 7).
This is where Peterson's metaphysics departs from poststructuralism yet is not, in itself, a necessary return to structuralism and becomes an argument according to causality or "first principles" (Peterson 1999, 9). While Peterson claims that "myth is not primitive proto-science" but instead a "qualitatively different phenomena" (ibid.), he differentiates myth and science as different forms of describing the world: the former as "description of the world as it signifies (for action)," while the latter is a "description of the world with regards to those aspects that are consensually apprehensible (ibid.). In other words, the mythical realm exists insofar as it promotes action, the movement and becoming of the human itself done so through act. Science is the world where things come together, a world of consensus mediated not through perception or the psyche but instead empiricism, the facticity of a thing, with no necessary dictates for action.
In this dichotomy, scientific thinking is akin to what we understand as postmodernist, while mythological thinking is something else. Scientific thought occupies the realm of the symbolic, the propagandistic, the ideological, the suggestive or seductive. The mythological, on the other hand, respects or upholds (or can be reduced to) a certain conception of a self, one as an active (liberal) agent in the act of self-creation. This makes society nothing more than "consensual apprehension," or agreement towards the external, whereas the mythological induction towards action prompts or induces a continual restatement of the sovereignty of the subject. This sovereignty is reiterated through action and in turn signifies itself.
There is a philosophy of technology in this dichotomy, where Peterson restates the Promethean conflict of the "technological power to do anything we want" against the question of "is there anything moral, in any realistic general sense, and if so, how might it be comprehended?" (10). In this sense, Peterson's self-description as a "classical Liberal" holds weight: the argument of the early pages of Maps of Meaning both upholds the substrate of certain human intentions (certain symbolic orders, through which his training as a Jungian psychologist comes through) and posits the human as a fundamentally agential subject defined by its capacities for action. On the other hand, the legitimacy of this metaphysics of the human rests on a fairly static dichotomy between the mythological and the scientific or, in other senses, action and appearance. Peterson claims this is a distinction between the moral and the aesthetic:
We lack a process of verification, in the moral domain, that is as powerful or as universally acceptable as the experimental (empirical) method in the realm of description. This absence does not allow us to sidestep the problem. No functioning society or individual can avoid rendering moral judgment, regardless of what might be said or imagined about the necessity of such judgment. Action presupposes valuation, or its implicit or “unconscious” equivalent. To act is literally to manifest preference about one set of possibilities, contrasted with an infinite set of alternatives. If we wish to live, we must act. Acting, we value.
This heuristic of action reveals a myopia of experience: the moral domain becomes not one that can be judged but one that necessarily invites judgment, and is the basis of all possible knowledge. As we will explore in chapter six, on Ludwig von Mises’ Human Action, this reduction is foundational to libertarian thought and its abstractions.
Cynical paternalism
Peterson's knowledge comprises the very oughts that are fundamental to his metaphysics. These oughts are the moral facts revealed by the red pill. Contra the later thinkers who call for various returns (to traditional gender roles, in manosphere and alt-light spaces, all the way to monarchy or monopoly or white supremacy, on the more extreme ends of Curtis Yarvin, Peter Thiel, and Nick Land) as the solution to social ills, Peterson posits that these things never really went away–there they are, at the very basis of the decisions we make, mythology and its necessary oughts (as he writes in Maps of Meaning, "no functioning society or individual can avoid rendering moral judgment" (xi)). This metaphysics of morality is, in Peterson's writings, a metaphysics insofar as it is what makes the world of sensation, of human experience: "to act is literally to manifest preference about one set of possibilities, contrasted with an infinite set of alternatives" (10). The world of human experience is thus the world of repeated choices about the world lived in by humans.
Peterson argues that human action emerges not from rational calculation but from what he calls "moral sensibility"—alternatively termed "knowledge of good and evil" or "mythological conventions." According to Peterson, morality constitutes the axiomatic foundation of human behavior, something intrinsic to existence itself rather than a product of rational systems. This foundational morality has been obscured, not clarified, by the rationalization of political systems, wherein "the fundamental propositions of fascism and communism were rational, logical, statable, comprehensible—and terribly wrong" (11). Peterson contends that despite mythology not being proto-science, it nonetheless serves as the ground or first principle of life—the space where authentic existence actually occurs. Drawing on Nietzsche's critique that "in the doctrine of socialism there is hidden, rather badly, a 'will to negate life,'" Peterson claims this demonstrates the existence of "some 'natural' or … 'absolute' constraints on the manner in which human beings may act as individuals and in society" (11). Some moral presuppositions and theories are simply incorrect, Peterson insists, because human nature is not infinitely malleable. At the core of Peterson's moral metaphysics lies a boolean conception of right and wrong—something that exists prior to rationally-ordered systems and ought to take precedence over decisions based purely on rational principles. Within these fundamental moral distinctions, Peterson locates the first principle of meaning itself, which emerges from mythology as the historical encoding of Jung's "collective unconscious."
The Darwinian myth
According to Peterson's conditions for knowledge, the hegemonic order–which was at the time that MoM was published in 1999 and remains (neo)liberal democracy–is both predetermined and resilient. Peterson posits history as a causal argument, equating the actuality of things with their value. Mythology and its dictates underlie contemporary human life and behaviour, resilient against the best efforts of intellectuals, scientists, and philosophers to change or reimagine social relationships. The split between mythology and science becomes, in Peterson's framework, the split between action and perception—the former representing the authentic location of human agency, the latter merely its effects or output.
Peterson's framework seems to face a fundamental contradiction: if mythology represents authentic human agency while science merely captures its "effects," how can mythological truths be validated without recourse to the very scientific rationality he claims is secondary? This dissolves when we recognize that that Peterson does not actually distinguish between mythology and science in the way his framework initially suggests. For Peterson, the process of science is the current historical form through which eternal hierarchical, ordering principles manifest.
Hence to demonstrate that these mythological oughts are not mere cultural constructs but imperatives encoded in the very structure of life, Peterson turns to evolutionary biology and neuroscience. This move reveals the deeper logic of his project: by grounding mythology in biological fact, Peterson transforms what could be read as contingent cultural arrangements into immutable natural laws. For example, one of his most famous teaching examples (which appears in the first of his rules for life, "Stand up straight with your shoulders back" (Peterson 2018, 1) is the case of the lobster. According to Peterson, lobsters–and all animals–have, according to the need to live socially, learned "tricks" to establish dominance, behaviour "endemic in the community of living things." Drawing an analogy between the nervous system of lobsters and of humans, Peterson writes:
Lobsters, scuttling around on the ocean floor, are no exception [to the dominance drive] … [they] have complex defensive and aggressive behaviours built right into [their] nervous system … Whether a lobster is confident or cringing depends on the ratio of two chemicals that modulate communication between lobster neurons: serotonin and octopamine. Winning increases the ratio of the former to the latter. (Peterson 2018, 5)
The lobster–and by extension, animal analogies–for Peterson reflect the scientific expression of mythological truths. While appearing to appeal to naturalism, a fleshy correspondence between behaviours endemic to "the community of living things," Peterson's example hinges not on hierarchy as a natural outgrowth of living in community but rather one that is biologically programmed. The appeal to serotonin and octopamine–the former popularized as the "happy chemical" by pharmaceutical campaigns designed to popularize SSRI medication like Prozac and Zoloft, the latter closely related to adrenaline and the "fight or flight" physiological response–indicates individual neurochemical states as the basis for experience.15 This allows for him to read his system across disciplines. For example, economic thought similarly reflects the conception of human society as "winner-take-all," where unequal distribution acts as a natural law that justifies hierarchy as both a drive and a natural order, so determined by the modulation of neurotransmitters. Peterson references economic heuristics such as Price's law and Pareto's law to justify this as an artifact of natural and cultural existence.16 Serotonin likewise appears in his fourth rule, "Compare yourself to who you were yesterday, not to who someone else is today," (Peterson 2018, 85) as an apparent natural chemical release in response to occupying some sort of specific and particular social role in (white, pastoral, fantasized) rural community–to be dominant at one's social role, for Peterson, is directly correlated with serotonin release as he describes it. In this reading, social dominance is biological law.
When Peterson turns to evolutionary biology and neuroscience, he is not abandoning his mythological framework for empirical evidence; instead, he is demonstrating how the same archetypal patterns that appear in ancient myths now reveal themselves through the language of brain chemistry and evolutionary psychology. The lobster's serotonin system does not prove hierarchy through biological mechanism but rather shows how the mythological truth of dominance has inscribed itself into the very structure of nervous systems across evolutionary time. In Peterson's schema, science becomes mythology by other means—hierarchy is the foundational myth that organizes both ancient narratives and contemporary research findings. The neurochemical language provides a veneer of objectivity, but the underlying logic remains mythological: reality itself is structured by dominance relationships that precede and determine any particular biological or social arrangement. Thus Peterson's appeal to scientific authority does not contradict his privileging of mythology over rational analysis; it demonstrates how mythological truth operates as the hidden organizing principle behind what appears to be empirical research.
Possessing the intellect to reveal science's hidden mythological content, Peterson's system attempts to place science under the domain of fundamental truth. It places these myths as axiomatic truths and gives them mastery over any possible knowledge claims that can be empirically made.
Regeneration and gender
Peterson's expertise and rules seem to generate themselves, where the expression of knowledge and appearance of knowledgeability signifies authority. What appeals about the sovereign, intellectual, paternal symbolic authority is not only its ability to assign the right, but the seeming escape from the economics of datafied knowledge. In this sense, the figure that Bratich calls the "autogenetic sovereign" (Bratich 2022, 27) underlies Peterson's mythological system.
Autogenetic sovereignty is the action of creating and locating authority in the very sovereign subject itself, hearkening back to a liberal-enlightenment idea that "the subject can create itself ex nihilo, disconnected from material connections and contexts" (ibid). The autogenetic sovereign is preoccupied with continually establishing its own power and sovereignty. Writing in the context of alt-right masculinity, Bratich considers autogenetic sovereignty as an effect not only of hyper-individualization but a network of destruction, where life-affirming connections are destroyed in the name of the continual construction of the self. The autogenetic sovereign is distinctively outside of society, and this very outside (re)generates its own status as both above and outside:
Autogenetic sovereignty is not a successful and stable ground—it is predicated on a flight that fails to secure itself, resulting in the need to restart the autogenetic process again and again. A failed autogenesis generates a dynamic of flight and return, a circuit that casts abstractions back onto the world as ordering forces. (Bratich 30)
The autogenetic sovereign deals in abstracts, explicitly tied to masculine conceptions of abstraction as masculine and materiality as feminine. The subject at the base of the sovereign is "always already masculine" (Butler qtd. in Bratich 26). Autogenesis emerges from Greek myths of the polis, where material reality could in essence be controlled through abstracted, authoritative acts that shape it.
Bratich traces this masculine authority back to the biblical creation story in Genesis, where the fundamental masculine figure is the fallen man who exists before woman enters the narrative. Like the Greek myth of Pandora, this origin story projects order and divine sovereignty onto a transcendent realm, while positioning the material world—and specifically the feminine—as a secondary disruption of an originally perfect masculine order. In this reading, nature and materiality only emerge as divine reactions to woman's intervention in paradise. Authority and authorship are intertwined: by positioning themselves as the original, uncorrupted subjects who must now create themselves anew after the fall, men claim the right to "authorize their own project" (ibid.). of self-creation. The key move is the flight toward abstraction—away from the messy materiality associated with the feminine and toward pure, transcendent principles. But this flight itself generates the very authority it claims to possess: the act of fleeing from material dependency creates the abstract status that appears to justify masculine sovereignty. The authority is not pre-given but produced through the performance of transcendence, even as it presents itself as eternal and natural.
The critical readings of gender that are the beginning of analysis for Bratich, Butler, and Buck-Morss are, for Peterson, the fundamental truth at the end of knowledge (Bowles 2018). Bratich's analysis here provides a genealogical rather than logocentric explanation for the very gender roles that Peterson views as mythologically innate. Peterson's justification for this dichotomy first occurs in Maps of Meaning, and it lines up closely with Bratich's identification of the genealogy of masculinity. For Peterson, the feminine, in its relationship to masculinity, exists within the realm of the material while the masculine is the "knowable:"
The eternal unknown—nature, metaphorically speaking, creative and destructive, source and destination of all determinant things—is generally ascribed an affectively ambivalent feminine character (as the “mother” and eventual “devourer” of everyone and everything). The eternal known, in contrast—culture, defined territory, tyrannical and protective, predictable, disciplined and restrictive, cumulative consequence of heroic or exploratory behavior—is typically considered masculine (in contradistinction to “mother” nature).
Peterson frames knowledge as an inherently violent pursuit:
The eternal knower, finally—the process that mediates between the known and the unknown—is the knight who slays the dragon of chaos, the hero who replaces disorder and confusion with clarity and certainty, the sun god who eternally slays the forces of darkness, and the “word” that engenders cosmic creation (Peterson 1999, 20).
This is where Peterson's conception of critique falls into vulgarity: Peterson justifies his mapping as "typical," not something arrived at through the dialectic activity of thought but a truth uncovered through his own studiousness. His own standpoint and subjectivity is misrecognized as the perspective of an eternal truth or a justified known. Hence the emergence of the autogenetic sovereign as an idealized subject position to the even see the autogenetic sovereign character in Peterson's analysis–the "eternal knower," who replaces disorder (the feminine) with clarity and certainty. This character, in Peterson's analytic, represents the flight and return of the autogenetic sovereign. Bratich's "flight that fails to return to itself" is the repeated process of constructing the autogenetic sovereign and necessitates its eternal return; Peterson's eternal knower "slays the dragon of chaos" by providing order, authority, and finality to the question of creation itself.
In the final instance, the power of creation that allows one to gatekeep truth rests in the hands of the autogenetic sovereign, and thus extinguishes any room for play. The "eternal knower" comes back to begin any and all process of creation with the word (logos). The initial status of the chaos engendered by the feminine is not that of some destabilizing but ultimately constructive force, but solely something to be reigned in by the supreme knowledge of the autogenetic sovereign. By reigning in, sovereignty is affirmed, but only the sovereignty of the king rather than sovereignty as human writ. The death of the author in postmodernity so feared by the thinkers detailed in this dissertation is feared because the author function exists again and again to reaffirm the authority of the autogenetic sovereign: its organization of knowledge, its ability to grant order and "right," and to order (through eliminating) feminine chaos through male paternal authority. The recursion moves onward.
Conclusion
For Peterson, "something we cannot see protects us from something we do not understand. The thing we cannot see is culture, in its intrapsychic or internal manifestation. The thing we do not understand is the chaos that gave rise to culture. If the structure of culture is disrupted, unwittingly, chaos returns. We will do anything–anything–to defend ourselves against that return" (Peterson 1999 xi).
Peterson's self-anointment as the brave hero of knowledge slaying the dragon of chaos places him in a position defending a "culture" that he cannot see. He presents like a lecturing father dishing out platitudes of life advice. His is the style of the strict authoritarian father, the father as life expert. He possesses rules and knowledge. These truths range from banal and traditional nuggets of Western cultural wisdom to more insidious prescriptions for an idyllic, patriarchal way of organizing society with conservative prescriptions to get ahead in a society of these structures' own making.
There is a contradiction in the rugged individualism that Peterson preaches: to be a man is to follow a script, to evacuate the self or any way of understanding it in order to serve the broader patriarchal social picture that he imagines. Much of his wisdom comes from other places; as political theorist Nathan J. Robinson argues, Peterson the wizened sage is an amalgam of folk wisdom and impressionistic grand theorizing that aims not to explain so much as overwhelm (Robinson 2018). Rather than understand the coding of masculinity as order and femininity as chaos as social or conceptual constructions, he views this binary as a fundamental truth. Mythological identities become prescriptions for action, and morality a measure of success in performance.
In the next chapter, I examine this cultural framing of expertise through a group of redpilled intellectuals that dubbed themselves "intellectual dark web." The IDW seeks out this same power to reduce moral complexity to calculable fact. Peterson, and the IDW, regularly complain about the boogeymen of “postmodern neo-Marxism” or “cultural Marxism”;17 as both would have it, postmodern neo-Marxism violates the rational principle of natural hierarchy.
Let us conclude with a consideration of the role of the public intellectual with which we opened the chapter. Ideas about robust intellectual cultures and the discovery of truth through rational contest are part of the very foundation of the Enlightenment (think a dialectical reasoning), and in this sense there might be an attempt to recapture a certain sense of it as a defining feature of public life. But the infrastructural changes and echo chambers of the contemporary age squirrel away the ability for this to be as generative as it might have been. We risk ahistoricism by diagnosing the debate as fundamentally altered by its spectacle, especially considering the lineage of understanding them as proxies for a particularly American political dichotomy. But the agreement reached by Žižek and Peterson seems, in a way, to be more generative of something than the spectacle of intellectual debate–on that front, it fizzled when the two essentially arrived at their agreement of happiness as a second-order phenomenon. The debate, then, simply reaffirmed the existence of the "debating subject" as a possible form of social existence. And we see this subject position reflected throughout social media: from punditry to podcasting, the dual function of pontification and exposure is the parasocial microcelebrity du jour, the failed or false debating subject who seeks to continuously recreate and affirm itself under the guise of reaching out to someone or something else. The dialectic of exchange serves to advance no common ground but instead the very one-way mirror of the parasocial in the exact same way that it is initially presented, and instead of flattening the dominance hierarchies through a dialectical spiral it serves instead the spire. In the age of datafied knowledge and its inherent reproducibility, of accumulation and quantification and "Intelligence Quotients," intelligence in the form of knowledge sits in a reciprocal relationship with data that fuels its own measurement. And the knowledgeable subject, the one who knows, is typically coded masculine. With the stage set, our investigation of the singular and the reactionary subject will move through themes of feelings and facticity, rebellion and the outside, and singular explanations for phenomena (from the logos to God, from the outside to the steeple) in the following chapters.
Notes
They differ in the relationship each maintains to the tradition they critique. Peterson's outsider positioning is fundamentally oppositional, presenting himself as the hero defending the world from the corrupt postmodern academy from a position of pure exteriority. Žižek's positioning, by contrast, emerges as a methodological necessity—his "outsider" stance is dialectical, using the tradition against itself to expose its own contradictions and blind spots. Where Peterson positions himself as the enlightened individual who has escaped academic groupthink, Žižek's method requires him to inhabit multiple contradictory positions simultaneously, refusing the comfort of any stable ground. Žižek has, however, had a bad habit of wading into polemical culture war issues that undermine the rigour of his thought systems (see, e.g., his commentaries on transgender issues and his conservative interpretation of Lacan on gender, for example, in Žižek 2019).
Fisher takes this from Fredric Jameson and Žižek himself. Žižek does not cite Jameson, but the earliest appearance of something resembling this quote from the latter is in 1994's Seeds of Time (Žižek 1994, 1; : Jameson 1994 xii).
The bill was designed to incorporate gender identity as a protected category for discrimination in Canada. It added the words "gender identity or expression" to the Canadian Human Rights Act, and two sections of the Canadian Criminal Code that deal with hate speech. Peterson's highly publicized speaking out against the bill was under the idea that the legal compulsion to use a person's pronouns constituted what he called "compelled speech" and was an affront to free speech rights.
Nathan Robinson quips: "the animal kingdom is also a place of mutual aid, and for a man to emulate a lobster is like a woman treating the existence of the praying mantis as a license to eat her husband" (Robinson 2018).
Pareto's law suggests that roughly 80% of effects come from 20% of causes. While named after Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, it is so named because Joseph M. Juran, a 1940s management consultant, came across Pareto's work illustrating that 80% of the land in the Kingdom of Italy in the 1910s was owned by 20% of the population. Peterson's application towards the entire domain of culture and power distribution is left up for debate, although Peterson likens the law to Matthew 25:29: "to those who have everything, more will be given; from those who have nothing, everything will be taken" (Peterson 2018, 9). Likewise, Price's law–a network model that determined how citation networks in academic research centralize around papers with high citation counts–acts, for Peterson, as another irrefutable law of humanity. The concept of "law"–especially as Peterson grounds it in the biological and extends it towards the distribution of resources such as dominance power, attention, and wealth–points us towards both the status of myth in Peterson's system of thought as well as the appearance of "first principles" later in this dissertation.
The term itself has a long history on the farther edges of conservative politics. As Mirrlees (2018) notes, “For almost three decades, everyone from paleo-conservatives to neo-Nazis has used the phrase ‘cultural Marxism’ as a shorthand for an anti-American bogeyman, a symbol for every liberal or left-leaning group the right defined itself against, and an epithet for progressive identities, values, ideas, and practices that reactionaries believe have made America worse than before”