Chapter 1. Introduction — Fear of mimesis

Contents · Official record (SFU Summit)

Chapter 1. Introduction

I finished writing this dissertation around the same time that Elon Musk left Donald Trump's second White House administration. He was was the head of the Department of Government Efficiency, an initiative designed to “slash excess regulations, cut wasteful expenditures,” and restructure federal agencies (Trump 2024).1 The two first discussed the department and role as part of a live broadcast interview formally welcoming Trump back to Twitter shortly after Musk bought the platform. DOGE shuttered government agencies, defunded programs, and enacted mass layoffs based on what Trump claimed was widespread "fraud and abuse" within government departments. While efficiency was the ostensible rationale, DOGE just so happened to align with broader political goals of the Trump administration. Its mandate extended beyond eliminating waste to include purging diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, reshaping agency priorities to better serve an ideologically driven “cost‐cutting” agenda. Musk’s personal investment in deregulation—and his public persona as possessing a sort of calculative business acumen—made him a natural figurehead for DOGE. To that point, the agency has been more spectacular than efficient: over two million government employees were offered voluntary buyouts yet then legally mandated to be rehired; Musk initially claimed that DOGE would save $2 trillion before halving his estimate, finding $61 billion of "waste" (Clarke 2025). DOGE was a soft landing in the White House for Musk after contributing an estimated $200 million to Trump's 2024 campaign (Merica 2024).2

Musk left DOGE acrimoniously after only 130 days, caught in a public quarrel with Trump. He immediately started a new, more libertarian (gun rights, cryptocurrency, and regulations) "America Party" (Schneid 2025). DOGE, like much of what I examine in this dissertation, was a fantasy of economism, where the reduction of government spending was equated with intelligence and efficiency. DOGE was a spectacular parody that combined the Trump administration's reactionary politics and the libertarian ideal of minimal government intervention. Musk presented himself as a rational hero capable of solving urgent problems. DOGE manifested the alt-right's obsession with rationality, minimalism, and the rejection of complexity in favour of a simplistic worldview. This worldview equates government spending and stupidity. Intelligence through economism, and its parallels with the simplicity and minimalism of logic, tie together the reactionary politics embodied variously as the alt-right, technofascism, or neo-fascism (Paul 2021; Neiwert 2017). These attachments to rationality span across the ideology's relationship with masculinity, computation, and libertarian politics, fuelling a masculine self-image that is both superhuman and antisocial.

In this dissertation, I am concerned with two main themes. The first is the association between mathematical efficiency and intelligence. The second, symbiotic with the first, is the emergence of the alt-right over the course of the 2010s. These themes drive three questions: what is the relationship between computational epistemologies and reactionary politics? How do they appear as neutral? And what role does "intelligence" play in legitimating antidemocratic ideologies? To answer these, I track the relationship between computing cultures and dominance as a form of social moderation. I take up the proliferation of the "red pill" and analyze its emergence, its influence, and its symbolism, as a response to the deterioration of the organizing and structuring power of large-scale social structures under neoliberalism–ideology, the nation-state, truth, History itself. Scholars have variously called this the demise of symbolic efficiency (Žižek 2000, 322), postmodernity (Jameson 2005), or late capitalism (Mandel 1975). By looking at the loose assemblage of the alt-right's public intellectuals, theoretical attachments, and subject positions, I examine different parts of the white male quest to bind together rationality, fundamental truths, and control. What I find is that fears of mimesis and contamination drive the fantasy of singular, self-created, sovereign identities that are amenable to the logics of programming. This is a form of identity biopolitics, placing its subjects on a field of the political that necessitates a paranoid, antisocial solidarity and justifies dominance from a position of perceived victimhood. Computational logics promise to control and order the world of sensual phenomena and its relations, presenting a "politics of no politics" that preserves existing power structures (Schneider 2023). The attempt to make everything amenable to technical interpretation falls prey to the very destruction of "aura" that Walter Benjamin characterized as the product of technological reproduction (Benjamin 2008), where a shared script of individualism is offered as a solution to problems arising from the alienation wrought by the homogeny of machinic abstraction.

The red pill

The story, at this point, is familiar. Early in 1999's The Matrix, directed by Lana and Lilly Wachowski, recurring dreams and cryptic messages haunt one Thomas Anderson, a software programmer living a double life as a computer hacker (Wachowski and Wachowski 1999). Cramped in an apartment, working the tropey Gen-X soul-sucking corporate job, he is one day contacted by Morpheus, who explains that what Anderson (now Neo) perceives as reality is actually a computer simulation designed to pacify humanity while machines harvest their bodies for energy. After this revelation, Morpheus offers Neo the choice of two pills. If Neo takes the blue pill, he returns to his cramped apartment as if nothing had happened—Morpheus explicitly states that he will wake up in his bed and "believe whatever [he] want[s] to believe" (Wachowski and Wachowski 1999). If he takes the red pill, he remains in this enlightened state, aware of—and because of this, called to witness—the substratum of elites that control the masses through this simulated reality. Neo takes the red pill, violently waking into an embryonic pod, connected to machines through cables and feeding tubes. He emerges into reality naked, hairless, and frail; such is the trauma of rejecting false consciousness.

The red pill allegory alludes to past artistic explorations of ideology's veil, from the glasses that allow their wearer to see the subliminal messages behind advertisements in John Carpenter’s They Live to the Wizard of Oz and its man behind the curtain (Fiennes 2012).3 The red pill differs through the degree of responsibility held by the subject who knows–Nada, the protagonist of They Live, is famously only interested in kicking ass and chewing bubblegum;4 the viewer of Magritte's The Treachery of Images is not called upon for anything besides an acknowledgment. In the Matrix, Neo has a choice and, in turn, responsibility: once Neo sees the truth, he cannot unsee it, obliged to join the resistance against the machines. The red pill is thus never actually just about Enlightenment: it has a practical, and indeed moral, directive. It is not only the burden of knowing one's exploitation but the imperative of its reversal. Morpheus warns Neo that "all [he's] offering is the truth, nothing more." Enlightenment brings obligation rather than comfort.

These texts share the idea that there is some deeper truth than what is immediately available to the social creature. Her world is founded upon illusions that uphold a social fabric that benefits something other than the “Lacanian real” of truths that maintain themselves in all possible universes (Žižek 1994, 30). The red pill's adoption as a political heuristic suits this framework of responsibility and action. Yet in a development almost too rich given the progressive gender politics of the Matrix (read as, among other things, a trans allegory5), the metaphor has been sublated by the alt-right. Contemporary usage of the red pill metaphor in alt-right spaces traces back to far-right Libertarian populist Andrew Breitbart writing of a “red pill moment” in 2011 when he discovered the theory of “cultural Marxism” (Breitbart 2011; qtd. in Mirrlees 2018). Breitbart was the creator of Breitbart News and its Editor-In-Chief until his death in 2012. The website was main digital media wing of Donald Trump's 2016 campaign, with a political agenda that focuses on patriarchal traditionalism, “anti-white racism,” closed borders, and antisemitism-tinged theories about George Soros and moneyed global elites controlling the world (Fuchs 2018; Marantz 2020). In this contemporary new-right manifestation, taking the red pill illustrates the set of axiomatic power relations that come before liberal culture’s ideological interference.

(Information) disorder and the crisis of symbolic efficiency

Vulgar ideology critique equates ideology with false consciousness, where the subject mistakes the essence of things with their appearance.6 The red pill mainstreamed this mode of critique. The shared concern about between progressive politics and the alt-right complicates the dichotomy that has plagued Western liberalism's attempt to define itself in reaction to these emergent fascistic forces. The red pill speaks to the same issues covered by the mainstream, liberalized notions of an epidemic of mis- and disinformation. With "post-truth" as Oxford Dictionary's Word of the Year in 2016 (Languages 2016), appeals to emotion and belief over the power of "objective" fact imperilled democracy. American historian Timothy Snyder wrote in the New York Times that "post-truth is pre-fascism" (Snyder 2021). Snyder and others who make this claim offer little justification beyond historical analogies to oppressive political regimes, and their argument elides the fact that "post-truth" diagnoses a similar collapse of symbolic efficiency as the red pill. Jayson Harsin argues that "post-truth" is useful as a periodizing concept that describes the shifting landscape of social, cultural, historical and geopolitical phenomena affecting public truth and trust (Harsin 2021, 137). Understanding this as a periodizing concept allows for the understanding that under "regimes of post-truth," it is not that "truth" no longer matters, but that relations between institutional public truth production and gatekeeping of knowledge have shifted (ibid. 139). "Truth" in "post-truth" often refers to factual truth, which is described as "fragile" and lacking the "coercive" force of rational truths (like mathematical or scientific truths), making it easily discredited as "just another opinion" or "fake news" (Harsin 2023, 5). These opinions are crafted through the machinations of the attention economy, platform culture, infotainment, and the emergence of parasocial relationships on social media (ibid. 12).

By understanding the concept of "information disorder" as periodizing, or epochal, we can begin to understand its precedence and look to its precedents. While the idea of any shared truth might have always been folly or fantasy, mis- and disinformation capture the idea of a collapse of a shared epistemic basis, grounded in the accelerating pace of information technologies (Virilio 2000). In this sense, the period reflects similar anxieties that existed at the turn of modernity and its confrontation with the rapid industrialization. Post-Enlightenment modernity encountered a similar restlessness and chaos in the social order that led to cultural nervousness, sensory overload, and the failure of a singular cognition to know. Eric Santner, reading Judge Daniel Schreber's Memoirs of a Nervous Illness, sees Schreber as emblematic of the subjective experience of the modern turn and the consequent destabilization that led to, among other things, the Nazi terror. Schreber's own psychosis was marked by what is termed in psychoanalysis the "crisis of investiture;" upon being called to preside as judge over a regional court in Germany, Schreber had a psychotic break and began to identify against the patriarchal norms of the legal role to which he was called. This gives us insight into the concentration of power and the possibility of an ensuing "crisis" of the self. As Santner writes:

One of the central theoretical lessons of the Schreber case is precisely that a generalized attenuation of symbolic power and authority can be experienced as the collapse of social space and the rites of institution into the most intimate core of one’s being. The feelings generated thereby are, as we shall see, anxieties not of absence and loss but of overproximity, loss of distance to some obscene and malevolent presence that appears to have a direct hold on one’s inner parts (Santner 1997 xii).

Santner, however, notes that this anxiety was particular to its time insofar as the modern project's notion of "proximity" meant that it was possible for many things to infringe on corporeal bodies through nerves. The increased sensory input of the industrialized city meant a wave of anxious exposures and expositions. Writers of the time attributed this sense to fatigue over a changing culture, where symbolic forms, values, and identities lost their credibility and their capacity to elicit belief. Santner points out that this sense of infringement in Germany had a moral valence. The author Max Nordau, for example, claimed the country's culture was in decline, a problem of "degeneration," and a "dusk of nations" (qtd. in Santner 6). This era of "feverish restlessness and blunted discouragement" supplanted Nordau's own bourgeois faith in reason and progress; the assault on corporeality was an assault on reason and, in turn, an imminent apocalypse. Anson Rabinbach notes that such a focus on entropy or decay was tied to the discovery of the second law of thermodynamics; science became a site of renewed sense of location within the symbolic network under the otherwise disparate nervousness of connection (qtd. in Santner 7).

Taking the "red pill" reveals a similar set of moral judgments about cultural excess and degeneracy in mainstream institutions and a similar antagonistic, untrusting relation–a drama upon which the disavantaged yet heroic individual is placed against the invisible mass of society (one of the Matrix's antagonists is Agent Smith, who in the sequel gains the ability to duplicate and multiply himself), equipped only with values that elide this possibility of simulation–the truth, freedom, knowingness (of one's conditions, of one's alienation). As Matthew Hannah describes, this "pill epistemology" involves itself an illusion: the performative awakening of one who takes the red pill masquerades as a process of reason and knowledge but requires leaps in logic and paranoid mentalizing to become epistemically actionable (2025, 1). Such destabilization begs for the pill's pharmacological intervention.

Misogyny and rationality

Where the mass of men taking the red pill differ from Schreber's failure to integrate himself into the patriarchal role asked of him is that, while Schreber was hailed by society to enact the powers vested through clerkship, relative advancements in feminism have destabilized scripts of power prior to the law, at the level of the social.

The (progress towards a) shift away from the nuclear patriarch as social leader in the West disrupted the pattern of socialization for men. As I examined in my own previous work (Burton 2022), taking the "pill" is endemic to the networked misogyny (Banet-Weiser and Miltner 2016) expressed by the various male interest groups online that have been dubbed the "manosphere" (Cohen 2015). The red pill, for many in these groups, "awakens" men to feminist misandry and brainwashing (Ging 2019, 3). As media theorist Jack Bratich and others have noted, the red pill's "truth" is one with explicit ties not only to misogyny but Enlightenment conceptions of rationality and scientific thought. The red pill tells two versions of truth in line with Neo's gambit of responsibility and action. The first mode of truth is told through "narratives that naturalize gender hierarchies and binaries via appeals to science, specifically marginalized and decontextualized evolutionary psychology" (Bratich 2023, 92). This "evidence-based misogyny," as Ann-Kathrin Rothermel calls it (2023), links to the rules and grounding truths that inform the red pill's second epistemological lens: that of Western Enlightenment scientism, "wherein deceiving everyday appearances are dispelled via rational analysis of empirical data as well critical reasoning" (Van Valkenburgh 2021, 91). This myopia points towards, as Rina James describes it, the victimization narratives that serve as the unifying thread across diverse manosphere groups—"men's rights" activists, pickup artists, incels,7 and the red pill—despite their differing solutions (2024). All view men as aggrieved subjects, reversing feminist critiques by portraying women as the root cause of men’s social and personal ills. Whether through claims of institutional misandry or personal accounts of disenfranchisement, these communities leverage shared grievances to justify both individual self-improvement and collective backlash. This discourse obscures the socioeconomic drivers of alienation and reframes them as purely cultural deficits. Language itself is a central tool in solidifying these dynamics. Terms originally coined as ironic jabs—“male tears,” the tongue-in-cheek invocation of “misandry”—have been repurposed into ideological weapons that cast feminism as a covert conspiracy and men as perpetual victims (Marwick and Caplan 2018, 548). Women who assert autonomy are branded "sluts," while men who reject hyper-masculine norms are labeled "soyboys," policing the boundaries of acceptable femininity under the guise of commonsense truth (Jones, Trott, and Wright 2020, 1).

Male fantasies

On the face of it, the upper-class men that occupy Trump's administration and the stereotypical "basement-dwelling" redpilled male are opposed. However, both exist as subject positions for men in this political milieu, and they both operate on the register of a fantasy of victimhood for the power that they hold. Let me qualify this claim via the latter group. Over the past five years, I've had two movies recommended to me more times than I can count. The first, TFW No GF (Moyer 2020), follows five young men who are not in education, employment, or training (often abbreviated online to NEET). Their vocabularies are stunted to 4chan meme culture, and they spend most of their time posting. Each has, according to the film, some degree of online notoriety based on their disaffection (and victimhood to the traditional expectations of patriarchal masculinity). Sean is socially isolated, spends much of his time in the gym, and is the archetypal quiet, introspective young man who lives with his mother. Kyle is a cowboy figure from Texas, a man of the people who frequents dusty rural bars. Charels and Viddy grew up in poverty without role models and turned to 4chan for escapism and belonging. Kantbot is a self-styled internet philosopher fixated on German romanticism who attempts to rationalize contemporary political systems through preexisting philosophical systems. The movie's polemic is that these men are lonely because they do not have girlfriends, and that their issues are structural. They are left out of patriarchal society for a host of structural reasons: the incels in TFW No GF are the detritus of a post-2008 American economy, steeped in resentment and unable to surmount the difficulties of initial setbacks (Sean, for example, failed grade 9 and didn't recover) (Gabert-Doyon 2020). A patriarchally-ordered world may have rewarded them in the past despite these lacks.

The second movie recommended is Feels Good Man, a documentary about the creator of the Pepe meme, Matt Furie. Pepe was born as a character in Furie's absurdist webcomic Boy's Club. The comic is about four anthropomorphic guys who just hang out. Pepe lives with three "similarly inebriated friends, Andy, Brett, and Landwolf" (Hennum, Sava, and O’Neil 2016). Their lives are seemingly free of consequences. They are impish, stoned all the time, engaging in childlike mischief. They are trolls, taking the piss, joking around. The comic itself is a case of generalized boys hanging out, a form of arrested development. Pepe is the avatar for the degree of unseriousness with which reactionary subcultures took their own trolling, circa the mid- and late 2010s. His affect is disengaged, and there is a knowing appropriation against the demands of being a man.

At first, Furie regarded the viral success of Pepe with bemusement; he was pleased that something he’d drawn resonated with so many people. Yet as the 2016 U.S. election approached, Pepe's memetic fame turned him into a de facto symbol for 4chan's “politically incorrect” board and a mascot for this new Trumpism. The film follows Furie's attempts to reclaim Pepe’s innocence through a host of tactics: he organizes a mock funeral for his character; launches legal action against websites trafficking in hate-meme merchandise; and even travels to Washington, D.C. to participate in a congressional hearing on online extremism.

We can read Pepe's political transformation as a metaphor for the coexistence of this lackadaisical masculinity and its vicious political underside. The NEET masculinity portrayed in these movies and the powerful geek masculinity that has ridden venture capital to the White House need each other to be whole, yet are always running from each other. The NEET must be able to ironize those things it cannot have, drawing out the contingency of the visible geek's success; the geek must be different from the incel through a performance of lesser femininity, lest he be identified as lucky or anything else outside of his control. Neither go so far as being the Chad,8 because Chad is not a victim. This constant self-surveillance leads to rigid identifications. Klaus Theweleit, whose opus Male Fantasies and its theorization of fascist male socialization has been much revisited in the past six years of post-Trump alt-right emergence, identifies the lack of a dialectic process of thinking as part of this problematic. Patriarchal subjectivity involves an inability to live with contradiction.

It is not only the (real) social conditions of the supposedly-victimized male that causes these problems. The Chad figure is constructed as a means to disavow the incel's own failure to live up to the patriarchal norms. This results in a split where resentment emerges and the male subject lacks integration. As Theweleit writes in the preface to Jacob Johanssen's Fantasy, Online Misogyny and the Manosphere: Male Bodies of Dis/Inhibition,

Who breathes and lives in our–roughly said–Western-democratic culture and its provided institutional conditions, is not exempt from such conditions through the expression: ‘I am different’, am no ‘perpetrator’, do not oppress women; am therefore no object of my study, am above my object (2021 xii).

Johanssen, writing about the manosphere, argues that they "cannot leave women behind," dependent on them as fantasies which they need to constantly discuss online. The distance remains, with the woman required to remain on a fantasy level, because a woman may eventually recognize them and validate their existence. Contra doomscrolling or lurking, where passive consumption might offer a sense of distance, the participation inherent in these discursive spaces allows one to occupy the victim position of the incel or the "edgelord," transgressing or subverting cultural norms. As media scholar Debbie Ging writes, this self-positioning as victim enables a "distance from hegemonic masculinity" while compounding existing hierarchies of inequality and power (2019, 651).9

Cyberlibertarianism

These two subject positions are also fixated on scientific rationality, and intersect through the political framework of cyberlibertarianism. Scholar of science and technology Langdon Winner described cyberlibertarianism, of which he first wrote in 1997, as "a collection of ideas that links ecstatic enthusiasm for electronically mediated forms of living with radical, right wing libertarian ideas about the proper definition of freedom, social life, economics, and politics" (Winner 1997, 14). Golumbia, building on Winner's definition, defines cyberlibertarianism as "a commitment to the belief that digital technology is or should be beyond the oversight of democratic governments" (Golumbia 2024 xxi). Golumbia traces its origins to the intersection of 1960s counterculture and Silicon Valley's military-industrial complex, drawing heavily on Fred Turner's seminal work From Counterculture to Cyberculture (Turner 2006). He extends Turner’s focus on the cultural transformation of Silicon Valley to its political continuities, arguing that figures like Stewart Brand and the Grateful Dead's John Perry Barlow, despite their countercultural aesthetics, actually promoted a fundamentally conservative, "pro-business, anti-government, Hayekian worldview" (Golumbia 2024, 67).

Cyberlibertarianism has been known under other guises, namely the "Californian ideology" (Barbrook and Cameron 1996) or "technolibertarianism" (Borsook 2001). These all describe a cultural and ideological fervor in Silicon Valley technology culture surrounding "a bizarre fusion of the cultural bohemianism of San Franciso" and technology that "promiscuously combines the free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies" (Barbrook and Cameron 1996, 1). The Californian ideology emerged from "a profound faith in the emancipatory potential of the new information technologies," promising that "in the digital utopia, everybody will be both hip and rich" (ibid.). The Californian ideology appears contradictory on its face, embracing both the "anti-corporate purity of the New Left" and the laissez-faire market politics of this Left's enemy; the practical, political mapping that emerges from this ambiguity depends on both a blindness-towards and a dependence-upon the social and racial polarisation of the society that bore it (Barbrook and Cameron 1996, 14).

Silicon Valley–and Palo Alto, California–looms heavily in this image. As authors such as Malcolm Harris and Paulina Borsook have shown, the area's attachment to American entrepreneurialism and the possibility of unfettered entrepreneurial success (through natural resource and labour exploitation) have defined the White settlement of the American west coast (Harris 2024; Borsook 2001). By the late 1990s, however, Silicon Valley was no economic or cultural outsider–it was a large enough economic presence to be a bubble that upon bursting lost over 1.7 trillion USD in market capitalization (Kleinbard 2000). Yet as Borsook observed, the objective conditions changed while the attitude remained the same: "while the post-1995 Internet boom in many ways has little to do with technology and a lot to do with speculation, and all the world wants to be what it thinks Silicon Valley is like, the ideology of freedom, revolution, and being outside the Establishment lingers on" (Borsook 2001). Suspicion towards public institutions and a belief in singular, technological innovation is upheld by the most visible Silicon Valley titans despite the close mutual ties between the U.S. government and this industry. Golumbia takes notes that, in addition to these intimate ties by the turn of the millennia, Silicon Valley's origins lie much closer to the government in defense contracting and eugenics research--William Shockley, who Golumbia writes "put the Silicon in Silicon Valley"—was a prominent racist (2024, 59).

Neoliberal statism

Winner also once asked "Do Artifacts Have Politics?," arguing that complex systems can contain political values (Winner 1980). Under such auspices, the Californian ideology has become inscribed into the products that it develops. As Nathan Schneider argues, this includes parallels with the habits of "homesteading–a legacy so familiar, nostalgic, and violent in the American West" (Schneider 2023, 4256). Almost all forms of major social media nudge users towards what he describes as a "politics of no politics" (ibid.), namely modes of community governance that lack even the most rudimentary structures of associational political life like boards, elections, term limits, and other constraints on power that fall under the democratic umbrella. Schneider argues that this constructs an "implicit feudalism" where governance over a community is "subject to a power structure that is apparently absolute and unalterable by those who lack such power" (Schneider 2022)–the apotheosis of the libertarian ideal as a freedom from interference on the exercise of power.

Both Silicon Valley and libertarianism worship the altar of selfhood and individualism in stark contrast to their material, historical, and political conditions. Borsook, writing in 2001, had already identified the paradox where "dot-com companies and their champions maintain a posture of fragility when they decry the notion of taxation on the Net…when none of them could have come into existence without the blessings of Big Capital and the fanciest of intellectual property law firms" (Borsook 2001). Barbrook and Cameron elaborate on this historical dependency, noting that "the iconic technologies of the computer and the Net could only have been invented with the aid of massive state subsidies and the enthusiastic involvement of amateurs" (Barbrook and Cameron 1996, 8).

Borsook describes technolibertarian culture as one that "romanticizes itself as outlaw when more than ever it's in bed with Wall Street and enamored of those who have elite establishment credentials" (Borsook 2001). Schneider connects these cultural patterns to broader political developments, arguing "the implicit politics of the network designs spread into mass politics" and that "the most novel, persistent kinds of spiritual-political imaginaries that have arisen on Californian tools are teaching other kinds of lessons, seeking other forms of salvation" beyond traditional democratic participation (Schneider 4262).

Within this framework, only the neoliberal subject–she of supposed infinite agency and rational calculation–can (and deserves to) succeed. The technolibertarian outlaw treats market success as proof of superior individual rationality and agency, making failure appear to be a personal moral deficiency rather than a systemic issue. To be anything but outlaw is to be irrational. Understood in its more specific enactments, libertarianism is simply theoretically-pure neoliberalism, as the latter is understood by its founders in the Austrian school of economics. Historian Philip Mirowski has shown how collectives such as the Mont Pelerin Society and the "Neoliberal Thought Collective" designed neoliberalism as not only a set of economic policies but a coherent and deliberately constructed worldview (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Mirowski 2002, 2013). This worldview includes, among its disdain for democracy, attempts to "punch holes in the territory of the nation-state, creating zones of exception with different laws and often no democratic oversight" (Slobodian 2023, 3).

The evolution of this anti-government perspective in Silicon Valley has matured into an alliance with more traditional, and embedded, notions of conservative liberty. Take, for example, the online journal Cato Unbound, published by the Cato Institute, a libertarian think-tank based in Washington, D.C. The journal describes itself as "a virtual trading floor in the intellectual marketplace, specializing in the exchange of big ideas" (Editors 2021). Eschewing "the trivial and ephemeral," the journal describes itself as "a hub for wide-ranging, open-ended conversation, where ideas will be advanced, challenged and refined in public view [sic]." No mention of libertarianism exists in the journal's About section, despite its nominal ties to the U.S.'s foremost libertarian think-tank. Rather, ideas themselves take the form of a market object–a capitalized, commodified object–measured by their given exchange value. This is a rote example of neoliberal logic extending beyond the economic, in this case to the ideal: all ideas, in this view, come to gain currency in a sort of (idealized) democratic Platonism.

Technological bros

This commodification of abstract ideas under market logic sets up identity itself as malleable and marketable. The same neoliberal logic that treats ideas as tradeable objects also enables the strategic repackaging of old masculine stereotypes as innovative tech culture, turning identity into another form of cultural currency to be algorithmically optimized and deployed. As Luciana Parisi writes in Reprogramming Decisionism:

Post-truth politics is the art of relying on affective predispositions or reactions already known or expressed to stage old beliefs as though they were new. Algorithms are said to capitalize on these predispositions or reactions recorded as random data traces left when we choose this or that music track, this or that pair of shorts, this or that movie streaming website (Parisi 2017)

This desire to be a man is a desire to emulate particular images invested in the social field with power and money. The irony, of course, is that the "nerds" that have been faced with the possibility of venging themselves are, in reality, the ones now in power. This vengeance restages the old in the new, an attempt to repeat according to an image of masculinity that is more ideological than grounded in reality (which is why it is practiced on the level of the image or public presentation, the male agent self-objectified, rather than in practice). As Paul Edwards described it in the early 1990s, "computer work remains a largely male world, one in which women are perceived as unprepared, alien, or unwilling participants" (Edwards 1990, 103). The "syllogistic, quasi-mathematical logic and formal gaming" of computational thought are routinely associated with masculinity, "fitting well with a conception of knowledge as an objective, achieved state rather than an ongoing, intersubjective process and with a morality built on abstract principles rather than shifting, contextually specific, emotionally complex relationships" (107). The very possibility of treating the self-image (and the world at large) as something divorced from the outside world is an extension of the computer's "simulated world, entirely within the machine itself, that does not depend on instrumental effectiveness"–the simulated world of mastery over the computer "contains its own worlds in miniature" (109).

Detachment from material consequences creates the conditions for a performative masculinity that can maintain ironic distance from its own claims to power. This abjection inheres in irony, a key site of masculinity in the digital age. DOGE was not the only late-2010s Reddit lingo that Elon Musk adopted after Trump's second election. Musk also claimed to be opening an AI game studio to "make games great again," a riff on Trump's slogan to "Make America Great Again" (Shutler 2024). On the face of it, this seems to be juvenile memery designed to signify belonging to a certain crowd of geek masculinity that Musk always catered to publicly. These jokes may have ingratiated Musk to the #gamergate crowd during its heyday, but their continued usage in 2024 prompts the question: is it cringeworthy? If so, is it intentionally cringeworthy? What is the difference? For something to be intentionally cringe is a paradox; one could argue for its impossibility. To cringe is to express hostility against others and the form of life they exhibit; in cringing, we take social distance from the cringee, we understand the social norm that the cringee is breaking–the cringee has "committed a loathsome mistake" (Spiegel 2023). Intention is the realm of action, of expression; cringe is the (seeming) rejection of that expression. To call things cringe was, at one point in time, the domain of knowingness for the alt-right–the dichotomy of "based" and "cringe" described an "overly-sincere naïveté or lack of familiarity with the protocols and language of the terminally online" (Sloan 2022).

In other words, intentionally cringe is ironic, leading us to another tentpole of this dissertation: the irony at the core of alt-right social. The deliberate performance of naivety demonstrates sophisticated cultural knowledge—one must thoroughly understand hegemonic digital behaviours to successfully mimic their violation. The apparent lack of awareness signals hyper-awareness, allowing practitioners to maintain plausible deniability while signaling their membership in the knowing in-group. It is what fuels the identification with the desire of the other, what leads to the defanging of theory in its application for (vile) ends. Media scholar Leif Weatherby, writing about the platformed interplay of irony on the alt-right, claims that irony leaves media messages open for resignification. Inflected through computer code and platform, irony is not just a playful utterance as it might have once been under the neoliberal speech regime. Instead, as Weatherby argues, the ironic stance that emerged in the alt-right after 2016 is an integral part of the movement's political development: it allows for a form of doublespeak, with Trump as master of a theory of irony:

Every time Trump denies something about collusion or says something about the coal industry that’s patently false, he’s exploiting the difference between two sets of truth-valuations that conflict with one another (e.g. racism and pacifism). That splits his audience—something that the splitting of the message in irony allows—and works both to fight his “enemies” and to build solidarity in his base. Trump has changed the media’s overall expression, making not his statements but the very relation between content and platform ironic (Weatherby 2019)

Quoting Friedrich Schlegel, Weatherby writes that irony serves to "reinforce or sharpen some message by means of the reflexivity of language: by contradicting the point, it calls it that much more vividly to mind" (Weatherby 2019). Irony is a perverse posture in the realm of performative speech, signifying a disavowal of traditional visions of masculinity, presenting instead in an inverted form. In other words, to be a male mired in performing masculinity through irony is to see the world in the same Chad-Incel binary that posits masculinity as two options, two ways of either becoming or not quite becoming. This inverted male gazer is caught in an imaginary realm of possible social belonging–the male body, a set of performative masculine behaviours, the sensation of traditional gender roles or categories.

Perverted knowledge, then, is at its core a knowledge that comes from outside: one that holds its object in a fetishized, reified position. It represents an unwillingness to engage with the Other in the terms of the Other. Rather than understanding through sustained engagement or dialectical encounter, perverted knowledge maintains a fundamental distance that both preserves and fuels the knower's position of mastery. The Other must remain legible only within the pervert's own symbolic framework, never as a subject with agency that might disrupt or redefine the terms of the relationship. This is why perverted knowledge thrives on data extraction rather than dialogue, on algorithmic prediction rather than encounter. It seeks to know without being known, to see (and, in turn, act) invisibly. It is only from the standpoint of the pervert that the masculine body can continue the position of glamorous self-creation, which can only occur in a culture still patriarchal, still rewarding of the king-philosoher figure so aptly displayed by Silicon Valley titans in command of power over the means of computation (of production and wealth and control). Irony also characterizes the relationship between these masculine-coded desires for power and their anti-social character. Silicon Valley titans require a seastead or the bunker to hide in from the apocalypse engineered by their own dreams and extensions of the infinite power of computing–the extraction and exploitation of the earth's natural resources (Crawford 2021), discriminatory algorithms that propagate racism (Noble 2018), and contemporary surveillance structures coercing and moderating human action (Browne 2015).

Thus acting “as-if” is a core feature of this mode of masculinity; it is a technicalization of the masculine body. This extends from masculinity as an axiom. In the patriarchal mode, a world without women is a world of frustrated sexual desire. As Johanssen writes, the "quantum of pleasure that was amplified but also problematically lived with in the original sexual revolution and somewhat continued, perhaps differently channelled, by our contemporary age, is desired by those who have not had it, or have not had enough of it, or have had it only with themselves or in the virtual realm: an army of machine-like, technosexual, algorithmic men" (Johanssen 2021, 198). This conception of the technical "as-if" man is the embodiment of a particular form of male subjectivity tied to programming cultures. It is, necessarily, not the body driven by desire; as a technosexual male body and neoliberal subject sine qua non, the male subject here both fears his own desires and fiercely guards them as integral to his self-concept.

To wit: on 10 January 2025, the Joe Rogan Experience published a two-hour, 50-minute interview with Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg. In the interview, Zuckerberg referred to the corporate world as "culturally neutered" and "emasculated," and lamented that contemporary corporate culture was moving away from its "masculine energy" (Factora 2025). He focused on hanging out with male friends and masculine bonding, talking about the benefits of martial arts as a time to just "wail" on his friends.10 He sits at Rogan's microphone with a mullet and a dog tag. The tech bro showed up as a bro. In that sense, he was simply following the imperative of the Silicon Valley king-philosopher to make themselves into an object of desire. Draw out competition among businesses, startups, the imaginary drama of venture capitalist funding. To make oneself into a king-philosopher is to make oneself into a (masculine) object of (masculine) desire. As a technosexual subject, he reduces the entire social field by attributing it his own desires. There is an attempt to disavow the version that just as easily could have ended up with "no GF" save for the accident of birth. The inverted version of this masculine ploy is the NEET, he who mimics the same latent attitudes, becomes a willing subject of the drama of Silicon Valley titan becoming. In this context, there appears to be two subject positions to occupy. One is a sort of instrumentalist view of the world, where power is useful purely for power's sake (this seems to be what has been taken up by those tech leaders who attached themselves to Trump's side). Or one can descend into fundamentalism (of gender, of race, of essentially Christian or white supremacist categories). What these two positions share is the belief that one can craft oneself into a subject like this in the first place, and this mastery over self is tied to the discrete understanding of the world. In The Cultural Logic of Computation, David Golumbia ties this rejection of the world to a "computationalist" worldview:

Computationalism, when harnessed by the power of State philosophy, underwrites an extremely specific and contemporary notion of the self that is tied closely to the kind of subjectivity displayed by powerful leaders in our society. Instrumentalist reason is now the highest form of reason; means are everything, because the ends will be taken care of by themselves (by market-driven Providence, manifest in a technological nature). The self is not part of the world, but must attain mastery over it; subjects who cannot attain mastery have earned their almost-inevitable fate (Golumbia 2009, 76).

This is a dream of unlimited power through the possibility of mastery, one that is uniquely afforded to the linear, causal possibilities of self-creation: the subjectivity on display by a "powerful leader" (which is more of an imaginary construct than a being ever met in relation) is one where power over oneself–sovereignty–is placed before the conceptual and material frameworks that might justify it. As Golumbia writes, submitting something to computation pushes details upwards towards the sovereign, which gatekeeps user control to said aspects of existence according to its own criteria (11). The computer is a proxy for an idealised form of rationality: as historian Martin Davis writes, the computer is a "full-blown wish for the elimination of everything that is imprecise or ambiguous in human social practice" (qtd. in Golumbia 2009, 15). Computationalism, having harnessed state philosophy, extends beyond the binary operations of its material applications into a means for human subjects to claim mastery. As queer studies scholar Julietta Singh writes, a colonial master "understands his superiority over others by virtue of his ability to have conquered them materially and by his insistence on the supremacy of his practices and worldviews over theirs, which renders 'legitimate' the forceful imposition of his worldviews" (Singh 2018, 7).

I follow Singh by extending her analysis of mastery beyond colonization towards an understanding of computationalism as a mode that, like the colonial master Singh describes, "invariably and relentlessly reaches toward the indiscriminate control over something," for the "full submission of an object–or something objectified–whether it be external or internal to oneself" (10). Under these discourses of mastery and of computationalism, access to the "code" of existing as a neoliberal self (as a way of relating to others) manifests in a "partial destruction of the object that the would-be master yearns to govern over completely" (ibid.). The world becomes an object to be submitted to the self of the computationalist view. This objectification of the world leaves the master alienated, outside the social and unable to view the social as a possible place to belong. Mastery fractures its object. I investigate cognitive mastery under computationalism in the second chapter of this dissertation through Silicon Valley's adoption of "first principles" epistemology. The appeal of a theory or an axiom, a first principle, is this exact form of distance from the object: the axiom can always be returned to as a form of necessary legislation or natural law to keep the object split from the processes of everyday life. This is, as Singh discusses, a form of self-maiming: the denial of the master's own dependence on other bodies.

The computationalist view, then, presupposes a mode of organizing and exerting power that is similar to the causal pleasure or jouissance11 of execution and of code. The computationalist view of the world adopts the conflation of word with result that is endemic, as Chun argues, to software (Chun 2008). Mastery over an object turns the master into the position of one who can execute, and in software contexts, this execution can occur on the level of the spoken or linguistic (Galloway 2004, 165). In this sense, then, the mastered object is the object that is already known. When the object is already known, the affective orientation towards it takes on a fractured or programmatic hue.

Chapter summaries

Dr. Peterson and autogenetic sovereignty

The first chapter examines Canadian psychologist and public intellectual Jordan Peterson as an embodiment of this mode of computationalist expertise, and an example of its extension beyond computer programming. Peterson is a figure who claims to know all. He in turn prefigures and guides an audience yearning for clarity amid perceived cultural chaos. While Peterson is not literally a computer programmer, his intellectual method mirrors computational logic in its drive to reduce complex social phenomena to programmable rules and universal algorithms. His approach treats human behavior as subject to the same deterministic patterns that govern code execution, transforming messy social realities into clean, predictable systems that can be optimized and controlled. This sovereign status rests on his ostensible possession of transcendent "truths": the naturalized hierarchies he derives from lobster neuroscience to justify "winner-take-all" social orders, or his elevation of Price's and Pareto's laws into universal human principles. Such appeals to biological essentialism and purported “laws” transform complex social dynamics into axiomatic truths, bypassing critical inquiry and reifying dominance hierarchies. In presenting himself as an authority that transcends ideology, Peterson seeks to embody (and has an intellectual relationship with, under another name) what Judith Butler calls “autogenetic sovereignty”—the idea that one can create oneself ex nihilo, the sole responsible party for one's own being and action, which releases them from social or institutional constraints. This illusory self-generation depends on suppressing the social and discursive conditions that produce any sovereign claim. This sovereign, however, is always incomplete—its “flight” from existing structures fails to secure a stable ground, necessitating repeated returns to reaffirm its authority.

Alt-right intellectualism

Peterson's embodiment of the autogenetic sovereign through his relationship to expertise and intellect finds expression among his associates in the "intellectual dark web," a group of thinkers who posit rational, scientific knowledge (biology, evolutionary psychology) as transcending ideology. While this rationality operates as deeply ideological—grounded in patriarchal and white supremacist assumptions—the IDW champions the "red pill" idea that liberal multiculturalism leads directly to totalitarian control. The social critique embedded in the red pill mirrors critiques from continental social theory of the late 20th century, raising crucial questions about how the IDW distinguishes its own embrace of "identity" from leftist identity politics. Whereas early identity politics sought solidarity among marginalized groups, the alt-right’s appropriation uses identity as a claim of victimhood by white men perceiving a loss of power. Groups like Identity Evropa and the Identitarian Bloc contend that white identity is under siege, using the language of “rights” and “liberation” to justify racist and sexist agendas. This identification with historically-oppressed minority groups displaces culpability and fosters resentment rather than solidarity—a reactionary form of identity that weaponizes grievance. This mimicry is the result of a paranoid vision of oppression, which I read through Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s distinction between paranoid and reparative reading. Paranoid reading seeks to expose hidden structures—treating knowledge as a weapon—yet can become stultifying, ignoring the “affective motive” and reducing discourse to exposure rather than understanding. IDW discourse exemplifies this paranoid reading: constant emphasis on exposing “cultural Marxism” or “postmodernists” as conspiratorial forces, diverting attention from structural critique to ideological witch-hunts. This approach cultivates a “paranoiac” masculinity, where fear of cultural decline is projected onto scapegoated Others, reinforcing reactionary cycles rather than enabling critical change. The spectacle of the “red pill” and the sovereign public intellectual thus represent a reactionary retreat from complexity—a quest for authoritative narratives that deny uncertainty and disavow the very social processes by which knowledge and meaning are negotiated. The IDW’s spectacle of expertise and “anti-hegemonic” rebellion in digital spaces ultimately reinforces traditional hierarchies. Their rhetoric, while framed as transgressive, recirculates patriarchal, white supremacist logics under a veneer of rationality. The true spectacle is not dialectical exchange but rather the perpetual reaffirmation of established power structures, mediated by algorithmic attention economies that commodify “rebellion” itself.

First principles epistemology

The third chapter moves from the ideological entrepreneurs of the alt-right to their more traditionally business-minded brethren in Silicon Valley. Specifically, it investigates the rise of "first principles" thinking in Silicon Valley. Pushed by PayPal co-founder and venture capitalist Peter Thiel, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, and Musk, the idea behind "first principles" is to make business decisions as if the problem were a simple math equation. Couching this in terms of business logic, the principle of first principles is fundamentally related to the fixations on oneness and logic (in short, on the logos) that the previous chapters investigate. First principles operates as a what Smith and Burrows call a "computationalist ontology," whose method of analysis involves applying logical reasoning to historical systems (Smith and Burrows 2021, 148). Historically, first principles thought is linked to Enlightenment ideals and figures like the "prime mover" or sovereign, suggesting a desire for a singular, authoritative source of order. This chapter shows first principles to be a fundamentally anti-social ontology, specifically posited against the demos and often manifesting in the ridiculous "exit" fantasies of Silicon Valley titans like seasteading or bunker building. Under first principles thought, society is a crowd whose knowledge gets in the way of development of the new philosopher-king, who views himself as a sovereign-in-waiting. The escapist technofantasies of Silicon Valley titans become clearer in this regard: the sovereign, as the "first principle" of selfhood, must necessarily see any sustained presence of the other as a threat, for they had no hand in their creation. It is an algorithm of the self (-sovereign) that attempts to control against the diffusion of digitality's hall of mirrors.

René Girard and the neoliberal politics of envy

Historian and philosopher of science Justin Smith-Ruiu claims that while Jordan Peterson is often considered "a dumb person's idea of what a smart person is like," the French anthropologist René Girard is "a practically-minded person's idea of what a theorist is like" (Smith-Ruiu 2021). Girard has captured the popular imagination in Silicon Valley with a theory of human science in the vein of natural science that purpots to explain the entirety of social interaction and historical development. Girard theorizes that all desire is mimetic, copied from others for whom we want to be. This naturally leads to the emergence of envy, that, if unchecked, would lead to societal collapse. Girard argues this collapse is resolved through the scapegoat mechanism: a collective antagonism directed at a single victim figure. This mechanism is presented as the foundation of mythology, religion, and social order, providing a temporary release of tension and restoring illusory unity.

Thiel regularly references Girard in his writings and public appearances, and worked with him at the end of the latter's life to promote and publish his work. This chapter takes this relationship as a starting point to examine the instrumentalization of theory and its making-technical. While Girard viewed his theory as a universal explanation, his discomfort with academic "theory" and his focus on its utility for uncovering "truth" aligns with a desire for knowledge as a tool for execution rather than open-ended inquiry.

The Silicon Valley appropriation of Girardian theory thus reveals the deeper anxieties underlying computationalist masculinity: the terror of being revealed as imitative rather than original, dependent rather than sovereign. By instrumentalizing Girard's insights into scapegoating and mimetic desire, figures like Thiel attempt to position themselves outside the very social processes that produced them, wielding theory as a weapon against the acknowledgment of their own contingency. The fear of mimesis becomes, paradoxically, the mimetic foundation of Silicon Valley's reactionary politics, where the supposed philosopher-kings of the digital age must constantly perform their difference from the masses whose desires they have internalized and whose approval they desperately seek.

Praxeology

This is followed by a brief excursus on the historical roots of first principles thought, looking at its progenitors in the Austrian school of economics, particularly the work of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Praxeology is the "action axiom," the fundamental principle that individuals engage in purposeful action, and from which the only legitimate and verifiable economic and social laws might be logically deduced. The Austrian school's self-understanding as an "extraordinary science" in opposition to mainstream, empirical, and macroeconomic analysis, is intimately tied up with this possibility of singular, axiomatic observation. This leads to an anti-social ontology that minimizes or excludes the influence of social structures, history, and relationality, reducing complex phenomena to mechanical calculations based on individual choices. I look at the Austrian School's self-narrative of victimhood, feeling marginalized by mainstream economics, and highlights von Mises' explicit claim that his economic ideas are necessary to preserve "modern civilization as developed by the white peoples" (Von Mises 1996, 10). Praxeology's axiomatic method is described as amenable to computational or algorithmic logic, treating social processes as solvable problems and reinforcing hierarchical views of intelligence and power.

Conclusion

The threads examined throughout this introduction—from DOGE's spectacular failures to the red pill's paranoid epistemology, from the manosphere's victimhood narratives to Silicon Valley's first principles fantasies—converge around the emergence of a computationalist masculinity that seeks to master the social world by denying its own social constitution. This dissertation argues that the reactionary politics of the red pill represent not merely a political backlash but a deeper crisis where the promise of digital technology to transcend material constraints has instead produced new forms of alienation and domination. The autogenetic sovereign, the red-pilled intellectual, and the first principles entrepreneur are the logical endpoints of a neoliberal order that demands infinite self-creation while systematically destroying the social conditions for freedom and genuine self-determination. By tracing these formations across their ideological, cultural, and technological manifestations, I reveal how computational logics have become the privileged grammar for a reactionary masculinity that can only sustain itself through the perpetual reproduction of its own victimhood.

Notes

  1. DOGE was named after a meme of a Shiba Inu dog from 2013. DOGE was tasked with reducing the "bloat" of government spending and end the "tyranny of the bureaucracy" (Allyn 2025).

  2. This reflected his various attempts to influence public discourse with some moral valence. He viewed his purchase of X (formerly Twitter) as a claim in the social process, and positioned it as an attempt to "help humanity, whom I love" (Musk 2022). Never mind the repeated keels to free speech, loosening of hate speech restrictions, banning of accounts critical of Musk, and weakening of functions like blocking and muting originally designed to protect users from harassment (Mann, Mark, and Edmonds 2024). The runway these functions clear is the claim to serve freedom of speech. This liberty of speech is almost always a freedom to speak without repercussion, save for criticism of Musk.

  3. The redpill critique also underlies Žižek's Pervert's Guide to Cinema, one of his more accessible critical pieces. Žižek acknowledges the overlaps of Lacanian conceptions of the real and redpill conspiracies, especially when he refers to Donald Trump as the "quintessential postmodern candidate" (Žižek 2020).

  4. At the time of this expression in the film, he does not have any bubble gum (Carpenter 1989).

  5. Lilly Wachowski was misquoted in 2020 claiming that the red pill was intended as a metaphor for gender identity, later clarifying that the allegory was latent but not explicitly intended (Sanders 2023).

  6. Contra Louis Althusser's interpretation of ideology critique, where ideological worldviews are gained through how certain social practices and institutions "interpellate" their subjects (Althusser 2014).

  7. Some have argued (Massanari 2017; Copeland 2024) that the allure of this reactionary posture is part of the core infrastructure of digital spaces.

  8. "Chad" is a name that refers to the opposite of an incel–sexually active, genetically superior, and successful in life and love.

  9. Some have argued (Massanari 2017; Copeland 2024) that the allure of this reactionary posture is part of the core infrastructure of digital spaces.

  10. He found his boy’s club.

  11. A term of art in Lacanian psychoanalysis, jouissance roughly translates into "enjoyment" in English but has no direct analogue. Jouissance in French connotes the French verb jouir, which directly translates to "come" and means to orgasm. Jouissance is a form of surplus pleasure that emerges from moments that give pleasure without drawing a person in to the symbolic order (Oxford English Dictionary 2023).

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